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Social protection in Europe 1999 — Executive summary 
Social protection in Europe 1999 
— Executive summary 
This is the first report following the European Commission proposal in July 1999 to set up a con-
certed strategy for modernising social protection 
(COM(1999) 347), an initiative that should be seen in 
the context of continuing developments in the political, 
legal, economic and social framework within which 
social protection policy operates, both at the Member 
State and European Union level. Rapid progress towards 
full economic and monetary union, the concerted 
employment strategy and Union enlargement have sig-
nificant implications for social protection and make it 
increasingly a matter of common concern for Member 
States and, therefore, a matter for closer cooperation at 
the European level. 
The responsibility for organising and financing social 
protection lies with Member States. However, the instru-
ments of EU policy coordination and surveillance, such 
as the broad economic policy guidelines and the stabili-
ty and growth pact, constitute broad frameworks also for 
social protection and employment policies by setting 
targets for budgetary consolidation and providing gui-
delines for public policies. The new policy-
oriented initiative of social policies, which takes into 
account the changing economic context and the need for 
overall policy coordination, aims at strengthening the 
cooperation in this area in parallel with, and comple-
mentary to, the employment process. The 1999 commu-
nication identified four broad objectives to which social 
protection systems should respond, i.e.: 
— to make work pay and provide secure income; 
— to make pensions safe and pension systems sustainable; 
— to promote social inclusion; and 
— to ensure high quality and sustainable health care. 
Within the overall framework, a new social protection 
report will assume a key role in monitoring recent de-
velopments and thereby in assisting Member States in 
policy deliberations. In order to be able to keep track of 
the reforms taking place in national systems, the 
Commission proposes to publish the report annually in 
future, in a form still to be discussed with Member 
States. The present report, in consequence, should be 
seen as an intermediary one. Nevertheless, it focuses on 
the four broad key objectives mentioned above. 
The report reviews recent developments in social pro-
tection expenditure and receipts and, as such, updates 
previous reports. The limitations for policy analysis of 
the data currently available at the European level, from 
Esspros (the European System of Integrated Social 
Protection Statistics) and the new European Community 
Household Panel (ECHP), are also discussed. The report 
points to the need for improved and, above all, more 
timely data if developments in social protection policies 
are to be analysed properly in the future. 
Gender issues are addressed as an important issue which 
cuts across all four objectives, and the report emphasises 
the need for social protection systems to respond better 
to changing gender realities, particularly the need to 
support increased participation of women in the work-
force. The report also examines, for the first time, social 
protection systems and the main developments in these 
in recent years in the central and eastern European coun-
tries which have applied to join the European Union. 
The report, in addition, contains new empirical findings 
based on results from the first two waves of the ECHP 
of what men and women actually received in 1993-94 
when they were unemployed compared with their take-
home pay when they were working. These findings, 
which aim at contributing to the ongoing debate on the 
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financial disincentives to work, should be interpreted 
with some caution, compared with evidence from other 
studies and will need to be further investigated as data 
from new waves become available for analysis. 
To make work pay and provide 
secure income 
Aprominent feature of policy across the Union in the past few years has been a widespread re-examina-
tion of conditions for benefit payment. As a result, 
measures have been taken in many Member States to 
tighten the qualifying conditions for eligibility to bene-
fits and to increase the activation of the unemployed to 
find a job. Measures have not been confined to unem-
ployment benefits. In particular, changes have also been 
applied to disability and early retirement schemes, 
which had come to be used extensively as effective sub-
stitutes for unemployment compensation in a number of 
countries. There have also been extensions of these 
schemes in the countries with the least generous systems. 
In order to increase the flexibility between labour force 
participation and retirement, several countries have 
increased the scope for more flexible retirement, such as 
through part-time retirement schemes. Changes in bene-
fit systems have also been combined in some countries 
with attempts to make work more rewarding financially 
by introducing measures to increase the net income of 
those taking up a job, both through allowing them to 
continue to receive some support after they begin to 
work and by extending in-work benefits. 
The report examines changes in family-related benefits, one 
of the major aims of which is to provide both financial and 
practical support to men and women with children in bal-
ancing their professional and family responsibilities. The 
provision of family-related support facilities is also a neces-
sary complement to active labour market measures. Support 
services for child care and for people with disabilities or 
who aie elderly and frail are of the utmost importance for 
improving the income security of people with families, 
especially women. Availability of child-care support has 
been increased in recent years in a number of Member 
States, especially in those where it has been limited, while 
parental leave entitlement has been raised throughout the 
Union, which is particularly important to enable people with 
young children to pursue working careers and to facilitate 
the new gender balance in the labour market. 
To make pensions safe and pen-
sion systems sustainable 
The significant growth in the number of people above retirement age in all Member States in 10 to 
15 years time has focused attention everywhere on the 
consequences of this for old-age pension systems. A new 
balance is being sought between the aim of providing 
sufficient and safe income to the elderly and that of ma-
king systems sustainable. While the measures intro-
duced differ in detail, in practice their common empha-
sis is on limiting the future transfers which will be nec-
essary, particularly those which governments are 
responsible for, or increasing the finance available. They 
include increasing the official age of retirement or the 
number of years of contributions required to qualify for a 
full pension, reducing the pension paid in relation to past 
earnings, or relating it more closely to contributions, and 
creating special funds to finance future transfers. The lat-
ter amounts to adding beside existing 'pay-as-you-go' sy-
stems, where present payments are financed from present 
contributions, 'funded' ones where present contributions 
are fixed in relation to future liabilities. 
To promote social inclusion 
Amajor feature of social policy in recent years has been the emphasis on active and preventive mea-
sures, as well as adapting social benefit systems to make 
work pay, designed to get men and women into work. 
This has been motivated, on the one hand, by the aim of 
increasing the numbers contributing to the generation of 
income rather than being supported by that produced by 
others, and on the other hand, by the aim of reducing 
dependency and social exclusion. Although the main 
emphasis is on employment, since it is recognised that 
having a stable job is an important condition for social 
inclusion, it is also recognised that there are other 
aspects to be addressed if social exclusion is to be 
tackled effectively. These include access to education 
and vocational training, decent housing and sufficient 
levels of health care and social services. In several 
countries, recent measures have actually been taken to 
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ensure better access to health care to low income house-
holds. In practice, despite the emphasis on active mea-
sures throughout the 1990s, there has been relatively lit-
tle shift in actual spending from passive to active mea-
sures. The amount spent on active programmes per 
person unemployed was the same in 1998 in relation to 
GDP as in 1994 and less than in 1990. This indicates that 
there is still scope to extend opportunities to benefit 
from active measures, especially towards the most dis-
advantaged groups. 
To ensure high quality and 
sustainable health care 
The pressure on social protection systems across the Union has manifested itself in a growing need 
for health care, reinforced by the effect of rising real 
income and advances in the range of treatment which 
can be provided in pushing up demand, and so putting 
substantial upward pressure on expenditure. The com-
mon response of governments has been to seek to limit 
the growth of spending and its effect on public bud-
gets, whilst seeking to maintain the quality of service 
and access to care. This has naturally led to a focus on 
ways of increasing productivity or improving cost 
effectiveness. 
All European social protection systems have to fulfil 
common broad objectives. They also face common 
challenges and need to be reformed to adjust to them. 
This report is a contribution to support the exchange of 
experiences and the ongoing debates on modernising 
and improving social protection systems, and thus 
complements the recent 1999 Employment in Europe 
report. The new political, legal and economic develop-
ments at EU level have increased the need for econom-
ic and structural policies to interact and reinforce one 
another in order to support the European social model. 
In this framework, social protection systems, together 
with employment policies, should act as key productive 
elements in order to support economic progress, a 
high level of social protection and to maintain social 
cohesion. 
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The European Commission has launched a new initiative in 
relation to social protection by sug-
gesting 'a concerted strategy for 
modernising social protection' (')· 
Systems of social protection through-
out the Union are undergoing a 
process of change in response to the 
major demographic, economic and 
social developments which have 
occurred in recent years in all 
Member States. These pose new chal-
lenges to governments in meeting the 
twin objectives of providing an 
extensive and high level of assistance 
to people in need of support and of 
ensuring that their economies remain 
competitive and capable of generat-
ing sustained, and sustainable, 
improvements in living standards and 
a high rate of net job creation. 
There is a variety of reasons for the 
Commission to launch a new initia-
tive now: the completion of EMU 
through the establishment of a sin-
gle currency, including the require-
ments for budgetary discipline and 
sound public finances, the entering 
into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, 
putting the European employment 
strategy and the fight against social 
(') 'A concerted strategy for modernising 
social protection' (COM(1999) 347). 
exclusion on a new legal basis, and 
the intensive preparations for Union 
enlargement. These change the poli-
tical, legal, economic and social 
framework within which social pro-
tection policy operates at both 
Member State and Union level and 
mean that developments in systems 
are a matter of common concern, 
requiring closer cooperation be-
tween Member States. 
The aim of this new, policy-orient-
ed, initiative is to strengthen cooper-
ation in this area in parallel with, 
and complementary to, the process 
in respect of employment. Policies 
on social protection are a key 
adjunct to the European employ-
ment strategy and a major means of 
helping Member States to pursue the 
measures set out in the employment 
guidelines which are the practical 
manifestation of the strategy. A 
number of the 1999 guidelines 
entail, either explicitly or implicitly, 
changes to systems of social protec-
tion and the Commission's propo-
sals for the guidelines for 2000 
retain or reinforce this approach. 
The communication identifies four 
key objectives, designed both to 
secure a high level of social protec-
tion which people in the Union can 
count on when they are in need and 
to reinforce the economic and 
employment strategy. They are: 
— to make work pay and provide 
secure income; 
— to make pensions safe and pen-
sion systems sustainable; 
— to promote social inclusion; and 
— to ensure high quality and sus-
tainable health care. 
The present report focuses on 
changes in systems of social protec-
tion which have either been made in 
the past two or three years or which 
are in the process of being intro-
duced, in the light of these broad 
objectives, and which are central to 
the modernisation of social protec-
tion systems. As such, it updates the 
analysis contained in the previous 
three Social protection in Europe 
reports (for 1993, 1995 and 1997). 
At the same time, the report devotes 
some attention to financial aspects, 
such as the level, growth and struc-
ture of expenditure on social protec-
tion, the different sources of revenue 
and the interlinkages between finan-
cing social protection and employ-
ment policy, as well as the level of 
benefits and incentives to work. 
Gender issues, as made clear in the 
communication, cut across all four 
objectives, and the present report 
emphasises the need for social pro-
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tection systems to respond better to 
changing gender realities, particu-
larly the need to support the partici-
pation of women in the workforce. 
In addition, the report, for the first 
time, examines social protection 
systems in central and eastern 
European countries (CEECs) and 
recent developments in these. 
Outline 
of the report 
The present report summarises the main findings of the full 
'Report of the Commission services'. 
The report first examines the princi-
pal demographic, economic and 
social developments which shape 
both the context within which social 
protection systems operate across 
the EU and the demands made upon 
them (Chapter 1 of the full report). 
Secondly, it analyses the scale of 
expenditure on social protection in 
the different Member States, its 
composition and the changes which 
have occurred over the 1990s 
(Chapter 3 of the full report). 
Thirdly, it examines the relative 
importance of different sources of 
finance for spending and the extent to 
which they have altered during this 
period (Chapter 3 of the full report). 
Fourthly, it reviews more largely the 
changes which have been made to 
systems of social protection across 
the Union over the past two or three 
years in relation to the key objec-
tives set out in the Commission 
communication. It focuses, in par-
ticular, on those which are designed 
to support the employment strategy, 
to reduce the number of people 
dependent on benefits and to expand 
the number in work. It also exam-
ines the evidence on the level of 
unemployment benefits relative to 
earnings from work and assesses the 
extent of any financial disincentive 
which this may create for those not 
actively looking for a job (in 
Chapters 2 and 4 of the full report). 
Fifthly, it gives an overview of 
developments in social protection 
systems in candidate CEECs, draw-
ing on recently completed studies 
carried out under the PHARE con-
sensus programme (Chapter 5 of the 
full report.) 
The changing context of social protection systems 
1. The changing context 
of social protection systems 
The major demographic, eco-nomic and social changes over 
the past 20 to 25 years across the 
Union have had profound implica-
tions for social protection systems 
and will continue to do so in future 
years. Four major trends are of 
particular importance: the ageing of 
the population in all Member States 
and the prospective increase in the 
rate of growth in the number of 
elderly people from 2010 onwards; 
the growing participation of women 
in the labour force and the changing 
gender balance; the persistence of 
long-term unemployment, especial-
ly among older workers, and the 
trend towards earlier retirement; and 
the increase in the number of house-
holds in relation to the growth of 
population, with the rise of people 
living on their own and of house-
holds with no one in work. 
These trends, moreover, are occur-
ring in a context of increasing 
globalisation and a faster pace of 
technical advance, which have accel-
erated the speed of structural change 
in the economy, put greater pressure 
on businesses and workers alike to 
adapt to changing market circum-
stances and new methods of working, 
and reduced the ability of govern-
ments to manage economic develop-
ments. At the same time, they have 
increased the importance of secur-
ing financial stability and have, 
therefore, limited the scale of gov-
ernment borrowing and constrained 
the growth of public expenditure. 
Public policies are directly affected 
by fiscal consolidation required by 
the stability and growth pact, as well 
as by the broad economic policy 
guidelines which provide a frame-
work for reforming public policies 
in line with broader objectives, in 
particular, in support of employment 
and job creation. These evolutions 
have concentrated policy attention 
on social protection, which repre-
sents a large component of overall 
spending. 
Demographic trends: 
the implications 
of an ageing 
population 
The growth in the number of people of 65 and over is set to 
accelerate over the next 10 to 15 
years as the post-war baby boom 
generation reaches its late sixties, 
so imposing increased pressure on 
pension systems. At the same time, 
the even larger expansion in the 
number of people of 75 and over 
will increase demand for long-term 
care markedly, just when increased 
female participation in the work-
force is also likely to reduce the 
available pool of unpaid family 
carers. 
Whereas, at present, there is on aver-
age in the Union, one person aged 
65 or over for every four people of 
working age (the old-age dependen-
cy ratio), this is projected to rise to 
just under one in three by 2020 and 
to almost one in two by 2040. In 
contrast to the past, this growth in 
the old-age dependency ratio is un-
likely to be offset very much by the 
continued decline in the number of 
children and young people under 15, 
which is forecast to decline more 
slowly than the number of people of 
working age. The overall dependen-
cy ratio, which has fallen slightly in 
the Union over the past 20 years, is 
projected to recover by 2010 and 
then increase markedly, from its 
present ratio of 5 people aged under 
15 or 65 and over per 10 of working 
age, to 6 per 10 by 2025 and 7 per 
10 by 2040. 
These prospective increases in 
dependency ratios, which are the 
conventional way of assessing the 
implications of demographic trends, 
are liable, however, to give a mis-
leading impression of the scale of 
the problem which they pose for 
systems of social protection and of 
the most appropriate policy res-
ponse to them. So far, attention in 
most Member States has focused on 
curbing the growth of pension com-
mitments and trying to ensure that 
there will be sufficient funds avail-
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able to effect the transfers involved. 
While this is important, it is equally 
important to take account of the fact 
that a large proportion of people of 
working age are not, in practice, in 
employment and, therefore, play no 
role in generating the income from 
which pensions for those in retire-
ment have to come. Instead, they 
rely, like those of 65 and over, on 
support from those who are working. 
In other words, any assessment of 
the prospective difficulties of fund-
ing social transfers in future years 
has to distinguish between the 
potential workforce — those aged 
15 to 64 — and the actual people in 
employment. 
In 1998, only just over 60 % of the 
working-age population were in 
paid employment. The rest were 
either unemployed (around 7 %) or 
(the great majority) not in the labour 
force at all, most of them women but 
around a third of them men. Among 
men, a major cause is early retire-
ment; among women, other factors 
are also important such as earlier 
barriers to female participation and 
caring obligations. In consequence, 
the effective dependency ratio — the 
number of people aged 15 and over 
not in work — was substantially high-
er than the conventional ratio cited 
above, even if children under 15 are 
left out of account. In fact, slightly 
more people in the Union of 15 and 
over are not in employment than 
those who are, and over 60 % of 
them are under 65. This ratio was 
much the same in 1998 as in the mid-
1980s, as the fall in unemployment 
and rise in women's participation has 
more than offset the increased number 
aged 65 and over. If the decline in the 
number of children is also taken into 
account, it means that the overall 
effective dependency ratio (everyone 
not in work, including those under 15, 
rela-tive to those employed) fell over 
this period. 
This illustrates the potentially mis-
leading impression gained by focus-
ing solely on the old-age depen-
dency ratio and demonstrates the 
importance of taking due account of 
the number of people in employ-
ment which will be critical to over-
coming the problems created by 
supporting an ageing population. In 
other words, the success of 
economies in effecting the transfers 
which will be necessary to ensure a 
decent standard of living for those 
of 65 and over ultimately depends 
on their success in increasing the 
proportion of people of working-age 
actually in work and, therefore, on 
their performance in creating jobs 
and wealth. 
Participation 
of women 
in the workforce 
One of the main features of so-cial change in the Union over 
the past two decades has been the 
increase in the relative number of 
women pursuing working careers. 
In practice, women account for all, 
or nearly all, of the expansion in 
jobs which has occurred over this 
period in all Member States. 
The biggest increase in participation 
has been among women of child-
bearing age, but there remain sub-
stantial differences in participation 
rates for this group between Member 
States, partly explained by differ-
ences in underlying labour market 
conditions. However, the statistics 
suggest that female participation is 
related both to marital status, espe-
cially in southern countries where 
participation of married women is 
much lower than that of non-
married ones, and to whether or not 
women have young children, partic-
ularly in northern Member States, 
where availability of child-care sup-
port outside the extended family is 
decisive. 
The effect of the apparent deficien-
cy in child-care support in a number 
of northern Member States shows 
up most notably in the much lower 
rate of participation of single moth-
ers than married mothers. This is 
particularly the case in the UK and 
Ireland, where under half of single 
women aged 25 to 49 with a child 
under five were in the workforce, 
much less than anywhere else in the 
Union and well below the rate of 
participation of married women in a 
similar position. There is, therefore, 
an evident need in many Member 
States for an extension in the avail-
ability of child-care facilities as well 
as for support arrangements to help 
women caring for disabled or frail 
elderly family members. 
As well as the increase in the par-
ticipation of women, the kind of job 
they do is also important. There is a 
strong trend across the EU for both 
sexes towards part-time working as 
well as towards temporary jobs. 
Women, who represent the main 
potential source of future labour 
force growth, tend to be concentrat-
ed in part-time jobs (around 33 % of 
women in work in 1998 worked 
part time). Yet many part-time jobs 
are in effect excluded both from the 
obligation to pay social contribu-
tions and from entitlement to bene-
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fit. These developments, therefore, 
have important implications both for 
the financing of social protection 
systems and for the availability of 
income support. 
The information presented in this 
report emphasises the challenges 
posed for social protection systems 
by the need to respond better to the 
complexity and diversity of gender 
relations in the modern European 
social economy. Most systems are 
still based primarily on a male 
breadwinner model which does not 
reflect the new realities: increasing 
participation of women in the labour 
force which needs to be further 
encouraged, more diverse models of 
child and family care requiring 
appropriate support, the dependence 
of a growing number of households 
on the earnings of women, more 
diversity in patterns of work for 
both men and women, a reduction in 
the effectiveness of derived rights as 
a means of ensuring support because 
of the decline in traditional family 
structures, as a result particularly of 
the rise in divorce and separation, 
and widening concern about the per-
sistence of barriers and disincentives 
to women pursing working careers. 
The high level 
of early retirement 
and the persistence 
of long-term 
unemployment 
Inadequate growth of employment in the Union since the mid-1970s 
has led to both a persistently high 
level of unemployment and a low 
rate of participation in the work-
force among older people, as well as 
low participation among women. 
This poses serious problems for 
both systems of social protection 
and labour market policy. 
Although the official male retire-
ment age in most Member States is 
at present 65 or over, there has been 
a slow but persistent decline in the 
number of men aged 55 to 59 in the 
workforce since the mid-1980s and 
a more marked decline for men aged 
60 to 64. In 1998, under 70 % of 
men and only 40 % of women aged 
55 to 59 were economically active. 
Only 32 % of men, and just 15 % of 
women aged 60 to 64 were still in 
the workforce. Reversing the trend 
towards early retirement among men 
and increasing the number of older 
women who are economically active 
has to be a major aspect of any poli-
cy aimed at relieving the pressure on 
systems of social protection. 
Large numbers of older people are 
also long-term unemployed, a state 
which often precedes early retire-
ment. In 1998, over 8 million people 
in the EU had been unemployed for 
a year or more, some 5 % of the 
labour force. Over 5 million of these 
had been out of work for at least two 
years. These figures are similar to 
those at the end of the recession of 
the early 1990s, and not much lower 
than in the mid-1980s. The high rate 
of long-term unemployment is a 
major source of pressure on systems 
of social protection across the 
Union, as well as of social exclu-
sion. It is clear, however, that the 
nature of the problem differs 
between different parts of the 
Union, which means, in turn, that 
the appropriate policies also differ. 
The changing 
structure of 
households 
and the growth 
of those with 
no one in work 
There is a continuing increase in the number of households 
across the Union, despite the low 
growth of population, and an even 
larger increase in the number of 
people under 65 living alone, a dis-
proportionate number of these being 
out of work. The decline in the aver-
age size of households implies a 
growing demand for social services 
since it makes it more difficult to 
provide care and support from with-
in the family. 
In the Union as a whole, just under 
25 % of households in 1998 consist-
ed of only one person aged 15 or 
over, and in some 16 % of these, 
there was a child under 15, virtually 
all of them being brought up by lone 
mothers. Both figures were signifi-
cantly higher than 12 years earlier. 
There is, however, a marked differ-
ence between the prevalence of 
single-person households, as in the 
average household size, between the 
north and south of the Union. In 
Finland, Germany, the Netherlands 
and the UK, some 30 % or more of 
households consisted of only one 
person of 15 or over, two to three 
times the proportion in southern 
Member States. 
People of working age living alone 
are, moreover, far more likely to be 
unemployed in the north of the 
Union than those living with other 
- 12-
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people. In the Netherlands, Germany, 
Belgium and the UK, for example, 
25 % or more of men aged 15 to 64 
who were unemployed lived alone, 
twice the proportion of those in 
employment. In the southern 
Member States, only around 4 % or 
less of men in this age group who 
were unemployed lived by them-
selves, much the same as in the case 
of those in employment. In most 
northern countries, moreover, the fig-
ure for those unemployed has 
increased since the mid-1980s as well 
as during the most recent period when 
unemployment has been falling. 
The relative pressure imposed on 
systems of social protection by 
unemployment, or, more generally, 
by people not being in work, is, 
therefore, not fully reflected in the 
figures for unemployment rates. In 
the south of the Union, high rates of 
unemployment combined with low 
levels of labour force participation 
impose much less pressure than they 
would in most northern Member 
States, because of the larger size of 
households and the support avail-
able to most of them from within the 
family. The trend towards smaller 
households and more people living 
alone means, therefore, that falls in 
unemployment do not necessarily 
give rise to proportionately lower 
needs for social and financial sup-
port. This is illustrated most forcibly 
in Belgium and the UK, where 
lower rates of unemployment have 
not been accompanied by a corre-
sponding decline in the number of 
households with no one in work. 
13-
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2. Trends in social expenditure 
In relation to output, overall spend-ing on social protection in the 
Union, gross of any taxes or charges 
levied on benefits, amounted to 
28Vi % of GDP. The level of spend-
ing ranged from over 30 % of GDP 
in France, Belgium, Germany, 
Netherlands and the three Nordic 
countries, with Sweden having the 
highest level at around 35 % of 
GDP, to 22 to 23 % of GDP in 
Greece, Spain and Portugal and only 
18'/2 % of GDP in Ireland. In very 
broad terms, the countries with the 
highest level of GDP per head tend 
to spend proportionately more on 
social expenditure, but the relation-
ship is by no means systematic, with 
expenditure in Sweden and Finland, 
in particular, being higher than 
would be expected on this basis and 
expenditure in Italy (25 % of GDP) 
and Ireland being lower. 
Net social spending 
The figures for expenditure on social protection, gross of taxes 
and social charges, however, tend to 
overstate both the cost entailed for 
governments, in terms of the rev-
enue they need to raise to finance 
spending, and the value of benefits 
going to those receiving support. 
This is because the taxes and social 
charges which are levied on bene-
fits, and which vary significantly 
between Member States, reduce the 
amount of transfers involved. On the 
other hand, the figures understate 
the amounts involved, since they 
exclude the social transfers which 
are made through tax concessions or 
reduced contributions which have 
the same effect on government bud-
gets and the net income of recipients 
as expenditure on benefits. 
Both of these elements are difficult 
to estimate, which is a major reason 
for their exclusion up to now from 
the Esspros database. Nevertheless, 
estimates produced by OECD. 
which have to be regarded as pre-
liminary, are at least indicative of 
the size of the amounts involved. 
These are relatively large for the 
Nordic countries and the 
Netherlands, where charges are 
levied on benefits to a greater extent 
than elsewhere. In net terms, there-
fore, the cost of social protection 
and the sums received by beneficia-
ries are reduced in these cases to a 
level more similar to that in other 
Member States. In Sweden, net 
expenditure on social protection is 
estimated to have amounted to 
around 30 % of GDP in 1996, much 
the same as in Germany, and in 
Denmark and Finland, to 26 to 27 % 
of GDP, much the same as in the UK 
and slightly above the level in the 
Netherlands. As a result, the gap 
between spending relative to GDP in 
these countries and that in Italy and 
Ireland is narrowed considerably. 
These preliminary results confirm 
the importance for policy analysis of 
extending the Esspros database to 
include estimates of net expendi-
ture, incorporating the amounts 
transferred by means of tax conces-
sions and reduced contributions, to 
give a complete view of the implica-
tions of social protection for nation-
al budgets and the redistribution. To 
this end, the Commission, through 
Eurostat, plans to set up a task force 
with Member States to develop a 
special module of the database con-
taining such estimates. 
Growth of social 
expenditure, 
1990-96 
While spending on social pro-tection has continued to 
grow in recent years in nearly all 
parts of the Union, the rate of 
increase in real terms has slowed 
down in recent years in most 
Member States since 1993. This 
coincides with the end of the reces-
sion of the early 1990s, which 
pushed up expenditure on unemploy-
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ment benefits in particular, but also 
on disability and housing benefits. 
Whereas social expenditure increased 
markedly between 1990 and 1993 
(from an average of 25 14 % of GDP 
to just over 2814 %), it fell slightly 
relative to GDP in the following 
years, partly because of the slow-
down or decline in unemployment-
related expenditure, but mainly 
because of a slowdown in real 
spending in most areas. Only in 
Portugal, Greece, Germany, Austria, 
Belgium and Luxembourg did 
spending continue to rise relative to 
GDP over the three years 1993 to 
1996, in the first two, reflecting the 
ongoing development of the social 
following-protection system, in the 
three, the failure of their economies 
to recover fully as in most of the rest 
of the Union. The decline in social 
expenditure relative to GDP in the 
rest of the Union was most marked 
in Sweden, Finland and Netherlands, 
the three countries with the highest 
level of spending in 1993. 
The pattern 
of social 
expenditure 
Spending on old-age and sur-vivors' benefits accounts for by 
far the largest element of social pro-
tection, amounting to an average of 
43 % of the total spent in the Union 
in 1996, or to just over 12 % of GDP, 
with health care the second largest, 
accounting for just over 21/4 % of 
the total, or just over 6 % of GDP. 
Outlays on disability and unemploy-
ment benefits were of a similar size, 
each accounting for just over 8 % of 
total outlays, though in 9 of the 15 
Member States in 1996, transfers to 
people with disabilities exceeded 
those to the unemployed. Expenditure 
on the family and children, which 
covers maternity benefits and child-
care support as well as child benefits, 
is only slightly smaller, on average, 
than outlays on disability and unem-
ployment benefits, while spending on 
the other three kinds of benefits — 
sickness, housing and social exclu-
sion — taken together is much the 
same size as this, averaging around 
714 % of overall spending in total. 
Despite the ageing of the population 
across the Union, the main change 
in the pattern of spending on social 
protection over the period 1990 to 
1996 was not, as might be expected, 
a relative growth of old-age pen-
sions or health care, spending on 
both of which increased at much the 
same rate as the total, but other ele-
ments of expenditure, in particular 
disability and housing benefits and 
social exclusion. Some of this rise is 
attributable to the recession of the 
early 1990s and the increase in 
unemployment which accompanied 
it, but spending on the first two 
items has continued to rise relative 
to that on other elements since 1993. 
The main item on which expendi-
ture has fallen since 1990 is sickness 
benefits, which seem to have been a 
focus for curbs on spending in a 
number of Member States. 
Expenditure 
relative to 
beneficiaries 
While no information on the number of beneficiaries is 
included in the Esspros database, 
some indication of the possible 
effect of changing numbers on 
expenditure can be gained by exam-
ining other evidence on this — 
specifically, data on the number of 
people over the official age of retire-
ment and the number unemployed. 
Over the period 1990 to 1996, 
expenditure on old-age benefits in 
the Union (including survivors' ben-
efits) increased on average by 314 % 
a year in real value terms. The num-
ber of people above retirement age 
went up by 1 !4 % a year, implying a 
rise in the average benefit paid per 
person of 2 % a year, which is broad-
ly in line with the long-term growth 
of GDP per head. Over this period, 
however, because of the depressed 
rate of GDP growth, it meant that 
average pensions rose by slightly 
more than GDP per head. Apart 
from the Netherlands and Greece, 
where there was a small fall, average 
pensions in these terms increased in 
all Member States, most especially 
in Denmark, the UK (both by 4 % a 
year) and Portugal (8 % a year). 
Spending on unemployment compen-
sation (excluding redundancy com-
pensation and benefits in kind) went 
up by just under 4 % a year in real 
ternis in the Union in the period 1990 
to 1996, less than the increase in the 
number of unemployed as defined 
according to International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) conventions, 
which rose by just over 5 14 % a year. 
Compensation per person unem-
ployed, measured in these terms, 
therefore, fell by almost 2 % a year, 
which may reflect a reduction in the 
number of unemployed covered rather 
than a decline in the average benefit 
paid as such, though it may indicate a 
tightening in the system of transfers, 
which would be in line with policy 
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efforts in many Member States over marked in Spain, Greece, France, increase in the implied value of com-
mis period. The fall was apparent in Belgium, Germany and Sweden. On pensation per person unemployed in 
most countries and was particularly the other hand, there was a substantial Ireland, Portugal and the Netherlands. 
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3. Financing social expenditure 
On average social contributions financed some 63 % of the total 
expenditure for social protection in 
1996, though the proportion ranged 
from two thirds or more in France, 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, 
Italy and Spain to just over half in 
Luxembourg, Sweden and Finland, 
around 40 % or less in Portugal, the 
UK and Ireland and only 25 % in 
Denmark. 
Since methods of financing are 
rooted in the way that systems have 
developed historically and are 
linked closely with the way that 
entitlement to benefits is controlled, 
they tend to be slow to change. 
Despite the increasing concern to 
limit or reduce the charges falling on 
income from employment, the rela-
tive importance of social contribu-
tions over the Union as a whole 
declined only marginally between 
1990 and 1996 (from just under 
6414 % of the total to just over 63 %). 
It should be emphasised that while 
social contributions represent the 
major part of total taxes on employed 
labour, there are other taxes account-
ing for more than one third of this 
total in the EU. 
The reduction in the relative impor-
tance of social contributions occur-
red in the first three years of the 
period, and after 1993 there was 
even a small increase in their rela-
tive importance. This was also the 
case as regards employers' contribu-
tions, their share of total funding fall-
ing from 42 % in 1990 to just under 
391/2 % in 1993, but remaining at this 
level over the subsequent three years 
while revenue from taxes increased 
from 30 % of the total in 1990 to 33 % 
in 1993 and then fell to 32% in 
1996. Nevertheless, the share of 
revenue collected from social con-
tributions changed significantly in a 
number of Member States over this 
period, though not uniformly down-
wards and more in countries where 
the share was relatively small initi-
ally rather than in those where it was 
large. In Portugal, it declined from 
57 % to 43 % over the period and in 
Ireland and the UK, by some 4 per-
centage points. On the other hand, 
social contributions became a more 
important source of funding in 
Denmark (where their share rose from 
13 % to 25 %) and the Netherlands 
(from 59 % to 6714 %), as well as, 
more modestly, in Finland, Belgium 
and Austria. Overall, therefore, there 
is little sign of any convergence in the 
proportion of revenue yielded by con-
tributions over this period. 
Since the share of wages and sala-
ries in GDP has tended to fall over 
the 1990s, particularly since 1993 
and the end of the recession, the 
revenue from contributions has risen 
significantly in relation to wages 
and salaries — and therefore labour 
costs — from an average of 33/4 % 
of labour costs in 1990 to 37 % in 
1996, while employers' contribu-
tions rose from 2VÁ % to 23 %. 
Nevertheless, since 1996, there is 
evidence of increased efforts in a 
number of Member States, especial-
ly those where rates of contribution 
are high, to shift the source of 
financing of social protection from 
contributions to taxes, in some cases 
to 'earmarked' taxes levied specifi-
cally to fund certain benefits. This is 
particularly the case in France, 
where the CSG (contribution 
sociale généralisée), introduced as a 
'solidarity tax' in 1991 to replace 
part of the social contributions and 
extended several times since then, is 
now higher than income tax. At the 
same time, the CRDS (contribution 
au remboursement de la dette 
sociale), an additional charge levied 
at a rate of 0.5 % on income and. 
introduced in 1995 to contribute to 
reducing the deficit of the social 
protection system, has been extend-
ed until 2014, while the tax levied 
on tobacco for a similar reason has 
been increased. 
As a consequence of this shift, soci-
al contributions have declined as a 
source of revenue since 1996 where-
as earmarked taxes have increased, 
accounting in 1998 for more than 
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15 % of total funding for social pro-
tection in France. Similarly, in 
Belgium, employers' contributions 
have recently been reduced, while in 
pensions was reduced in 1999 and a 
proposed 'ecological tax reform' 
will provide extra finance for social 
spending. Moreover, in Italy, it is 
family benefits, including maternity 
allowances, from contributions to 
general taxation. 
Germany, the contribution rate for planned to shift the financing of 
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4. Recent changes in policy 
The changes in systems of social protection which have occurred 
in recent years have centred on the 
same key objectives emphasised in 
the Commission communication 
published earlier this year and out-
lined above. In most cases, the aims 
have been: to increase the incentive 
for people not in employment to 
find jobs if they are capable of 
working and to support them in their 
efforts to so, while trying to ensure 
that those unable to work have a rea-
sonable level of income; to reduce 
the numbers dependent on State 
benefits and to encourage and help 
them to become integrated into soci-
ety; to seek to safeguard future pen-
sions both by limiting the transfers 
which will be required and by 
increasing the finance which will be 
available to fund them; and to con-
tain the cost of health care whilst 
improving the standard of service 
provided. 
Through the shift in the emphasis of 
policy from income support alone to 
active measures, in line with the 
employment guidelines, social pro-
tection is coming to represent a 
more important factor in overall 
economic and employment policy in 
the Union, supporting rather than 
obstructing the action taken in other 
areas. 
4.1. 
Key objective: to 
make work pay and 
to provide a secure 
income 
There is a widespread recogni-tion across the Union that sys-
tems of social protection need to 
ensure that people have a financial 
incentive to look for work, that they 
do not spend so long out of work 
that it harms their chances of finding 
a job and creates an attitude of 
dependency, and that their employ-
ability is enhanced rather than dam-
aged during their spell of unemploy-
ment. This has led to efforts to 
ensure that levels of benefits in rela-
tion to prospective earnings do not 
represent a financial disincentive to 
find a job and that people are helped 
to do this through appropriate active 
measures. 
At the same time, benefits still need 
to provide an acceptable level of 
income while people look for work. 
The challenge facing Member States 
is to set benefit levels and the regu-
lations governing entitlement to 
them so that these two objectives are 
achieved simultaneously. In prac-
tice, both access of those unem-
ployed to benefits and the amount 
they get differ significantly between 
Member States, the main divide in 
the case of the former being be-
tween the north and south of the 
Union. This seems to be confirmed 
by a recent empirical study of 
replacement rates, based on what 
people actually receive when unem-
ployed as compared with their net 
earnings when in work, as reported 
in the first two waves of the 
European Community Household 
Panel (ECHP). The results, which 
relate to 1993 and 1994, are 
exploratory. They will need to be 
compared with evidence from other 
studies and to be further investigat-
ed as data from new waves become 
available for analysis. It should also 
be kept in mind that it is always dif-
ficult to gather high quality informa-
tion on income and transfers 
through interviews. 
The findings show that in Italy, 
Greece and Portugal, over half of 
those in the Union who were unem-
ployed for at least three months over 
the two years did not receive any 
unemployment benefit at all and 
most of these no social assistance 
either, while in Spain around a quar-
ter received no form of social trans-
fer. In Denmark, Germany and 
Belgium, by contrast, only 10 % or 
less of the unemployed received no 
unemployment benefit and hardly 
anyone no State support of any kind, 
the latter being the case also in 
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France, Ireland and the UK, despite 
fewer receiving unemployment ben-
efit as such. 
The average level of unemployment 
benefit (including those receiving 
no benefit at all) varied from almost 
80 % of net earnings when the per-
son was working in Ireland and 
70 % or above in Germany, Belgium 
and Denmark to under 25 % in Italy 
and the UK and under 10 % in 
Greece, with France (around 60 %), 
Spain and Portugal (around 35 %) in 
between. For the UK, in particular, 
however, these figures understate 
the amount received because they 
exclude housing benefits paid to 
households, which are important in 
the UK. 
These averages give only a very par-
tial indication of the extent of the 
financial incentive for people unem-
ployed to look for work. A more 
relevant indicator is the proportion 
receiving relatively high benefits 
compared with earnings in employ-
ment, though there is no general 
agreement on what should be 
regarded as 'high'. In most Member 
States, for example, only a small 
proportion of men and women who 
were unemployed had a replacement 
rate of 80 % or above. Except in 
Denmark (27 %), Germany (25 %) 
and France (24 %) for men, and 
Denmark (49 %), Germany (21 %), 
France (30 %), Belgium (23 %) and 
Ireland (21 %) for women, less than 
20 % of unemployed persons had a 
rate as high as this in all Member 
States. This proportion was only 
around 10 % in Spain and well 
under 10 % in Italy, the UK and in 
Greece both for men and women. 
Except in Denmark, over 60 % of 
men and women either had a 
replacement rate of under 65 % or 
did not receive any benefit at all. 
This evidence suggests that the 
financial disincentive to work was 
relatively weak for a majority of the 
unemployed in most Member States 
in 1993-94. This broad conclusion 
has to be reached with some cau-
tion. Further investigation should 
notably pay attention to specific 
groups, such as low-paid people, 
who may face financial incentives to 
be unemployed or not actively look 
for work. Furthermore, since 
1993-94, the discussion on incen-
tive issues has led several govern-
ments to tighten benefit entitlement 
conditions. 
A prominent feature of policy across 
the Union in the past few years has 
been a re-examination of benefit 
entitlement conditions. As a result, 
measures have been taken in many 
Member States to tighten the quali-
fying conditions for eligibility for 
benefit and to increase the activation 
of the unemployed to find a job. 
These measures have not been con-
fined to unemployment benefits but 
have also been applied to disability 
benefits and early retirement schemes, 
which had come to be used as 
effective substitutes for unemploy-
ment compensation in a number of 
countries. 
Changes in benefit systems have 
also been combined in several coun-
tries with attempts to make work 
more rewarding financially by intro-
ducing measures to increase the net 
income of those taking up a job, 
both through allowing them to con-
tinue to receive some support after 
they begin to work and by extending 
in-work benefits. 
In-work benefits 
This approach has been pushed furthest in the UK, where 
'Family credit', aimed at supple-
menting the net income of people in 
low-paid jobs with children, was 
replaced in 1999 by 'Working 
families' tax credit', guaranteeing 
all people in employment with 
dependent families, including lone 
parents, a higher minimum level of 
income than before and giving them 
an allowance towards the costs of 
child care. In addition, a similar 
measure has been introduced for 
people with disabilities and a pilot 
scheme of the same kind has been 
launched for people over 50 who are 
unemployed, with the aim of 
encouraging them to work. 
The only other country in the Union 
in which in-work benefits are 
important is Ireland, where 'Family 
income supplement' has existed for 
some time and has covered an 
increased number of people in 
recent years as qualifying income 
levels have been raised and the con-
ditions of eligibility and receipt 
made more favourable. Moreover, 
recipients of unemployment benefit 
can now retain their dependent child 
allowances for 13 weeks after taking 
up a job to increase their net income 
and provide an extra incentive to 
start working. 
Elsewhere, in-work benefits have 
also been introduced in a number of 
countries to help people make the 
transition from unemployment into 
work but equally to encourage them 
to take part-time or temporary jobs, 
as in Austria, Germany and 
Portugal, where the main aim is to 
help the unemployed gain work 
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experience so as to improve their 
future employability. 
Changes 
in unemployment 
compensation 
schemes 
While the changes made to unemployment benefits over 
the 1990s have concentrated on con-
taining the costs to public budgets, 
in recent years a wide concern has 
also been to integrate income sup-
port with active labour market meas-
ures to a greater extent and to 
encourage those in receipt of benefit 
to find a job as soon as possible. 
In a number of Member States, 
including Denmark, Germany, the 
Netherlands and the UK, the defini-
tion of what constitutes a suitable job 
for an unemployed person to take up 
has been broadened, to encompass 
jobs which they are capable of doing 
with a minimum of training rather 
than merely those they were doing 
before. Refusal to accept a suitable 
job after being unemployed for a 
time or unwillingness to participate 
in active labour market programmes 
can lead to loss of benefit. 
At the same time, changes have 
been introduced, or are planned, in a 
number of countries to improve the 
safety net provided by unemploy-
ment benefit schemes. In Italy, an 
insurance-based unemployment 
benefit scheme, with means-tested 
support after entitlement has 
expired, is being introduced to pro-
vide wider protection than up to 
now, while in Portugal, the period of 
entitlement to unemployment bene-
fit has recently been lengthened for 
people in all age groups. 
While the recent focus of policy 
attention across the Union has been 
on ensuring that work pays, there 
are still circumstances in some 
countries where people may have 
little financial incentive to be in paid 
employment. This applies particu-
larly to people, usually women, 
whose spouse is unemployed and in 
receipt of means-tested unemploy-
ment benefit related to household 
income, such as in the UK and 
Belgium. Any additional earnings in 
these cases are liable to be offset by 
a loss of benefit. In both the UK and 
Belgium however, measures have 
been taken to lower the possible 
deterrent to working. 
Changes in 
disability benefits 
Disability benefits have been used as a more 'acceptable' 
substitute for unemployment bene-
fits in a number of Member States, 
especially in respect of the long-
term unemployed. As expenditure 
and the number of claimants have 
grown, however, there have been 
widespread moves to try to restrict 
eligibility to those who are genuine-
ly incapable of working because of 
their disability. In the Netherlands 
and the UK, where more people 
than are unemployed are being 
supported on benefit, reforms were 
introduced in the mid-1990s to 
make medical testing procedures 
more stringent and to widen the def-
inition of the jobs that the person 
concerned can potentially do. 
In addition, in the Netherlands, 
some of the onus of policing the sys-
tem was shifted on to employers 
from 1998 on, by charging them dif-
ferential contribution rates accord-
ing to the risk of their employees 
becoming claimants, giving them an 
incentive to reduce the numbers 
either by dissuasion or by making it 
easier for people with disabilities to 
continue working. In the UK, further 
measures are planned to tighten the 
qualifying conditions even more, 
while, as noted above, those moving 
into employment are now guaranteed 
a minimum income through a tax 
credit, though at the same time, bene-
fits to those who are really incapable 
of working have been raised. 
Elsewhere, such as in Austria, 
Greece and Italy, eligibility for bene-
fit has also been made more restrict-
ed, while in Sweden, where spending 
is comparatively high, the system is 
in the process of being reformed. In 
contrast, in Ireland, where spending 
on disability benefits is relatively 
low, social assistance disability 
allowance was extended in 1997 to 
those in part-time residential care 
and benefits were increased to 
couples who both have disabilities. 
Early retirement 
pensions 
A long with recipients of disabili-ty benefit, the number of people 
taking early retirement has also risen 
over the past 15 to 20 years, as noted 
above, for much the same reason. 
Indeed, the two are alternative res-
ponses to the problem of long-term 
unemployment, with the UK and the 
Netherlands, for example, opting to 
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expand disability benefits, while France, 
Germany and a number of other coun-
tries rely more on early retirement. 
The rising cost has led to require-
ments for eligibility being tightened 
in the case of both types of scheme 
and levels of benefit being reduced in 
the case of early retirement. 
In Denmark, Austria and Italy, the 
years of contribution required to be 
eligible for early retirement have 
been increased, while in Germany, 
the minimum age for claiming a 
pension is in the process of being 
progressively raised (to 63, or 62 if 
long-term unemployed). 
In Luxembourg, however, the possi-
bility of early retirement has been 
extended, though with the aim of 
encouraging people to continue 
working on a part-time basis rather 
than retiring completely. This is 
similar to schemes operating in 
France, Germany, Denmark and 
Austria, where employees over a 
certain age can opt to reduce their 
hours of work progressively until 
they retire and be compensated by 
receiving a partial pension. In addi-
tion, as in Austria and Germany, 
employers are entitled to a reduction 
in social contributions if they take 
on someone who has been unem-
ployed at the same time. 
Family benefits and 
other arrangements 
to reconcile work 
and family 
Social protection for families with children has three main 
aims: to help people bear the addi-
tional costs of having children 
through child benefits or allow-
ances; to support women when they 
give birth through maternity 
allowances and entitlement to leave, 
which is being increasingly extend-
ed to both parents; and to provide 
help with child care and with caring 
for family members with disabilities 
or who are elderly and frail. All 
three are important for improving 
the income security of people with 
families, especially women, and 
helping them reconcile work with 
their other responsibilities. Child-
care support arrangements and the 
right to leave to take care of children 
— as well as other members of the 
family who may need long-term 
care — are crucial for many women 
who wish to pursue working 
careers. This is especially the case 
for those bringing up children on 
their own, who are increasingly 
numerous. As recognised explicitly 
in the EU employment strategy, 
women still face special difficulties 
in gaining access to the job market, 
advancing their careers and reconcil-
ing professional and family life. 
Under the employment guidelines, 
Member States have committed 
themselves to ensuring that women 
have equal access to labour market 
measures and job opportunities. 
In Germany, child benefits were 
raised significantly at the beginning 
of 1999 and are due to be raised 
again in 2000, along with child tax 
allowances, so increasing the net 
income of families. In Luxembourg, 
support is being targeted more on 
low-income families through reduc-
ing child tax allowances (which tend 
to favour higher income earners) 
and increasing child benefits by an 
equivalent amount. Similarly, in 
Italy, a new means-tested benefit 
was introduced in 1999 for all 
families with more than three children 
below 18. 
The main developments in this area, 
however, have been aimed at 
increasing parental leave possibili-
ties, encouraged by the recent 
Community directive. The entitle-
ment of people with children to take 
leave has been extended, or is in the 
process of being extended, in many 
parts of the Union, including 
Austria, Luxembourg, Denmark, 
Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands, 
Italy, Spain and the UK. 
At the same time, the availability of 
child-care support has been 
increased in recent years in a num-
ber of Member States, most espe-
cially in ones where support has 
been limited in the past. Support 
facilities are often a necessary com-
plementary component of active 
labour market measures to make it 
possible for many people, especially 
women, to pursue a working career 
and to become properly integrated 
into society. In Spain, tax deduc-
tions allowable for child-care costs 
for children under three were raised 
significantly in 1998. In Greece, a 
pilot project has been launched to 
extend the time children are able to 
spend in nursery and elementary 
schools as well as in State day-care 
centres and in Portugal, the network 
of nurseries has been expanded. In 
the Netherlands, from 1999, lone 
parents looking for a job or under-
going training are entitled to reim-
bursement of after-(primary) school 
child-care costs if their income falls 
below a certain level. In the UK, a 
new child-care tax credit was intro-
duced in October 1999 for low-
income families, including lone par-
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ents, while there is an objective to 
expand the number of out-of-school 
child-care places. 
4.2. 
Key objective: to 
make pensions safe 
and pension 
systems sustainable 
The significant growth in the number of people above retire-
ment age in all Member States in 
10 to 15 years time has focused 
attention everywhere on the conse-
quences for old-age pensions and 
their funding given that old-age and 
survivors' benefits already represent 
43 % of the total social protection 
expenditure in the Union, or just over 
12 % of GDP. Though the measures 
introduced differ in detail, they have 
a common emphasis on limiting the 
future transfers which will be neces-
sary or increasing the finance avail-
able. They include increasing the 
official age of retirement or the num-
ber of years of contributions required 
to qualify for a full pension, reducing 
the pension paid in relation to past 
earnings, or relating it more closely 
to contributions, and creating special 
funds to finance future transfers. The 
latter amounts to adding beside exist-
ing 'pay-as-you-go' systems, where 
present payments are financed from 
present contributions, 'funded' ones 
where present contributions are fixed 
in relation to future liabilities. 
In Austria, Italy and Luxembourg, 
where rules for civil servants' pen-
sions were more favourable, they 
were reformed to bring them closer 
to those in the private sector, while 
in Spain, the basis for calculating 
pension entitlement is in the process 
of being progressively extended 
from salary in the best eight years to 
that in the best 15 years. In Italy, the 
highest pensions were frozen for 
1998, while in Germany, the basis for 
indexing pensions has been changed 
from wage increases to price infla-
tion for both the years 2000 and 
2001, so in effect reducing expendi-
ture. On the other hand, the 1999 
reform, aimed at a gradual lowering 
of pensions from 70 % of the average 
net wage to 64 %, has been sus-
pended until the end of 2000. 
In order to increase available 
finance, the contributions paid by 
higher and middle income earners in 
Spain have been increased without 
compensating rises in future pension 
entitlement, while in Italy, contri-
butions paid by the temporary 
self-employed have been raised. 
In Denmark, contributions were in 
effect increased from 1998 by 
incorporating an extraordinary 
charge of 1 % levied in 1997 into 
the system for funding supplemen-
tary pensions. 
In the Netherlands, where a ceiling 
has been imposed on the rate of con-
tributions, the government has set 
up a special fund, into which it con-
tributes an amount each year calcu-
lated to meet the peak in expendi-
ture in the years after 2020. In 
France, there is a proposal to 
increase the contributions required 
for a full pension from 40 to 42.5 
years, and, as in Spain, a fund has 
been created to consolidate the 
finance available for pensions. In 
Ireland, a 'Social welfare pension 
fund reserve' was set up in 1998, 
using money from tax revenue and 
privatisation of telecommunica-
tions, to fund the future cost of pen-
sions. The high rate of economic 
growth, however, has enabled the 
full rate of social contributions to be 
reduced and the basic pension to be 
increased significantly in both 1998 
and 1999. 
At the same time, measures have 
been taken in a number of countries, 
such as Italy, to encourage the 
development of occupational and 
personal pensions to relieve the 
future burden on the State. 
Despite the focus in most countries 
on making pension systems sustain-
able, improvements have, neverthe-
less, been made in a number of 
Member States to the entitlement of 
disadvantaged groups. In Italy and 
Spain, minimum or non-contribu-
tory pensions were raised. Credit for 
periods spent looking after children 
or adults in need of care has been 
extended in Luxembourg, Germany, 
Austria and the UK, while people 
working part time have been accord-
ed increased pension rights in 
Luxembourg, Germany and Spain, 
and those with shorter working 
careers than the norm in Finland. 
4.3. 
Key objective: to 
promote social 
inclusion 
Amajor feature of social policy in recent years, as noted above, 
has been the emphasis on active pol-
icy measures designed to get people 
into work. This has also been moti-
vated by the aim of reducing 
dependency and social exclusion. 
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Although the main focus is on 
employment, since it is recognised 
that having a stable job, or at least 
having the option to work, is a major 
condition for social inclusion, it is 
also recognised that there are other 
aspects of exclusion which need 
equally to be addressed if the prob-
lem is to be tackled effectively. These 
include better access to education 
and vocational training, to decent 
housing and to reasonable levels of 
health care and social services. 
In all Member States, governments 
have committed themselves to pre-
venting exclusion and increasing the 
effort devoted to active measures, 
aimed at providing job search assis-
tance, improving employability and, 
where necessary, direct access to 
jobs. These measures have been 
directed primarily at the unemployed, 
especially the long-term unemployed 
and young people, but also other dis-
advantaged groups, such as women 
returning to work after interrupting 
their working careers because of car-
ing responsibilities. They have also 
been aimed at other people out of 
work, particularly people with dis-
abilities but capable of working, older 
people who have taken early retire-
ment and lone parents with children. 
In the case of young people and the 
long-term unemployed, following 
the adoption of the employment 
guidelines for 1998 and 1999, all 
Member States have introduced mea-
sures to ensure that everyone out of 
work for more than a certain time (6 
months in the case of those under 25 
and 12 months for those of 25 or 
over, though 3 months and 6 months 
respectively in Sweden, Portugal and 
Luxembourg) has access to an active 
measure of some kind or a sub-
sidised job. It has been accompanied 
by efforts to tailor measures more 
closely and systematically to indi-
vidual needs in order to increase 
their effectiveness. In many coun-
tries (such as Belgium, France, 
Ireland, Finland and the UK), the 
same kind of approach has been 
applied to people with disabilities, 
and conscious efforts have been 
made to integrate them into active 
labour market programmes. In the 
Netherlands and the UK, the same 
kind of assistance has recently been 
introduced for lone parents, particu-
larly those with children over five. 
In several countries including 
Belgium, Denmark. Germany, 
France and the Netherlands, mea-
sures regarding job search, career 
guidance and the provision of train-
ing, or retraining, have been supple-
mented by the significant growth of 
subsidised jobs or direct job creation 
schemes. These have been directed, 
in particular, at the long-term unem-
ployed and others with difficulties 
finding work. 
The activation of measures has 
extended to those on minimum 
income schemes, who. in a number 
of countries, are being encouraged 
to participate in programmes 
designed to improve their employa-
bility. This is the case in Belgium, 
for example, where training is now 
provided for those on minimum 
income support and in Denmark, 
where from 1998, receipt of income 
support has been made dependent 
on people participating in schemes 
aimed at increasing their self-
reliance. Moreover, in Italy, recipi-
ents of the prospective means-tested 
benefit guaranteeing a minimum 
level of income who are capable of 
working will be obliged to partici-
pate in a training course. 
Efforts to ensure that people are bet-
ter off when working than when not 
have been extended from unemploy-
ment insurance benefit schemes to 
minimum income schemes in sever-
al Member States. In France, for 
example, since 1998 the possibility, 
which already existed, for some 
means-tested benefits (allocation de 
solidarité spécifique, revenu mini-
mum d'insertion) to top up wages 
has been increased. The periods 
over which this is possible have 
been extended and the levels of 
income permitted raised. This possi-
bility has also been extended to spe-
cific allowances for lone parents and 
widows (allocation de parent isolé, 
allocation d'assurance veuvage). 
Similar steps have also been taken 
in other countries, such as Belgium, 
Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands 
and Denmark, while in Italy, a pilot 
scheme for a new means-tested ben-
efit to guarantee for the first time a 
national minimum level of income 
incorporates an earnings disregard 
of 25 % so as to maintain a financial 
incentive to work. 
In practice, despite the emphasis on 
active measures over the 1990s, 
there has been relatively little shift 
in actual spending from passive to 
active measures. According to 
OECD data on labour market expen-
diture, the relative increase in 
spending on active measures in the 
Union since 1994 and the end of the 
economic recession has been small 
and these accounted for the same 
share of total expenditure in 1998 
(just under 37 %) as in 1990. 
Moreover, the amount spent on 
active programmes per person 
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unemployed was the same in 1998 
in relation to GDP as in 1994 and 
less than in 1990. This indicates that 
there is still scope to extend oppor-
tunities of benefiting from active 
measures, especially towards the 
most disadvantaged groups. 
4.4. 
Key objective: to 
ensure high quality 
and sustainable 
health care 
The pressure on systems of social protection across the Union has 
also manifested itself in a growing 
need for health care which in 1996 
accounted for just over 2114 % of 
social protection expenditure or 6 % 
of GDP. This pressure is reinforced 
by the effect of rising real income 
and advances in know-how and in 
the range of treatment in pushing up 
demand, so putting substantial 
upward pressure on expenditure. The 
common response of governments 
has been to seek to limit the growth 
of spending and its effect on public 
budgets, whilst seeking to maintain 
the quality of service and access to 
care. This has naturally led to a focus 
on ways of increasing productivity 
or improving cost effectiveness. 
To this end, governments across the 
Union have tightened control over 
overall spending, either directly 
where there are national health sys-
tems or indirectly by limiting contri-
bution rates in the case of insurance-
based systems. At the same time, in 
many countries with national health 
services (Spain, Italy, Sweden, lhe 
UK and Ireland), more responsibili-
ty for managing services and deter-
mining the allocation of budgets has 
been devolved to the regional or 
local level, where needs can be more 
closely assessed. In addition, there 
has been a widespread tendency to 
extend co-payment for drugs and 
treatment, increasing the cost borne 
directly by consumers to encourage 
them to economise on their use of 
the service as well as to provide 
additional finance. This has gone 
along with the establishment of 
approved lists of drugs and the 
introduction of generic medications 
to limit the cost of prescriptions. 
In some Member States, however, 
there has been a reaction to continu-
ous increases in charges left to 
patients. In Sweden, in particular, 
where these were raised markedly 
during the 1990s, there has been 
growing concern that low income 
households, especially those with 
children, might forgo treatment to 
the detriment of their health. 
Charges for children were, there-
fore, abolished in 1998, leading to 
counter-concerns about possible 
excessive demands on the service 
and cutbacks in other public ser-
vices to compensate for the reduced 
funding. The response has been to 
transfer more earmarked revenue to 
the local authorities responsible for 
the provision of services and to pro-
pose shifting resources from 
defence to health care. In France, 
because of concerns about access to 
health care, basic health-care insur-
ance is to be extended to everyone 
and complementary health insur-
ance is to be provided free to low 
income households, or to some 6 
million individuals. In Luxembourg 
and Belgium, measures have also 
been taken to ease access to health 
care and to lower charges for poorer 
households, while in Spain, all for-
eigners, legal and illegal, are to be 
granted access to health care on an 
equal footing with nationals. 
In the Netherlands, a 20 % charge on 
all treatment and drugs, except visits 
to hospitals and GPs, levied in order 
to encourage people to use services 
more prudently, was withdrawn at 
the beginning of 1999 because it 
seems to have had little effect on 
dampening demand while involving 
heavy administrative costs. In 
Germany, where expenditure on 
health care is among the highest in 
the. Union, a number of measures 
introduced to increase the cost of 
treatment falling on patients were 
withdrawn or suspended at the 
beginning of 1999, but ceilings on 
doctors' fees were maintained. 
Proposals under discussion, designed 
to contain cost increases and keep 
down contribution rates, include lim-
iting patients' freedom of choice over 
provision, restricting the drugs that 
can be prescribed and imposing ceil-
ings on expenditure of general prac-
titioners, leading to claims that doc-
tors might refuse to treat elderly or 
chronically ill patients because of the 
cost. 
The share of private expenditure in 
total expenditure on health care in 
the Union has increased slightly 
over the 1990s, according to OECD 
data, from 22 % in 1990 to almost 
24% in 1997, so adding just over 
30 % to the outlays included as part 
of social protection. The importance 
of private spending on health care 
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varies markedly between Member in Luxembourg. In countries such as 1997 — directly as well as indirectly, 
States, from 40 % of total spending Italy, Finland and Sweden, con- since the increased use of co-financ-
in Portugal and 30 % in Italy to straints on public health expenditure ing was one of the ways of achiev-
around 15 % in Sweden, the UK, seem to have led to a growth of pri- ing a reduction in public spending. 
Belgium and Denmark and only 8 % vate provision between 1990 and 
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5. Data issues 
Wherever possible the analysis in this report is based on 
quantitative information about the 
scale of spending on social protec-
tion and on particular types of bene-
fit, and about the sources of finance 
and recent changes. This is impor-
tant in order to present an objective 
view of developments and the fac-
tors underlying these and so help to 
improve understanding of the 
changes occurring across the Union 
and of their implications, not only 
for economic policy and govern-
ment budgets, but also for social 
issues, such as the relief of poverty 
and social deprivation. 
Nevertheless, the quantitative analy-
sis which it is possible to undertake 
in this area is limited by the avail-
ability of data. The new Esspros 
database of social protection expend-
iture and receipts, which Eurostat 
has compiled in recent years on a 
more coherent and satisfactory basis 
of classification, and the recently 
established European Community 
Household Panel (ECHP) surveys 
provide an invaluable insight into 
the features of social protection sys-
tems across the Union and into the 
developments taking place. There 
are, however, still important gaps in 
coverage. 
In particular, apart from problems of 
comparability in certain areas, the 
Esspros data do not as yet include 
details of the social transfers deliv-
ered through tax concessions rather 
than benefits or of the taxes and 
charges levied on benefit payments 
which reduce both the net income 
paid to recipients and the cost to 
governments of funding the trans-
fers entailed. Nor do they include 
details of the number of people 
receiving benefits and, equally 
importantly, of those who do not, 
which makes it difficult to say any-
thing about the effectiveness of sys-
tems in providing support to those in 
need or about the average amounts 
they receive. The lack of data on 
beneficiaries is in the process of 
being rectified for the unemploy-
ment function at least, by the devel-
opment of a labour market policy 
module of Esspros. 
The ECHP represents an alternative 
means of examining these kinds of 
issue since it provides information 
about income and the various 
sources of this, as well as about the 
personal circumstances of the indi-
viduals covered, including their 
employment status, and details of 
the households in which they live. 
The main problem with the panel, 
however, is that it is a small sample, 
comprising some 60000 households 
across the Union as a whole and less 
than 200000 people, which may 
bring risks of representativeness 
where small groups of people are 
concerned. This restricts the analy-
sis which can be undertaken, espe-
cially in areas of social protection 
which apply to only a small minori-
ty of the population. 
Moreover, there are serious delays 
in data becoming available, which 
limits the usefulness of both sources 
as tools for monitoring changes. The 
data available being analysed relate, 
at a minimum, to the situation 
around three years previously, time 
enough for significant changes to 
have occurred. While both are rela-
tively new sources of data, which 
explains some of the delay, it is 
important that they become avail-
able on a more timely basis if they 
are to fulfil their full potential as 
tools for policy analysis. 
27 
Social protection in the candidate countries of central and eastern Europe 
6. Social protection in the candidate countries 
of central and eastern Europe 
There is widespread interest in the way that social protection 
systems are developing in the candi-
date countries of central and eastern 
Europe (CEECs) that have applied 
to join the European Union, which 
is likely to increase as their acces-
sion draws closer (')- The signifi-
cance of the current enlargement -
the largest yet in terms of people - is 
one of the factors affecting the 
future of social protection policy in 
the EU identified in the recent 
Commission commiiMiiñcattion 'A 
concerted strategy for nedeirausiing 
social protection*. 
A strategy of the land the communi-
cation proposes and the challenges 
to which it is a response are not the 
sole province of the present 15 
Member States. New countries join-
ing the EU must embrace the full 
acquis or body of agreements, com-
mitments and policies that Member 
States have in common and which 
they are developing together. In rela-
tion to social protection, this means 
both the binding directives and regu-
lations in force at the time and the 
common principles or values to 
which Member States subscribe in 
ensuring that their systems are 
geared to tackle emerging problems 
(') Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
and to take advantage of new oppor-
tunities. Underlying this is the notion 
that well-designed and responsive 
systems of social protection have a 
fundamental role to play in support-
ing economic policy and improving 
economic performance. Further 
shared ideas and ideals may well 
emerge during the course of Member 
State deliberations on the agenda 
proposed in the communication, 
though it is important in all this not 
to forget that, while Member States 
may share a common vision of the 
purpose of social protection and the 
broad way it should evolve, they 
have total freedom to decide the spe-
cific changes they make and the new 
measures they introduce. 
The four objectives set out in the 
communication also offer a way of 
articulating what social protection 
systems in candidate countries must 
achieve in way of securing the eco-
nomic, social and political stability 
necessary to ensure the fullest gains 
from participation in the internal 
market and EMU. Enabling men 
and women to make a secure living 
through working, mitigating the 
effects on them when they cannot, 
guaranteeing a safe and decent 
income during retirement and ensur-
ing access for all to quality heath 
care and the essentials of life can 
only strengthen political stability 
and support for enlargement. The 
benefits they bring to individual 
lives will also translate into benefits 
for the economies of the countries 
concerned. Ensuring sustainable 
funding for social protection, not 
least for health care and pensions, 
will be essential under the economic 
discipline associated with EMU. It is 
also essential that social protection 
systems are efficient and effective, 
which means putting in place appro-
priate administrative structures. This 
is a key aim in the EU's approach to 
supporting candidate countries in 
their preparations, helping them 
strengthen the administration needed 
for implementation, through, for 
example, training and sharing ex-
perience. 
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Chapter 1: Changing context of social 
protection systems: demographic, social and 
labour market changes 
The concern of this chapter is to document the main demographic, 
social and economic developments 
across the Union which define the con-
text in which social protection systems 
have to operate and the needs to which 
they have to respond. As indicated in 
the last report (Social protection in 
Europe 1997, Chapter 1), the four major 
trends which are common to most parts 
of the Union are: 
• the significant growth in the num-
ber of people of 65 and over, which 
is set to accelerate over the next 10 
to 15 years as the post-war baby 
boom generation reaches this age, 
and the even larger expansion in the 
number of people of 75 and over, 
who tend to impose greater 
demands on pension systems, 
health care and social services. At 
the same time, the even larger ex-
pansion in the number of people of 
75 and over is set to increase the 
demand for long-term care marked-
ly, at a time when increased female 
participation in the workforce is 
also likely to reduce the available 
pool of unpaid family carers. This is 
coupled with a prospective decline 
in the number of people of working 
age, from whom the labour force to 
generate the income necessary to 
support those who have retired from 
the workforce is drawn, which is a 
result of a falling birth rate over 
many years; 
the continuous increase in unem-
ployment and decrease in participa-
tion rates in the Union since the mid-
1970s is reflected by both a persis-
tently high level of unemployment 
and a low rate of participation in the 
workforce, especially among women 
generally and among men approach-
ing retirement age. Moreover, a large 
number of those who have become 
unemployed have remained out of 
work for some time in most Member 
States, posing serious problems both 
for systems of social protection and 
labour market policy; 
the changing gender balance and the 
growing numbers of women pursu-
ing working careers, despite the dif-
ficulties of finding employment, 
which has been accompanied by an 
increasing demand for support ser-
vices, both for child care and the care 
of people with disabilities as well as 
the elderly infirm. This puts gender 
issues and the importance of ensur-
ing equality of opportunity for men 
and women at the forefront of the 
challenges facing systems of social 
protection across the Union; 
the increase in the number of house-
holds, despite the slow growth of 
population, and the consequent 
decline in the average size of these, 
which has been associated with the 
break-up of the traditional extended 
family and with a growing number of 
people living alone. This has made it 
more difficult to provide care and 
support from within the family and 
increased the importance of the 
availability of income and other sup-
port for people who are not in paid 
employment. 
The aim here is to update the analysis in 
the 1997 report and to extend it in sev-
eral ways. In particular, it examines the 
projections of population beyond the 
next 20 years, since the reform of pen-
sion systems which is now under way in 
a number of Member States, and which 
is being considered in others, has to 
take account of the position in 40 years 
time or so when those entering the 
labour force now retire. It shows that, in 
practice, the underlying cause of 
prospective problems of funding social 
protection systems is not so much the 
growth in the number of people above 
retirement age in future years, but the 
combination of this growth with a 
declining number of people of working 
age who will need to provide the 
finance. 
Accordingly, this serves to focus atten-
tion on the relative number of those of 
working age in employment and con-
tributing to income generation and, 
more particularly, the counterpart of 
this, which is the significant number in 
this age group who are not in paid work, 
who are not helping to fund social 
transfers but, who, in many cases, are 
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1. Population growth in the Union, 1980­2040 
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2. Growth of working­age population in Member States, 1980­2030 
the past 20 years or so but is set to fall 
over the next 20 years while total popu­
lation continues to grow, if only very 
slowly. Beyond that, it is projected, on 
intermediate assumptions about birth 
and death rates and migration flows, to 
decline more sharply, so that by 2040, it 
will represent only around 58 % of total 
population as against 67 % at the present 
time (Graph 1; the figures for future 
years are derived from the Eurostat base 
projection of population by age group 
up to 2050, which is an intermediate 
one, assuming the broad continuation of 
recent trends, with a further increase in 
life­expectancy, a slow recovery in fer­
tility rates and a modest decline in net 
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adding to the need for these. These 
include not only the unemployed 
actively seeking work but many 
more, especially women, who are not 
part of the labour force at all. These 
two groups are substantially more 
numerous than those above the age of 
retirement on whom policy attention 
has tended to focus. Expanding the 
number of these who are in work 
would help to alleviate the future 
problem of funding social protection 
systems at least as much as, if not 
UK EU 
more than, the reform of pension 
arrangements per se. 
Demographic trends 
As indicated in the 1997 report, the proportion of the population in the 
Union aged 65 and over is increasing 
while the share of young people under 
15 is declining. In between, the number 
of people of working age has risen 
slightly faster than total population over 
By contrast the number of people aged 65 
and over has risen much faster than total 
population over the past 20 years and will 
go on doing so in the future, even though 
the rate of growth is projected to slow 
down slightly over the next 20 years 
(from just over 1 Vi % a year to just 
under). Working­age population, how­
ever, is forecast to begin to fall from 
around 2010 on. After 2020, it will 
decline by around Vi % a year or more, 
a reduction of 1 % a year as compared 
with the average over the past 20 years. 
The ratio of people of 65 and over to 
those of working age — the so­called 
old­age dependency ratio — is, there­
fore, set to rise markedly. At present, it 
amounts to just under one in four. By 
2020, it is projected to rise to just under 
one in three and by 2040, to almost one 
in two. Whereas in the past, as noted 
further below, this has been offset in 
some degree by a decline in the relative 
number of children and young people 
under 15, this is likely to be much less 
the case in future years. Since 1980, 
their number has fallen from 21 Vi % of 
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population to around 17 %, a slightly 
larger fall than the increase in the pro­
portion of people of 65 and over. Over 
the next 15 years, their share is project­
ed to decline by another 1 lA percentage 
points, about half the rise in the share of 
the elderly. Over the 25 years following 
that, it is forecast to fall by only around 
1 percentage point, only a fraction of 
the steep rise in the relative number of 
people of 65 and over. 
The average age of those of 65 and over 
is also set to increase, with the propor­
tion of these aged 75 and over rising 
from 43 % at present to 47 % in 10 
years time, the number of people in this 
age group growing by almost 2 % a year 
over this period and over the longer 
term. In 40 years time, well over half of 
those aged 65 and over will be in this 
older age group and these will account 
for 14 % of the total population in the 
EU. This has implications for the likely 
need for both health care and long­term 
care. Although more people are living 
into old age, there is little evidence that 
their demands on health services are 
declining. Indeed, with increasing tech­
nology and advances in medical know­
how, the life­threatening conditions 
which can be treated have expanded 
considerably. This is also the case in 
respect of long­term care and the 
demands on social services, which do 
not seem to be diminishing even though 
the need for care may be occurring at an 
older age than previously. (See Ageing 
and care for frail elderly persons: an 
overview of international perspectives, 
Occasional Papers, No 38, OECD, 
which reports some increase in 'disabil­
ity­free life expectancy' in a number of 
countries, though mainly in respect of 
severe disability rather than for lesser 
forms of incapacity which still give rise 
to the need for caring.) 
Although the population is ageing in 
all Member States and the relative 
number of people of 65 and over is 
growing everywhere, the rate at which 
this is occurring varies across the 
Union. In the south of the Union, 
especially in Greece, Spain and Italy, 
the growth in the number of people of 
65 and over has far outstripped the 
growth in working­age population 
over the past 20 years (Graphs 2 and 
3). Whereas the number of those of 65 
and over has risen by 2 to 2Vi % a year 
over this period, the number of people 
of working age has increased by only 
around Vz % a year (in Italy, the gap 
between the two was over 2 percent­
age points). As a result, the old­age 
dependency ratio has gone up from 
one in six to just over one in four in 
Italy over this period and by only 
slightly less in the other two countries 
(Table 1 and Graph 4). In Portugal and 
Finland, the population of 65 and over 
3. Growth of population over 65 in Member States, 1980­2030 
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4. Population below 15 and over 65 in relation to working­age 
population in Member States, 1980­2040 
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Table 1 
Population below 15 and over 65 in relation to working-age 
population in Member States, 1980-2040 
°/c working-age population (15-64) 
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1980 
30.6 
21.7 
52.3 
32.2 
22.2 
54.4 
28.0 
23.7 
51.7 
41.0 
17.5 
58.4 
35.1 
21.8 
56.9 
51.4 
17.0 
68.4 
34.5 
17.1 
51.6 
27.8 
20.7 
48.5 
33.7 
17.3 
51.1 
31.8 
23.9 
55.8 
41.0 
18.2 
59.2 
30.0 
17.7 
47.6 
30.6 
25.4 
55.9 
32.S 
23.2 
56.0 
33.0 
19.9 
52.9 
1998 
27.0 
24.9 
51.9 
26.8 
22.3 
49.1 
23.3 
23.2 
46.5 
23.0 
23.6 
46.5 
28.9 
23.8 
52.8 
34.1 
17.1 
51.2 
21.6 
25.5 
47.1 
28.1 
21.2 
49.4 
27.1 
19.8 
47.0 
25.5 
22.7 
48.2 
25.2 
22.2 
47.4 
28.2 
21.8 
49.9 
29.8 
27.1 
56.9 
29.6 
24.1 
53.8 
25.4 
23.7 
49.1 
2010 
25.2 
26.9 
52.0 
27.3 
24.3 
51.6 
22.0 
29.2 
51.2 
23.9 
26.5 
50.3 
26.6 
25.5 
52.1 
28.7 
18.5 
47.2 
22.9 
31.0 
53.8 
26.5 
23.5 
49.9 
26.1 
22.5 
48.7 
23.6 
25.6 
49.2 
26.4 
24.3 
50.7 
25.6 
24.7 
50.2 
26.7 
27.9 
54.6 
25.7 
24.7 
50.3 
24.5 
27.0 
51.5 
2025 
25.8 
36.6 
62.4 
25.2 
32.4 
57.6 
21.4 
35.3 
56.7 
20.4 
32.6 
53.0 
26.4 
36.2 
62.6 
28.1 
27.5 
55.6 
20.0 
38.1 
58.1 
26.1 
31.5 
57.6 
25.2 
33.7 
58.9 
22.6 
31.9 
54.4 
23.8 
29.2 
53.0 
26.8 
38.8 
65.6 
28.3 
35.2 
63.5 
25.7 
32.9 
58.7 
23.4 
34.8 
58.2 
2040 
26.7 
45.5 
72.2 
28.0 
39.9 
67.9 
22.3 
48.2 
70.5 
22.3 
49.2 
71.5 
26.7 
45.6 
72.3 
25.1 
34.6 
59.7 
22.7 
54.9 
77.6 
27.5 
39.9 
67.4 
27.8 
44.0 
71.8 
24.0 
45.3 
69.3 
25.4 
39.2 
64.6 
26.5 
42.1 
68.6 
28.3 
39.1 
67.3 
26.5 
43.8 
70.3 
24.7 
46.7 
71.4 
grew by over 1 VT % a year, over 1 per­
centage point more than the growth in 
the number aged 15 to 64, while in 
Belgium and the Netherlands, the gap 
was just under 1 percentage point. 
In the rest of the Union, however, the 
number of people of 65 and over 
increased by less — in most cases, by 
under 1 % a year — and the growth 
rates of the two population groups was 
much closer ('Δ percentage point a year 
or less). Indeed in Denmark, Germany 
and Ireland, the number in the two 
groups rose at much the same rate, and 
in Austria, the population of working 
age went up by more than the relatively 
small rise in that of 65 and over (partly 
because of net immigration from central 
and eastern Europe). In these Member 
States, therefore, there has been little if 
any rise in the old-age dependency ratio 
over the past 20 years. In consequence, 
the pressure on social protection sys­
tems has been considerably less than in 
the other countries, and in the three 
southern Member States in particular, 
especially since for the most part the 
systems are funded on a pay-as-you-go 
basis (i.e. with present expenditure 
being financed from current receipts, 
instead of from past contributions). 
Over the next 10 years, the average rate 
of growth in population aged 65 and 
over in the four southern Member States, 
where it has greatly exceeded the growth 
of working-age population in the past, is 
projected to slow down appreciably — 
to around 1 VT % a year in Greece and 
just under in Italy (in each case, still 
more than in most other countries) and to 
under 1 % a year in Spain and Portugal. 
In six of the other Member States, 
growth is also forecast to slow down, 
though only a little, and in Sweden and 
the UK, it will remain at only around 
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VT % a year. On the other hand, in 
Denmark, Germany, Austria, the 
Netherlands and Luxembourg, it is pro-
jected to be higher in this decade than in 
the previous two, especially in Germany, 
where it is expected to average around 
2 % a year, more than anywhere else in 
the Union, though in the Netherlands 
and Luxembourg, the average is forecast 
to be close to 1 Vi % a year. 
Nevertheless, any easing of pressure on 
social protection systems in countries 
where the number of people of 65 and 
over rises less rapidly is likely to be off-
set by much lower growth in the popula-
tion of working age. Indeed, in Germany 
and Italy, in both of which the growth in 
the older age group is projected to be par-
ticularly high, the number of people of 
working age is forecast to decline. Only 
in Belgium, Luxembourg, Sweden and 
the UK, is growth of working-age popu-
lation forecast to be higher, if only very 
slightly, than over the preceding 20 years. 
In the latter countries, this, coupled 
with the slow growth of population 
aged 65 and over, means that there is 
likely to be relatively little increase in 
the dependency ratio over the next 10 
years, as in the past (under 1 percentage 
point). In France and Ireland, growth of 
working population of around VT % a 
year is also projected to moderate the 
rise in the dependency ratio. Elsewhere 
in the Union, however, the dependency 
ratio is projected to increase signifi-
cantly (by over 2 percentage points), 
especially in Germany, Italy and Greece 
(by 5 to 6 percentage points). In each of 
these three countries, those aged 65 and 
over are expected to total around 30 % 
of those aged 15 to 64 by 2010. 
Over the 15 years after this, from 2010 
on, the growth in the number of people 
of 65 and over is projected to slow down 
in Germany, Italy and Greece to around 
1 % a year. Everywhere else in the 
Union, however, it is forecast to acceler-
ate, in most cases, substantially. Only in 
Austria, Spain and Portugal is the growth 
rate projected to be under VT % a year 
higher than over the preceding 10 years, 
and these three countries, together with 
the former three, are the only ones in the 
Union where the rise in the number in 
this age group is projected to be under 
11/2 % a year. In Ireland, the Netherlands 
and Finland, growth is forecast to aver-
age around 2/4 % a year and in France 
and Luxembourg, over 2 % a year. 
At the same time, the population of 
working age is projected to decline 
everywhere apart from Greece, 
Luxembourg and Portugal, in all of 
which growth is expected to be very 
slow. In Italy and Finland, working-age 
population is projected to fall by around 
VT % a year. As a result, the old-age 
dependency ratio is likely to increase 
markedly in all Member States, without 
exception. In Belgium, France, the 
Netherlands and Finland, it is projected 
to rise by 10 percentage points or more 
(14 percentage points in Finland), rais-
ing the ratio from one person aged 65 
and over for every four people of work-
ing age to over one in three (well over 
in all except the Netherlands). By 2025, 
only in Ireland and Portugal will the 
number aged 65 and over amount to less 
than 30 % of those aged 15 to 64, and in 
Germany, Italy and Sweden, as well as 
in Belgium, France and Finland, it will 
be over 35 %. 
Over the 15 years after that, although 
the growth of the population aged 65 
and over is projected to slow down in all 
Member States, apart from Germany, 
Austria, Greece, Spain, Italy and 
Portugal, in some cases markedly, it is 
still expected to average 1 % a year or 
more everywhere except Finland and 
Sweden. At the same time, the decline 
in working-age population is projected 
to accelerate in most parts of the Union. 
Only in Sweden and Luxembourg is no 
reduction forecast and in Spain and 
Italy, it is projected to fall by around 
1 % a year. 
In consequence, in these two countries, 
the old-age dependency ratio, based on 
these projections, would increase by 
some 17 percentage points in 15 years, 
to around one person aged 65 and over 
for every two people of working age in 
Spain by 2040 and to well over one for 
every two in Italy. In Germany, the 
Netherlands, Austria, Portugal and the 
UK; the rise in the dependency ratio 
would be over 10 percentage points 
over this period and by the end of it, 
only in Ireland would the number of 
people of 65 and over amount to signif-
icantly less than 40 % of working-age 
population. 
Overall dependency ratio 
The prospective increase in the old-age 
dependency ratio is offset in some 
degree, in terms of the implications for 
social protection and, more generally 
for public expenditure, by the decline in 
the relative number of children under 15 
which is projected for future years. This 
decline, however, in contrast to the fall 
which has occurred over the recent past, 
is relatively small. Whereas the ratio of 
the number under 15 to population of 
working age in the Union fell from 
around a third in 1980 to a quarter at the 
end of the 1990s, and by more in the 
southern Member States, it is projected 
to decline by only around 2 percentage 
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points over the next 20 years and to 
increase marginally from then on. 
Moreover, in the south of the Union, 
where the increase in the old-age 
dependency ratio is expected to be par-
ticularly large, little reduction at all is 
forecast for child dependency. This 
largely reflects the prospective decline 
in population of working age and the 
assumption made in the intermediate 
projection that there will be a slow 
recovery in the fertility rate in future 
years, in place of the fall which has 
occurred in the past. 
It is unlikely, therefore, that changes in 
the child dependency ratio and the 
implied changes in the need for social 
expenditure will compensate for the rise 
in the old-age dependency ratio, as they 
have tended to do in some degree in the 
past. Nevertheless, the fact that the 
number of children in the Union is pro-
jected to fall slightly over the next 20 
years and not to increase much there-
after will at least tend to moderate the 
pressure on social protection systems 
from this source. At the same time, 
however, there is still a need for more 
support facilities, particularly in respect 
of child care, in many parts of the 
Union, if the aim of equalising the 
opportunities of men and women to 
pursue working careers is to be realised. 
This is important not only in itself but 
also to compensate for the prospective 
decline in the number of people of 
working age and, therefore, prospec-
tively in the workforce. 
Moreover, while the number of children 
and young people to be educated and 
trained is likely to diminish over the 
next decade or two, the increasing 
emphasis on strengthening the skills of 
the workforce as a means of improving 
the competitiveness of the Union econ-
omy and, therefore, its capacity to sus-
tain growth, means that the need for 
expenditure on education may expand 
rather than decline in the future. 
The effective 
dependency ratio 
The main qualification to the above estimates of the dependency ratio 
as conventionally measured is not that it 
excludes children, but that it fails to dis-
tinguish between people of working age 
who are in employment and those who 
are not. Although the assumption 
underlying the ratio and its use as an 
indicator is that working-age population 
represents a meaningful measure of the 
potential workforce, in practice a sig-
nificant number of those in this age 
group in the Union are not actually in 
work and contributing to the generation 
of output and income on which the 
funding of social protection systems 
depends. In the Union as a whole, 
almost a third of people aged 15 to 64 
were not in the workforce at all in 1998, 
in the sense that they were neither 
employed nor actively looking for 
work, while another 7 % were looking 
for a job but did not have one (i.e. they 
were unemployed). Only just over 60 % 
of working-age population, therefore, 
were in paid employment. This com-
pares with around 75 % of those in this 
age group in the US and almost as many 
in lapan. 
A major proportion of those aged 15 to 
64 who were not in the labour force 
were women, as might be expected, 
many of them with family or caring 
responsibilities, but also due to other 
factors including earlier barriers to 
female participation and early retire-
ment. However, slightly more than a 
third were men. Although just under 
45 % of these were in full-time educa-
tion and training, most of them under 
25, around 30 % were retired, despite 
the fact that the official retirement age 
is 65 in most Member States (the main 
exceptions are Belgium, France and 
Italy, where retirement from 60 on a full 
pension is possible in many cases). 
Indeed, the actual age of retirement of 
men across the Union is some five years 
less than this at present and, as indicat-
ed below, has shown a long-term down-
ward trend. Another 12 % were people 
with disabilities, while the remainder 
(14—15 %) were not in the workforce 
for unspecified reasons. (These figures 
are based on the Union Labour Force 
Survey.) 
Of the women who were not in the 
workforce, around 45 % claimed to be 
economically inactive for family rea-
sons (some 9/4 % of the total number of 
men and women of working age), while 
a quarter were in full-time education 
and training (proportionately, slightly 
more than in the case of men). Some 
15 % were retired (only slightly less in 
relation to total population in this age 
group than for men), while almost 6 % 
were women with disabilities (again 
slightly less than in the case of men). 
The main changes to occur over the past 
10 to 15 years, which in part have offset 
each other, have been, first, a rise in the 
proportion of men under 65 withdraw-
ing from the labour force to take early 
retirement and, second, an increase in 
the proportion of women pursuing 
working careers and consequently a 
reduction in the proportion who are 
economically inactive. 
As shown below, the relative number of 
men taking early retirement as well as 
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Table 2 
Effective dependency rates by age group 
in Member States, 1985 and 1998 
Population 15 and over not in work as % of total 
employed 
Β 
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Ρ 
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EU 
Population 
65 + 
15-64 
Total 
65 + 
15-64 
Total 
65 + 
15-64 
Total 
65 + 
15-64 
Total 
65 + 
15-64 
Total 
65 + 
15-64 
Total 
65 + 
15-64 
Total 
65 + 
15-64 
Total 
65 + 
15-64 
Total 
65 + 
15-64 
Total 
65 + 
15-64 
Total 
65 + 
15-64 
Total 
65 + 
15-64 
Total 
65 + 
15-64 
Total 
65 + 
15-64 
Total 
65 + 
15-64 
Total 
1985 
38.4 
88.8 
127.2 
29.2 
33.7 
62.9 
33.3 
60.9 
94.2 
35.2 
78.1 
113.3 
41.9 
127.2 
169.0 
31.6 
63.5 
95.1 
33.8 
97.6 
131.4 
36.4 
88.3 
124.7 
30.3 
64.1 
94.4 
30.4 
72.4 
102.9 
31.5 
54.8 
86.2 
29.0 
60.6 
89.6 
24.3 
42.3 
66.6 
33.2 
35.7 
68.9 
34.6 
52.8 
S7.4 
34.1 
69.4 
103.5 
1998 
43.9 
74.2 
118.1 
28.4 
31.2 
59.7 
38.4 
58.9 
97.3 
44.3 
77.6 
121.9 
48.5 
100.3 
148.8 
40.8 
65.9 
106.7 
28.6 
72.1 
100.7 
50.2 
95.1 
145.3 
35.7 
47.4 
83.1 
29.4 
44.9 
74.3 
33.4 
46.5 
79.9 
32.6 
48.2 
so.s 
34.1 
56.3 
90.4 
38.6 
44.6 
83.2 
34.5 
41.8 
76.2 
39.5 
64.1 
103.6 
the women who are inactive as opposed 
to being in work or actively looking for 
work varies markedly across the Union 
— and even between regions within 
countries — just as both have changed 
significantly over time. This suggests 
that there is substantial scope for reduc­
ing the numbers concerned and adding 
to the Union's workforce. The main 
constraint, however, as is evident from 
the large numbers of people who are 
unemployed and, therefore, already in 
the labour force but who cannot find 
work, appears to be the difficulty of 
creating sufficient jobs to keep men 
approaching retirement age in employ­
ment and to attract women into work. 
The effect of the large number of people 
of working age who are not in employ­
ment, but who instead, like those of 65 
and over in retirement, are dependent 
on those in work, is to raise the effective 
dependency ratio in the Union to over 1. 
(It should be emphasised that the effec­
tive dependency ratio is here defined to 
exclude children under 15, who are 
sometimes included in the definition, in 
order to bring out more clearly the 
effect of the large number of people of 
working age in the Union who are not 
in employment. This, however, does not 
mean that children should be ignored in 
any assessment of overall dependency 
since they still need to be supported.) In 
other words, there are slightly more 
people aged 15 and over who are not in 
work than those who are. In 1998, over 
the Union as a whole, those not in work 
amounted to some 104 % of the number 
in employment (Table 2 and Graph 5). 
Just under 40 % of those not in work 
were 65 or over, almost all of them in 
retirement, so that the largest number 
were people aged 15 to 64, most of 
these, as noted above, being economi­
cally inactive rather than being unem­
ployed. Moreover, over the 1990s, the 
number not in work increased signifi­
cantly relative to those in employment 
(from around 96 % in 1990) as much 
because of a rise in the number under 
65 not working as in the number of 
people of 65 and over. 
The effective dependency ratio varies 
considerably across the Union, much 
more so than the conventional one. At 
one extreme, in Spain and Italy, there 
were almost 1 Vi times as many people of 
15 and over not in work in 1998 as were 
employed, while in Greece, the figure 
was some 1.2 times. In both former two 
countries, those of 65 and over account­
ed for only around a third of the total 
number of dependants. The large number 
of people under 65 who are not in 
employment in these two countries, 
therefore, adds substantially to the prob­
lems arising from the large increase in 
the old-age dependency ratio, as conven­
tionally measured, noted above. 
By contrast, in the north of the Union, 
in the Netherlands and the UK, those 
aged 15 and over not in work represen­
ted only around 75 % of the total num­
ber in employment in 1998 and in 
Denmark, under 60 %. In the latter two 
countries, those below 65 but not 
employed accounted for just 55 % or so 
of the number of people dependent on 
those in work. 
The effective dependency ratio, as 
defined here, has changed little over the 
past 10 to 15 years in the Union as a 
whole. While the relative number of 
people of 65 and over has risen, this has 
been offset by a fall in the relative num­
ber of people of working age who are 
not in employment, because of a slight 
decline in unemployment but more 
because of an increase in labour force 
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5. Effective dependency rates by age group 
in Member States, 1985 and 1998 
Population 15 and over not In work as % of total employed 
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6. Participation rates of men aged 55­59 
in Member States, 1985 and 1998 
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participation among women (participa­
tion of men fell). The fall has been par­
ticularly marked in the Benelux coun­
tries, Spain, Ireland, the Netherlands, 
Portugal and the UK, in all of which it 
much more than offset the growth in the 
relative number of 65 and over between 
1985 and 1998. In France, Italy, Finland 
and Sweden, however, the proportion of 
people not in employment rose over this 
period, adding to the increase in that 
of elderly people, while in Germany 
and Greece, the fall was not enough to 
compensate for the rise in the latter. 
In future years, therefore, the signifi­
cance of the ageing of the population 
which is set to occur right across the 
Union and its prospective effect on sys­
tems of social protection, particularly on 
the difficulty of funding them, is likely to 
depend as much on the number of people 
of working age who are in employment 
and, accordingly, the success of the 
economies concerned in creating jobs, as 
on the growth in the number of people 
above the official age of retirement. 
The remainder of this chapter examines 
the trend towards early retirement in 
different Member States, the difference 
in the relative number of women pursu­
ing working careers and the effect of 
their marital status and of the need to 
take care of children on this, the persis­
tence of high levels of long­term unem­
ployment and the continuing tendency 
for the average size of households to 
decline and, therefore, of the number of 
independent households to increase. All 
of these features have significant impli­
cations for the demands imposed on 
systems of social protection. 
The trend towards 
early retirement 
I n 1998, some 69 % of men aged 55 to 59 in the Union were economi­
cally active, most of the rest having 
taken early retirement. This compares 
with a figure of 74% in 1985 (and 
72 % in 1990). There has, therefore, 
been a slow but persistent decline in 
the number of men of this age in the 
workforce, which serves to reduce 
their rate of participation by an aver­
age of around 1 percentage point 
every three years, though the extent of 
the decline is affected by the rate of 
employment growth. The lower the 
rate, the more men seem to opt for 
early retirement both because more of 
them tend to lose their job when this is 
the case and because of the shortage of 
alternative employment opportunities. 
For men aged 60 to 64, the reduction 
in the rate of participation has been 
more marked. In 1998, only 32 % of 
men in this age group in the Union 
were still in the workforce as com­
pared with 40 % in 1985 (and 36 % in 
1990). The rate has, therefore, 
declined by over VT percentage point a 
year over this period, though again by 
slightly more during periods of slow 
growth than when net job creation has 
been higher. 
The decline in participation for men of 
55 and over has occurred right across 
the Union. It was particularly marked 
for men aged 55 to 59 in Italy and 
Belgium, the proportion of those of 
this age in the workforce in the former 
falling from almost 70 % to 53 % and 
in the latter from 62 % to 51 %, the 
lowest in the Union, in the 13 years 
1985 to 1998 (Graph 6). There was 
also a similarly large fall in Ireland 
(from 82 % to 7114 %), but here the 
rate remained above the Union aver­
age. In contrast, the rate remained 
much the same in the Netherlands, 
Finland and Sweden (though the fig­
ures for 1985 for the last two involve 
some estimation to make them compa­
rable with those for 1998) and rose 
slightly in Portugal. 
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7. Participation rates of men aged 60-64 
in Member States, 1985 and 1998 
% men 60-64 
8. Participation rates of women aged 55-59 
in Member States, 1985 and 1998 
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Participation of men aged 60 to 64 
declined in all Member States over 
these 13 years, especially in Belgium 
and Ireland, as for men aged 55 to 59, 
but also in France and Finland, where in 
each case, the fall was over 10 percent­
age points (Graph 7). As a result of the 
decline, the proportion of men in this 
age group who were still economically 
active in 1998 was only 16 % in 
Belgium and 11 % in France, while in 
Austria (ll ' /2%) and Luxembourg 
(10 %), the figure was equally low. In 
all four of these countries, the possibil­
ity of retiring from the workforce at a 
relatively young age — i.e. 60 or below 
— is greater than in other parts of the 
Union, though measures have been 
taken in each case to try to increase the 
number of older people remaining in 
employment (see Chapter 4 below). In 
Ireland (despite the significant fall over 
preceding years), Portugal, Sweden and 
the UK, by contrast, half or more of 
men aged 60 to 64 were still either 
working or actively looking for work in 
1998. 
The same decline in participation has not 
occurred among women. Any trend 
towards early retirement has, in most 
parts of the Union, been more than offset 
by the tendency for more women to pur­
sue working careers, which is detailed 
below. This is particularly so for those 
aged 55 to 59, the number of whom in the 
workforce increased in relation to the 
total in this age group in all Member 
States, except Greece and Austria, 
between 1985 and 1998. Nevertheless, it 
was still the case that only just over 42 % 
of women of this age were economically 
active in the Union, reflecting the fact 
that participation of women is still rela­
tively low in many countries (Graph 8). 
Although the rise in participation of 
women aged 60 to 64 was less general 
over these 13 years than among those 
slightly younger and although there was 
little change over the Union as a whole 
— largely because of a decline in 
France and Italy — there was still a rise 
in the majority of Member States 
(Graph 9). Under 15 % of women in 
this age group, however, were in the 
labour force in the Union in 1998. The 
latter low figure is probably also linked 
to the persistence of an earlier pension­
able age for women than men (60 rather 
than 65) in a number of countries — 
though this is in the process of being 
equalised — which encourages early 
retirement. 
Reversing the trend towards early 
retirement among men and increasing 
the number of older women who are 
economically active has to be a major 
aspect of any policy aimed at increasing 
employment rates in the Union and 
relieving the pressure on systems of 
social protection. To achieve this, how­
ever, involves formidable problems 
given the continuing tendency of 
employers to concentrate redundancies 
on older workers who then have diffi­
culty finding alternative work, in part 
because the skills they possess are 
sometimes outdated, in part because of 
a reluctance by companies to recruit 
older people, not always for justifiable 
reasons. Women who have been absent 
from the workforce for long periods, 
due to caring responsibilities or earlier 
legal and social barriers to female 
workforce participation, have specific 
needs for retraining and reintegration. 
The increased 
participation of 
women in the 
workforce 
The increasing participation of women in the workforce is one of 
the main features of social change 
which has occurred across the Union 
over the past 30 or 40 years. Indeed, in 
virtually all Member States, women 
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9. Participation rates of women aged 60­64 
in Member States, 1985 and 1998 
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10. Participation rates of women aged 25­44 
in Member States, 1985 and 1998 
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have accounted for the whole of the 
increase in employment which has 
taken place over this period and the 
number of men in work has generally 
declined. This increase in participation 
has been common to all parts of the 
Union and is especially marked for 
women of child­bearing age. 
In the Union as a whole, for example, 
the number of women aged 25 to 44 in 
the workforce (i.e. either employed or 
actively looking for work) increased 
from just under 62 % of those in this age 
group to just over 73 % in 1998 (Graph 
10). Apart from in the three Nordic 
countries, Denmark, Finland and 
Sweden, in each of which the participa­
tion rate was close to 90 % in 1985 and 
in which in the latter two, in particular, 
the rate declined markedly in the reces­
sion of the early 1990s, the rise was 
general throughout the Union. It was 
especially high in Spain and Ireland, 
where the rate was very low in 1985 and 
where it increased in both cases from 
40 % to around 65 %. Similarly, in 
Greece, participation went up from 
50 % to 66 % and in the Netherlands, 
from 5714 % to 75 % over these 13 years. 
Nevertheless, participation of women 
remains low in many southern regions, 
especially those where job availability is 
inadequate and unemployment high. 
This is particularly the case in southern 
Italy; here the relative number of women 
pursuing working careers has hardly 
changed since 1985, while in the north of 
the country, by contrast, it has risen 
markedly. For example, in Calabria, 
Puglia and Sicily, under 30 % of women 
aged 25 to 54 were in employment in 
1998 (i.e. in this case, excluding those 
who were unemployed) as compared 
with over 60 % in most of the northern 
regions. In Campania and Puglia, this 
represents a significant reduction in rela­
tion to 1985 and in Sicily, only a small 
increase, whereas in most parts of the 
north, the proportion rose by some 15 
percentage points or more over this peri­
od. The key difference between the two 
parts of the country is that while the rate 
of net job creation has been relatively 
high in the north and unemployment 
generally low, the reverse has been true 
in the south, deterring women from join­
ing the labour force and making it diffi­
cult for them to find work if they did. 
Despite the apparent influence of 
labour market conditions, it still seems 
to be the case, however, that whether 
women pursue a working career or not 
is very much dependent on whether 
they are married or single, especially in 
the south of the Union, where there 
may still be less social acceptance of 
women working than in the north. At 
the same time, the effect on participa­
tion of being married seems to be 
declining since it is less marked for 
women in the younger than older age 
groups. In northern parts of the Union, 
on the other hand, participation seems 
to depend much more on whether or 
not they have children, which in part 
reflects the difficulty of arranging child 
care, which in the south seems to be 
provided by the extended family. 
Thus, whereas in the northern Member 
States, except the Benelux countries and 
Ireland where it is larger, there was a 
difference of only around 10 percentage 
points or less in 1997 in participation 
rates between single women aged 25 to 
49 without a child under 10 and married 
women in the same position, in Greece, 
Spain and Italy, the difference was some 
25 percentage points or more (Graph 11, 
in which 'single' women includes those 
who were separated, divorced or wid­
owed — i.e. it consists broadly of those 
living alone). Indeed, in all three of 
these countries, only 55 % or so of mar­
ried women in this age group without 
young children were in the workforce, 
whereas the figure was 80 % or more in 
Germany, France and the UK. These dif­
ferences, however, need to be interpret­
ed with some caution, since other fac­
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tors apart from family circumstances 
may be at work, such as educational 
attainment levels or differences in the 
age structure of married and single 
women without children between north­
ern and southern Member States. 
The proportion of married women aged 
25 to 49 with a child under five who 
were in the workforce in the three 
southern countries was not much lower 
than for those without young children 
(50 to 55 %) in 1997 (Graph 12). The 
same was true in Portugal, where more 
married women are economically active 
than in the rest of the south. In all of the 
northern countries, except Belgium 
(where the rate was much higher), by 
contrast, participation of married 
women with young children was 
markedly lower than for those without. 
This was especially so in Germany and 
the UK, in both of which the participa­
tion rate of those with children was well 
over 20 percentage points lower than 
for those without. Indeed, in Germany, 
the rate was among the lowest in the 
Union and slightly below that in 
Greece, Spain or Italy. 
Differences in the effect of marital sta­
tus on participation rates across the 
Union may also be inferred if single and 
married women with young children are 
compared. In the three southern coun­
tries, just over 70 % of single women 
aged 25 to 49 with a child under five 
were in the workforce in 1997, i.e. some 
20 percentages point higher than the 
figure for married women with a child 
of this age and only around 10 percent­
age points lower than for single women 
without children. In northern countries, 
while participation was also generally 
higher among single women with a 
young child than among married 
women, the difference was much 
11. Participation rates of women aged 25-49 with no children 
below 15 by marital status in Member States, 1997 
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12. Participation rates of women aged 25-49 with at least one child 
below five by marital status in Member States, 1997 
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smaller. In Finland, Ireland and the UK, 
however, participation was lower 
among single women. Indeed, the pro­
portion of single women with children 
in he workforce (including, it should 
be reiterated, those who were separated, 
divorced or widowed) was lower in 
Ireland and the UK than anywhere else 
in the Union. In the case of the UK, 
where the figure was only around 45 %, 
this is in stark contrast to the high par­
ticipation among women generally. As 
L NL A P FIN UK EU 
noted above, however, these differences 
may partly reflect differences in the age 
structure of single and married women 
with young children between northern 
and southern countries. 
Some of the difference in participation 
rates among single women with chil­
dren in the UK and other parts of the 
Union, on the other hand, might also be 
attributable to differences in unemploy­
ment of this group, which in a number 
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13. Participation rates of women aged 25­49 with at 
least one child aged 5­9 by marital status in 
Member States, 1997 
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of Member States is substantially high­
er than among other women, perhaps 
reflecting the use of unemployment ben­
efits as a source of income support. In 
Belgium, for example, the average rate 
of unemployment among single women 
with a child under five was almost 27 % 
in 1997 as against a rate of only 9 % for 
married women in this position. In 
France over 22 % as opposed to under 
15 % for the latter group and in Ireland, 
23 % as opposed to 9 %. There are also 
pronounced differences between the two 
groups of women in Spain and Greece, 
but in both cases, many of the unem­
ployed, especially in Greece, are likely 
to be ineligible for benefit (see Chapter 4 
below). 
The low participation of single women 
with children in the UK, as well as in 
Ireland, together with the large differ­
ence in rates between married women 
with and without children, strongly sug­
gests a shortage of child­care facilities in 
these two countries, which seems to out­
weigh the financial pressure on single 
women with children to work seemingly 
apparent in most other parts of the 
Union. This impression is reinforced in 
the case of the UK by the fact that par­
ticipation rates of both single and mar­
ried women with a child of school age 
FIN UK EU Β D EL E F IRL I L I 
No data available for Denmark and Sweden. 
ρ FIN UK EU 
(five to nine) are much higher than for 
those with a younger child (Graph 13). 
The UK, however, is not alone in this 
respect. The same was true in 1997 in all 
northern Member States, except 
Belgium, whereas in the southern 
Member States, there was very little dif­
ference in rates of participation between 
the two groups of women. 
At the same time, pursuing a working 
career in a number of countries in the 
north of the Union often involves work­
ing part time instead of full time, in order 
better to reconcile family responsibilities 
with having a job. In the Netherlands, 
around 90 % of married women aged 25 
to 49 in employment with a child under 
15 worked part time in 1997 as com­
pared with under 70 % of married 
women in this age group without chil­
dren and under 40 % of single women 
without children (Graphs 14 and 15). In 
the UK, just under two thirds of married 
women with children in work had a part­
time job, whereas only a third of those 
without children worked part time and 
under 15 % of single women without 
children. By contrast, the figure was 
almost 60 % for single women with a 
child. A similar pattern, if less pro­
nounced, is evident for other Member 
States in the north of the Union, whereas 
in the south, there is very little difference 
in the relative number of women with 
part­time jobs between those with chil­
dren and those without. In both cases, the 
number involved was still very small in 
1997, though it is on the increase. 
The effect on the overall size of the 
labour force of these differences in par­
ticipation rates of women with differing 
personal circumstances between the 
north and the south of the Union is 
increased by the fact that there are also 
major differences between the two in the 
relative numbers involved. In each of the 
northern Member States, apart from 
Luxembourg, Belgium and Ireland, over 
25 % of women aged 25 to 49 were 
either single, separated or divorced in 
1997. In Finland, the figure was almost 
40 % and in the UK and France, around 
a third. Moreover, a significant propor­
tion of these in most of the countries — 
around 35 % in the UK and France, some 
12 % of all women in this age group — 
had a child under 10 (Graph 16). 
In each of the southern Member States, 
in marked contrast, only some 10% of 
women in this age group were single, 
separated or divorced in 1997, and 2 % 
or less had a child under 10. These dif­
ferences not only affect rates of partici­
p o 
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pation of women in the labour force, they 
also have significant implications for the 
need for support facilities, which are 
clearly greater in most parts of the north 
of the Union than the south. Equally, 
however, the differences might well be a 
reflection, in some degree, of the differ­
ing levels of social support available in 
the two parts of the Union, as well as of 
differences in the opportunities open for 
women to work, including the availabili­
ty of part­time jobs. 
The extent of women's participation in 
employment is not the only issue of note: 
the nature — or quality ­ of the jobs they 
do is also of importance. Over the 1990s 
and even over the period of economic 
recovery since 1994, most of the net 
additional jobs created for women in the 
EU have been part time ones. In 1998, 
33 % of women in employment in the EU 
worked part­time. In the Netherlands, the 
figure was as high as 68 % and in the UK 
and Sweden, over 40 %, while in south­
ern Member States it was much lower 
(under 20 % in Greece, Portugal, Spain 
and Italy, but also Finland). For men, the 
proportion is much less, though it is 
increasing rapidly and while the number 
in part­time employment has risen over 
the 1990s, the number in full­time jobs 
has fallen significantly. In 1998, some 
6 % of men in employment in the EU 
FIN UK EU Β IRL EL 
No data available for Denmark and Sweden. 
worked part time, up from 4 % in 1990. 
(The pattern of variation between 
Member States is similar to that for 
women, with the highest proportion in 
the Netherlands at 18 % and with the fig­
ure in the UK, Sweden and Denmark 
being around 9 % or more, but only 
around 3 % in Spain, Greece, Italy and 
Luxembourg.) The proportion of 
employees working in temporary jobs, 
though generally small, is also rising — 
from over W/T% in the case of women 
and 12 % in the case of men in the EU in 
1998 as against some Ψ/τ % and 
7'/2 %, respectively, in 1985. 
These developments have important 
implications for both the financing of 
social protection systems and the extent 
of income support they provide. Many 
people in part­time jobs in a number of 
countries are in effect excluded both 
from having to pay social contributions 
and from entitlement to benefit, while in 
a few cases people in certain temporary 
jobs are not entitled to the same benefit 
as those in permanent ones. 
The analysis throughout this report 
draws attention to the challenge posed 
for systems of social protection across 
the Union by the complexity and diversi­
ty of gender relations in modern 
European societies. Most systems are 
still based primarily on a model of men 
being the breadwinners and women stay­
ing at home which clearly does not 
reflect the new realities: increasing par­
ticipation of women in the labour force 
(which, indeed, needs to rise further); 
more diverse patterns of caring, for chil­
dren and other family members, calling 
for appropriate support facilities; grow­
ing dependence of households on the 
earnings of women; greater diversity in 
the pattern of work for both men and 
women; and increased rates of divorce 
and separation. The system of derived 
rights has accordingly become an inef­
fective means of ensuring adequate lev­
els of support in a growing number of 
cases. At the same time, despite the need 
to encourage more women to work, bar­
riers and disincentives to them taking up 
jobs persist in many parts of the Union. 
The persistence 
of long-term 
unemployment 
R elatively low rates of participation in the workforce in many parts of 
the Union are not the only source of 
pressure on systems of social protection 
and their financing. Pressure also stems 
from the fact, as noted above, that a sig­
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17. Unemployment and long-term unemployment in the Union, 
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nificant number of those who are econ-
omically active are unemployed rather 
than working. Moreover, to add to the 
pressure, a large proportion of these are 
long-term unemployed, in the sense that 
they have been out of work for at least a 
year and in many cases much longer. 
Almost 7 % of the working-age popula-
tion in the Union were unemployed in 
1998, slightly higher than the proportion 
in the mid-1980s and not much lower 
than the peak level reached in 1994. Of 
these, around half (49'/2 %) had been 
unemployed for a year or more and 
almost a third (31 %), unemployed for at 
least two years (Graph 17). Despite the 
efforts in Member States to tackle this 
problem, these proportions are not much 
different from what they were in the mid-
1980s and slightly higher than in 1994 
which marked the start of economic 
recovery in the Union after the recession 
of the early 1980s. In 1998, therefore, 
there were over 8 million members of the 
workforce who were long-term unem-
ployed, over 5 million of whom had been 
unemployed for two years or more. 
Long-term unemployment is particularly 
prevalent in Spain and Italy, where it 
affected 5 to 6% of people of working 
age in 1998 (some WT million people in 
Spain, almost 2 million in Italy in 1998) 
and where 3 to 4% of those in this age 
group had been unemployed for two 
years or more (over 1 million in both 
cases) (Graph 18). While in Spain there 
has been a reduction in these figures 
since 1985, in Italy both are sharply up, 
as they are in Greece and Germany 
(where the number of both long-term 
unemployed and very long-term unem-
ployed in 1998 was much the same as in 
Italy). For the majority of countries for 
which data are available for both years, 
however, the relative number of people 
who are long-term unemployed has 
fallen since the mid-1980s. The reduction 
is particularly large in Denmark, Ireland, 
the Netherlands, Portugal and the UK, 
where in all cases the proportion of work-
ing-age population out of work for one 
year or more in 1998 was less than half 
the level in 1985. In all of these countries, 
this was associated with a substantial 
decline in overall unemployment. 
Although the number of long-term 
unemployed may be similar in 
Germany and Italy, the nature of the 
problem is somewhat different, as it is 
generally between the north and the 
south of the Union. In the EU as a 
whole, some 23 Vá % of the long-term 
unemployed were aged 50 or over in 
1998, a somewhat larger proportion 
than the number of people aged 50 to 64 
in the workforce (20 %). In general, 
therefore, workers of this age are more 
likely to be out of work for a long time 
than those under 50. In most northern 
Member States, however, the relative 
number of long-term unemployed who 
are 50 or more is even higher, which 
also partly reflects the low percentage 
of young long-term unemployed. In 
Denmark, the share of long-term unem-
ployed over 50 was as high as AÍVT % in 
1998, in Germany, 39 % and in Austria, 
35 % (Graph 19). In the south of the 
Union, however, the proportions are 
much lower, Portugal apart. In Spain, 
the figure was just over 20 % in 1998, 
in Greece, 15 % and in Italy, as low as 
9 %. The proportions were also rela-
tively low in Ireland and the Benelux 
countries, though in the latter case, this 
largely reflects the comparatively small 
number of people in this age group still 
in the labour force, as it does in Italy. 
These differences in the relative num-
bers of older people among the long-
term unemployed are associated in 
many cases with a counterpart differ-
ence in the proportion of the long-term 
unemployed who are under 25. In the 
Union as a whole, around \%VT% of 
those who had been out of work for a 
year or more in 1998 were young peo-
ple below this age. In Greece and Italy, 
however, the figure was over 30 % 
(almost 36 % in Italy) and in Spain and 
Portugal, 22 to 23 %. By contrast, in 
Denmark, only 3 % of the long-term 
unemployed were under 25, in 
Germany and Austria, only around 
6/2 % and in Finland and Sweden, 
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under 9 %. These marked differences 
reflect not only the much greater avail­
ability of vocational training in the latter 
group of countries as compared with the 
former, but also the more extensive sup­
port provided to help young people 
make the transition from school to 
work. 
They also have differing implications 
for social protection needs, which in the 
south are largely met through the 
extended family, as is apparent from the 
very small number of young people 
who live alone, shown below. 
Changing structure 
of households 
A s documented in Social protection in Europe 1997, the number of 
individual households in the Union has 
tended to rise significantly faster than 
population. This is reflected in a gradual 
decline in the average size of households 
and is associated with more people living 
alone, which, in turn, has led to a growth 
of households with no one in work and, 
accordingly, greater demands on systems 
of social protection. These trends appear 
to be continuing, though from very dif­
ferent starting­points in the north and the 
south of the Union. 
In 1998, the average number of people 
aged 15 and over per household contin­
ued to decline in virtually all Member 
States (by VT % or so on average). (The 
focus here is on the number aged 15 and 
over since the main concern is with the 
potential support available from within 
the household for those who might need 
care, as well as with the ability, or 
inability, of households to support 
themselves financially from paid 
employment. The data come from the 
Union Labour Force Survey.) In the 
Union as a whole, there was an average 
of just over two people in this age group 
per household, some 5 % less than in 
1986 (Graph 20). In most parts of the 
north — specifically Germany, France, 
the Netherlands, Finland and the UK 
(there are no comparable data for 
Denmark and Sweden, though the fig­
ure is likely to be similarly low) — the 
average is below two (below 1.8 in 
Germany and the UK in 1998 and only 
1.7 in Finland). In the four southern 
Member States as well as in Ireland, it 
is over 2.25 (in Portugal, just under 2.5 
and in Spain, 2.6 in 1998). 
Moreover, the decline in average num­
bers has been significantly larger in the 
north than in the south over the past 12 
years, almost 1 % a year in the 
Netherlands and the UK as against only 
around 3 % over the period as a whole 
in Greece, Spain and Portugal and little 
change at all in Italy. 
Differences in average household size 
are reflected in similar differences in 
18. Unemployment and long­term unemployment in Member States, 
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19. Long­term unemployment by age in Member States, 1998 
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20. Average number of people aged 15 and over per 
household in Member States, 1986 and 1998 
Number per household 
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■ 1998 
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the relative number of households with 
only one person of 15 and over. In the 
Union as a whole, just under 25 % of 
households in 1998 had no more than one 
person of this age and in some 
16 % of these (just under 3/4 % of all 
households), there was a child 
under 15, virtually all of them being 
brought up by women rather than men 
(Graph 21). 
Both figures were significantly higher 
than 12 years earlier and have continued 
to increase in the recent past. In Finland, 
however, almost 40 % of households had 
only one person living in them and in 
Germany, the Netherlands and the UK, 
around 30 %. Moreover, in the UK, a 
third of the people concerned (almost IVT 
% of all households) were lone parents. 
In all three of the latter countries (there 
are no comparable data for Finland), the 
proportions were higher than in 1986; in 
the UK they were almost twice as high, 
the relative number of single­
person households with children increas­
ing by nearly 2VT times over the period. 
By contrast, in Italy and Greece, only 
around 15 % of households in 1998 
had only one person of 15 and over 
living in them and in Spain and 
Portugal,under 9 %, while in all four 
countries only 1 VT % or less of all 
households were home to lone par­
ents. Except in Greece, these propor­
tions were not much higher than 12 
years earlier, though they have 
increased in all four countries over the 
past two years. 
Households with 
no one in work 
People living alone, if they are of working age, are far more likely 
to be unemployed, at least in the north 
of the Union, than those living with 
other people of 15 and over. In 1998, 
some 15 % of unemployed men aged 
15 to 64 lived in single­person house­
holds as opposed to 10 % of men in 
employment (Graph 22). In the 
Netherlands, almost a third of unem­
ployed men lived alone, around twice 
the proportion of men with a job, and 
in Germany, the UK and Belgium, in 
each of which around 25 % of unem­
ployed men lived alone, the differ­
ence was equally pronounced. In all 
these countries, apart from Germany, 
moreover, and most especially in the 
Netherlands and the UK, the propor­
tion of the unemployed in single­per­
son households was larger than two 
years previously, despite overall 
unemployment being lower. 
In all of the southern Member States, 
on the other hand, the relative number 
of unemployed men living alone was 
both small (around 4 % or less of the 
total) and less than for those in 
employment. Furthermore, in 1998 
the proportion was either the same or 
less than two years earlier. The coun­
terpart of this is that a significant pro­
portion of men who are unemployed 
(53 % in Spain and 47 % in Italy) 
lived in large households, with four or 
more people, where there is every 
possibility of financial support. Many 
of these were almost certainly young 
people under 30, in Italy, looking for 
their first job and in Spain, looking 
for a stable, long­term one. 
A similar difference in household 
characteristics between the employed 
and unemployed is evident for women 
in both the north and south of the 
Union. Although, on average over the 
Union as a whole, the proportion of 
those unemployed living alone was 
much the same as those in work in 
1998, in all northern Member States it 
was larger and in all of the four south­
ern countries, smaller (Graph 23). 
Indeed, in the south, the difference 
was much more marked than for men, 
reflecting the importance of women 
having a job to be able to live alone. 
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The disproportionate number of peo­
ple unemployed living on their own in 
the north of the Union is one of the 
reasons why the relative number of 
households with no one of working 
age in employment is much higher 
than the rate of unemployment. Just 
over 19 % of households in the Union 
which were home to people aged 15 
to 64 (i.e. leaving aside households 
with only older people in retirement 
living in them) had no one in a job in 
1998, up on the 1986 figure, despite 
the marginally lower level of unem­
ployment, but down slightly on the 
figure in 1996 (just over 20 %), 
reflecting the fall in unemployment 
(from 10.8 % to 10 %). 
Although unemployment is higher in 
most parts of the south than in the 
north of the Union, the main excep­
tion being Portugal, the much larger 
number of the unemployed living 
alone in the north means that differ­
ences between the two in the relative 
number of households without any­
body in paid employment are relative­
ly small. As noted above, part of the 
explanation comes from the different 
behaviour of young people in the 
north and the south. Indeed, in 
Belgium, Germany and the UK, the 
proportion of households in 1998 with 
no one in work was larger than in 
either Spain or Italy, where unem­
ployment was markedly higher 
(Graph 24). This is most striking in 
the case of the UK, which had an 
unemployment rate only a third as 
high as in Spain and half that in Italy, 
but a larger number of 'workless' 
households (I9V2 % of the total). 
Moreover, whereas unemployment 
fell significantly between 1986 and 
1998 in the UK (from 11.5% to 
6.3 %), this fall had no effect at all on 
22. Employed and unemployed men, aged 15-64, by size of 
household in Member States, 1998 
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23. Employed and unemployed women, aged 15­64, by size of 
household in Member States, 1998 
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the relative number of households 
with no one in work which increased 
slightly over this period. The same 
was the case in Belgium, though here 
the fall in unemployment was much 
less (just under 1 percentage point), 
while in the Netherlands, where the 
proportion of 'workless' households 
fell, this was still less than might have 
been expected given the halving in the 
unemployment rate. 
The relative pressure imposed on sys­
tems of protection by unemployment, 
or, more generally, by people not 
being in work, is, therefore, not fully 
reflected in the figures for unemploy­
ment rates. In the south of the Union, 
high rates of unemployment combined 
with low levels of labour force partic­
ipation impose much less pressure 
than they would in most northern 
Member States, because of the larger 
size of households and the support 
available to most of them from within 
the family. Moreover, the trend 
towards smaller households and more 
people living alone means that falls in 
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24. Share of households with nobody in employment in Member 
States, 1986 and 1998 
Workless households as % of all households, 15-64 
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unemployment do not necessarily give 
rise to proportionately lower needs for 
both social and financial support. 
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Chapter 2: Recent developments in the 
modernisation of social protection 
The major demographic, social and economic changes taking place 
across Europe, which were examined in 
the previous chapter, pose serious chal-
lenges to systems of social protection in 
every Member State. While there is an 
acceptance of the importance of provid-
ing high levels of social support for 
those in need, it is also recognised that 
this must be consistent with, and where 
possible reinforce, the maintenance of 
economic competitiveness and policies 
for sustained — and sustainable — 
growth and high employment which are 
essential for the long-term achievement 
of social objectives. Indeed, economic 
growth is important not only for job 
creation and securing improvements in 
the general well-being of society but 
also for generating the income on which 
the funding of systems of social protec-
tion depends. 
The recent Commission communi-
cation, 'A concerted strategy for mod-
ernising social protection' (COM(1999) 
347) drew attention to these challenges 
and to the valuable role which social 
welfare systems can perform in under-
pinning economic development and the 
structural changes in activity and 
employment which it entails as well as 
helping to safeguard economic and 
social cohesion. At the same time, it 
emphasised that increasing the number 
of people in work and improving their 
long-term job prospects is an important 
way of raising social welfare and com-
bating social exclusion. It identified 
four key objectives which are central 
elements in the modernisation of social 
protection systems in EU Member 
States: 
• to make work pay and to provide 
secure income; 
• to make pensions safe and pension 
systems sustainable; 
• to promote social inclusion; 
• to ensure high quality and sustain-
able health care. 
The concern in this chapter is to review 
the changes which have taken place in 
systems of social protection across the 
Union in recent years and the motiva-
tion behind these, as well as those 
which are in the process of being intro-
duced or are being debated. 
Accordingly, it updates the analysis 
contained in Social protection in 
Europe 1997, which covered develop-
ments up to the end of 1997. At the 
same time, it focuses on the four key 
objectives set out in the Commission 
communication, which are common 
elements in the process of modernising 
social protection systems now under 
way in Member States. 
It considers, firstly, the objective of 
making work pay and providing secure 
income, and examines changes to both 
systems of unemployment compensa-
tion and other schemes to support those 
of working age who are not in paid 
employment, in particular sickness and 
disability benefits, early retirement pen-
sions and minimum income guarantee 
schemes. Since developments in this 
general area are reviewed in some detail 
in Chapter 4 below, the analysis is lim-
ited to summarising the main kinds of 
change which have taken place across 
the Union and their implications for the 
general aim of ensuring that there is a 
financial incentive for people to work 
rather than be dependent on the State, 
but also that they receive an acceptable 
level of income if they are unable to 
work. 
Changes in family-related benefits are 
also reviewed under this head, as a 
major aim of these is to ensure that 
people with children have a secure in-
come as well as practical support, so that 
caring responsibilities do not become 
an obstacle to the pursuit of a working 
career. This is particularly important for 
women, on whom caring responsibili-
ties mainly fall in practice and who, 
therefore, face the problem of reconcil-
ing them with having a paid job. 
Secondly, it reviews the measures taken 
to promote social inclusion and to pre-
vent people, as far as possible, from 
becoming dependent on State benefits 
for prolonged periods, which is likely to 
make it difficult if not impossible for 
them to participate fully in society. This 
is the third of the objectives listed 
above, but it is here considered in rela-
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tion to the first objective, since giving 
people access to a stable job with a rea-
sonable level of pay is an important, if 
not critical, means of making it possible 
for them to become normal members of 
society. They are also closely related to 
labour market policies, aimed at help-
ing people improve their employability 
and find a job, which are a central part 
of the European employment strategy 
and which are examined along with 
other changes in unemployment benefit 
systems in Chapter 4. 
Social inclusion, however, is not con-
fined to having a job and to people 
being able to support themselves with-
out relying on social transfers. It also 
means having access to education and 
vocational training, a high standard of 
health care and decent housing. Policies 
to promote social inclusion, therefore, 
need to encompass these aspects as 
well. 
Thirdly, it considers the second of the 
objectives listed above and examines 
the changes made to old-age pension 
systems to secure the future income of 
those in retirement and ensure that they 
are sustainable. In practice, this means 
making sure that the transfers required 
to provide a reasonable standard of 
living can be met without imposing 
intolerable strains on future generations 
and, in particular, on those in work. 
Finally, it considers the last of the 
objectives listed above and the develop-
ments which have occurred in health 
systems across the Union to ensure the 
delivery of high-quality care on a sus-
tainable basis. In particular, it reviews 
the changes in the way that services are 
organised and the scale of public sector 
provision and funding, which have been 
aimed at maintaining control of costs 
and limiting expenditure to levels which 
can be sustainably financed whilst 
improving standards and ensuring equal 
access to all. This issue is closely re-
lated to the objective on pensions, in so 
far as people in retirement, particularly 
those of more advanced years, represent 
the main client group for public health 
services. It is also related to the ques-
tion of long-term care, especially for 
the elderly, which has become an 
important challenge for systems of 
social protection in recent years as more 
people live into advanced old age and 
which is, therefore, examined under this 
head. At the same time, changes in 
health systems may also be linked to the 
promotion of social inclusion, notably 
by ensuring access for all to a high 
standard of care. 
Key objective: 
making work pay 
and providing 
secure income 
I n recent years, there has been a re-examination across the Union of 
benefits, particularly, though not only, 
in respect of unemployment, and the 
conditions attached to their payment in 
terms of the incentive they imply to find 
a job. This has been prompted by the 
persistence of high rates of unemploy-
ment and a concern to ensure that social 
protection systems themselves do not 
encourage people to delay actively 
looking for a job or even to choose to 
live on benefits rather than to be 
employed. It has also been a response to 
a slowdown in real income growth and 
rising rates of tax and social charges on 
those in employment which has led to 
declining popular support for large 
transfers to those who are not working. 
As a result, measures have been taken 
in many Member States to limit the 
amounts transferred to those out of 
work, to tighten up the qualifying con-
ditions for eligibility for benefit, to 
increase the pressure on the unem-
ployed to find a job as quickly as poss-
ible, to step up efforts to counter fraudu-
lent claims and abuse of the system, to 
shorten the period over which benefits 
are payable and, in a few cases, to 
reduce benefit rates. These measures 
have been applied not only to unem-
ployment benefits but also to disability 
benefits and early retirement schemes, 
which had come to be used as effective 
substitutes for unemployment compen-
sation in a number of countries, in 
recognition of the unlikelihood of 
many, especially those in their fifties 
with outdated skills, finding a job, but 
also because of their effect in reducing 
the published unemployment figures. 
This was particularly so in the late 
1970s and 1980s when the number of 
people out of work rose markedly and 
long-term unemployment became a 
major problem. 
Those efforts have been accompanied 
in all countries by increased emphasis 
on active measures to help those out of 
work find a job and to improve their 
employability, as a long-term means of 
reducing social transfers and the num-
ber of people dependent on benefits, as 
well as the length of time they remain 
out of work. Indeed, getting people into 
secure jobs with decent levels of pay is 
seen as the surest way of combating 
poverty and deprivation and, therefore, 
of ensuring their inclusion in society as 
well as giving them the possibility of 
fulfilling their personal aspirations. 
Accordingly, active labour market 
measures, and employment policy in 
general, have come to be used as a 
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major weapon against social exclusion 
and are discussed further below under 
this head, though, as noted there, they 
need to be accompanied by action in 
other areas to tackle other aspects of 
exclusion if they are to be fully effec-
tive. 
Changes in benefit systems have also 
been combined in some countries with 
attempts to make work more rewarding 
financially by introducing measures to 
increase the net income of those taking 
up a job, both through allowing them to 
continue to receive some support after 
they begin to work and by extending in-
work benefits. These measures have 
been directed, in particular, towards en-
couraging people to take up low-paid or 
part-time jobs, which they might other-
wise be reluctant to do if the earnings 
they received were little if any higher 
than the amount of benefit payment. 
In-work benefits 
This approach has been pushed furthest 
in the UK, where 'Family credit', aimed 
at increasing the net income of people in 
low-paid jobs with children, by paying 
them a supplement on top of their wage 
if their household income fell below a 
minimum level, was introduced as an in-
work benefit some years ago. In addition 
to the introduction of a national mini-
mum wage for the first time, 'Family 
credit' has recently been replaced by a 
more extensive and more generous 
scheme, the 'Working families' tax cred-
it', guaranteeing all people in employ-
ment with dependent families, including 
lone parents, a minimum level of income 
(of GBP 200 a week -just over EUR 300 
- for those in full-time work) and giving 
them a more generous allowance to 
cover the costs of child care. In addition, 
all maintenance payments to lone par-
ents, following divorce or separation, are 
disregarded in calculating the new bene-
fit. 
A similar measure has also been intro-
duced for people with disabilities, the 
'Disabled persons' tax credit', guarantee-
ing them a minimum income if they take 
up full-time work at the national mini-
mum wage. In addition, a pilot scheme, 
'Employment credit', with the same kind 
of provision has been launched for peo-
ple over 50 who are unemployed, with 
the aim of encouraging them to work, 
even if the only job they are able to get 
carries a much lower wage than they are 
accustomed to. (Details of these two 
schemes are set out in Chapter 4.) 
There are also other benefits payable to 
those in work on low incomes in the UK 
as well as to those out of work, specifi-
cally 'Housing benefit' and 'Council tax 
benefit', the effect of which is similarly 
to increase the disposable income of 
those in poorly paid jobs and to encour-
age them to remain in employment. 
The only other country in the Union in 
which in-work benefits are important is 
Ireland, where 'Family income supple-
ment' has existed for some time and has 
covered an increased number of people 
in recent years as qualifying income lev-
els have been raised and the conditions 
of eligibility and receipt made more 
favourable. Here a recent measure 
enables recipients of unemployment 
benefit to retain their dependent child 
allowance for a period of 13 weeks after 
taking up employment, so increasing the 
net income they receive, at least in the 
short term, and providing an extra incen-
tive to start working. 
Elsewhere, in-work benefits have also 
been introduced in a number of countries 
in recent years, with a similar end in 
mind, in other words to help people 
make the transition from unemployment 
into work but equally to encourage them 
to take part-time or temporary jobs. This 
has been the case for some years in 
Ireland, in the form of schemes such as 
the 'Back to work allowance' and 'Back 
to education allowance' or the 'One-par-
ent benefit' which provide income sup-
port to people when they first return to 
work or education. In Austria, since 
1998, people have been able to work in a 
job for a very short period (16 days) 
without losing their benefit providing 
they earn less than a given amount. In 
Germany, a flat-rate benefit was recently 
introduced for unemployed people on 
means-tested assistance (usually those 
out of work for some time) taking up 
temporary jobs for less than three 
months. Such measures are largely 
aimed at enabling the unemployed to 
gain work experience so as to improve 
their future employability. 
In addition, a new provision in Germany 
allows people to work and earn a small 
amount (up to 20 % of their monthly 
unemployment benefit) without suffer-
ing any loss of benefit, though, in this 
case, while they might gain useful ex-
perience, it serves to narrow the gap 
between what they receive when unem-
ployed and their potential earnings in a 
new job. In Portugal, unemployed peo-
ple taking up part-time work may con-
tinue to receive benefit under a provi-
sion introduced in April 1999. In 
Belgium, those who were previously 
long-term unemployed can work in so-
called SMET jobs in private services or 
in private households and in non-profit-
making community activities under 
schemes organised by local employment 
services and earn a small amount with-
out losing their unemployment benefit. 
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Changes in 
unemployment 
compensation schemes 
The other changes which occurred 
over the 1990s in respect of unem-
ployment benefit systems mainly 
involved efforts to contain or reduce 
the cost to social insurance schemes or 
public budgets, largely in order to 
keep down contribution rates or taxes. 
In the first half of the decade, in par-
ticular, as unemployment increased 
and budgetary problems worsened, 
steps were taken in a number of 
Member States to limit expenditure by 
restricting entitlement to benefit 
(through, for example, increasing the 
prior period over which contributions 
needed to have been paid) and/or by 
shortening the period over which ben-
efits are payable. This was the case, 
for example, in Belgium, France, 
Spain, the Netherlands, Denmark and 
Sweden, as well as, in 1996, in the 
UK, with the introduction of the 
'Jobseekers' allowance' (see Social 
protection in Europe 1997, Chapter 2, 
for details). In some cases, rates of 
benefits as such were also reduced 
during the 1990s (in Germany and 
Finland). 
Efforts to restrict entitlement to ben-
efit have continued in more recent 
years and have been combined with 
measures to encourage those already 
in receipt of benefit to find a job as 
soon as possible. In a number of 
Member States, therefore (including 
Denmark, the Netherlands and the 
UK), the definition of what consti-
tutes a suitable job for an unem-
ployed person to take up has been 
broadened, to encompass jobs which 
they are capable of doing with a min-
imum of training rather than ones 
similar to those they were doing 
before or which they have been 
specifically trained for. Refusal to 
accept a job considered suitable after 
being unemployed for a period of 
time (after three months in Denmark, 
for example) can lead to a loss of 
benefit, as can an unwillingness to 
participate in active labour market 
programmes. 
In Germany, rules which define 'a 
suitable job' have also been widened. 
Under previous arrangements, unem-
ployed people were assigned to a par-
ticular qualification level and were 
expected to accept any job offer at 
this level. Now, however, they are 
expected to take any reasonable job at 
a level of pay reasonably close to the 
one on which unemployment benefit 
is being calculated (i.e. the one they 
held before). The rules defining what 
constitutes 'reasonably close' have 
also been broadened. In the first three 
months of unemployment, they are 
expected to accept a job paying up to 
20 % less than their previous one, in 
the following three months, up to 
30 % less and, from then on, any job 
paying at least the same as the benefit 
they are receiving. Moreover, from 
1998, anyone unemployed was 
expected to 'use all possible means of 
terminating unemployment', reinforc-
ing the onus on them actively to seek 
work. These changes, however, have 
been accompanied by some softening 
of the rules governing unemployment 
benefit entitlement, aimed at encour-
aging recipients to take a lower paid 
job than they had before by guaran-
teeing that they will not subsequently 
lose out if they become unemployed 
again (see Chapter 4 below). 
Furthermore, efforts have been made to 
widen the safety net provided to those 
losing their jobs. Accordingly, unem-
ployment social insurance benefits have 
recently been extended to cover those 
with two or more part-time jobs, though 
'part-time' here is defined as working at 
least 15 hours a week and receipt of 
benefit is limited to six months. The 
requirement that people entitled to ben-
efit need to have worked for at least 12 
months during the preceding three years 
has been slackened in respect of those 
who have been caring for children or 
dependent relatives as well as those 
starting up their own business. Though 
periods of caring as such do not give 
rise to entitlement to unemployment 
insurance benefit, they are in effect 
ignored when calculating entitlement so 
that the people concerned do not lose 
any entitlement they already had 
beforehand. On the other hand, the pro-
vision under which periods of materni-
ty or parental leave could be treated like 
periods of employment in relation to 
unemployment insurance if they were 
taken after a period of paid employment 
or receipt of unemployment benefit, 
was abolished, implying a worsening of 
their position for the people concerned, 
who are predominantly women. 
In certain countries, however, changes 
to unemployment benefit schemes have 
not been directed at reducing expendi-
ture. In Italy, the government is in the 
process of reforming the system to 
improve the support given. The new 
system is intended to consist of: a 
scheme for redundancy benefits, more 
circumscribed than the existing Cassa 
Integrazione Guadagni, which applies 
most especially to those employed in 
large companies; a new expanded and 
more generous system of unemploy-
ment insurance, providing replacement 
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benefits for a fixed period to workers 
losing their jobs; and a means-tested 
safety net for those workers who remain 
unemployed after their entitlement to 
insurance benefit expires. In Portugal, 
the period of entitlement to unemploy-
ment benefit has recently been length-
ened for people in all age groups (to 18 
months for those aged 30 to 40 and 24 
months for those aged 40 to 45, for 
example), while in Belgium, the rate of 
benefit for single people was increased 
in May 1999. 
At the same time, means-tested benefits 
which are related to household income 
may have the effect of discouraging 
people, mainly women, from working. 
This is still present in both the UK and 
Belgian unemployment benefit sys-
tems, even though the deterrent to 
working has been reduced in the recent 
past. In the UK, the hours a week which 
someone can work if their spouse is 
unemployed and in receipt of means-
tested benefit was increased from 18 
hours to 24 hours on the introduction of 
the 'Jobseekers' allowance', which 
means that people working longer than 
this need to earn more than the house-
hold receives in transfers to make it 
worthwhile to continue in employment. 
In Belgium, the income a partner of 
someone unemployed is allowed to earn 
from a job has been raised and, from 
1997, indexed in line with inflation, but 
it remains relatively low, again being 
likely to deter many people from con-
tinuing to work. 
Changes in 
disability benefits 
As noted above, disability, or invalidity, 
benefits have been used in the past as a 
more 'acceptable' substitute for unem-
ployment benefits in a number of 
Member States, especially in respect of 
the long-term unemployed. As in the 
case of unemployment benefit, in 
response to the significant growth of 
expenditure and the number of 
claimants over the 1980s and early 
1990s, there has been a widespread ten-
dency across the Union in recent years 
to try to reduce entitlement to benefit 
and restrict eligibility to those who are 
genuinely incapable of working 
because of their disability. This has 
been particularly so in the Netherlands 
and the UK, where, by the early 1990s, 
the relative number of people being 
supported on benefit had risen to a 
much higher level than in most other 
parts of the Union. In the mid-1990s, in 
both countries, reforms were introduced 
to tighten the qualifying criteria, to 
make the medical testing procedure 
more stringent and to widen the defini-
tion of the jobs that the person con-
cerned is deemed capable of doing. 
In both countries also, efforts have con-
tinued to be made in more recent years 
to cut the number of people dependent 
on disability benefits. In the 
Netherlands, where the number of 
claimants increased again in 1997, a 
measure was introduced in 1998 to shift 
some of the onus of policing the system 
on to employers, by charging them dif-
ferential contribution rates according to 
the risk of their employees becoming 
claimants. Companies which generate 
more claims for benefit, therefore, face 
higher costs, which they can reduce by 
dissuading their employees to register 
as disabled, improving working condi-
tions or adapting the working environ-
ment to make it easier, or possible, for 
employees with disabilities to work. 
They can also choose to opt out of the 
collective system completely and 
assume responsibility for providing 
income support for their staff who 
become disabled (as a few large compa-
nies have already done, though it seems 
unlikely that many will follow). 
In the UK, where expenditure on dis-
ability benefits has continued to 
increase, measures are in the process of 
being introduced to tighten the qualify-
ing conditions even further, with the 
explicit aim of excluding people who 
are really long-term unemployed and so 
put pressure on these to look for work. 
Moreover, it is planned to reduce ben-
efit entitlement if the person concerned 
is receiving an occupational pension. At 
the same time, however, as noted above, 
a minimum income guarantee — an in-
work tax credit — has been introduced 
for people with disabilities who move 
off benefit into a paid job, so making 
such a move more attractive, while a 
'Disability income guarantee' is planned 
for those with severe disabilities, who 
require care both day and night. The 
rationale, therefore, is to encourage peo-
ple who can do so to work, through a 
mixture of financial pressure and active 
assistance, and, at the same time, to 
increase the financial support for those 
who are unable to work. 
The criteria for being eligible for dis-
ability benefits was also tightened in 
Austria in 1998 for the second time in 
three years. In Sweden, where spending 
on disability benefits in relation to GDP 
was higher than in the UK in 1996 and 
only slightly lower than in the 
Netherlands, reform of the system is in 
the process of being introduced. New 
principles adopted by parliament should 
link disability benefits more closely to 
sickness benefits in order to strengthen 
the efforts to rehabilitate people affect-
ed by illness or disability. In Denmark. 
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on the other hand, where a substantial 
number of people are also in receipt of 
disability benefit (some 10 % of the 
workforce) and where spending on 
these was slightly higher in 1996 than 
in the UK relative to GDP, there is 
widespread recognition of the need to 
reform the present system, but so far 
relatively little has been done. In 1999, 
however, the central government reim-
bursement of the expenditure on bene-
fits by municipalities — which are 
responsible for paying these — was 
reduced from 50% to 35% in order to 
encourage them to cut spending by 
increasing active measures. 
Changes in disability benefit systems 
have also been made in the recent past 
in countries where expenditure is 
below average. In Italy, where, as else-
where, disability benefits have been 
used as a substitute for unemployment 
benefits, an extensive panoply of con-
trols has been introduced to verify the 
medical condition of benefit recipi-
ents, while, in addition, the possibility 
of receiving both disability benefits 
and income from work has been 
reduced. In Greece, in late 1998, 
receipt of benefit was made condition-
al on income being below a certain 
level and all cases of disability were 
re-examined. In Ireland, in contrast, 
where spending on disability benefits 
is small relative to GDP, the scheme 
was extended in 1997 to those in part-
time residential care, who became eli-
gible for part-time payment of 
'Disability allowance'. Moreover, ben-
efits were increased to couples who 
both have disabilities, and the com-
plete withdrawal of allowances from 
someone whose spouse has income 
above a certain level was replaced by a 
progressive reduction, the level being 
raised in both 1997 and 1999. 
At the same time, in Ireland, Greece 
and Spain, as in the UK, active mea-
sures to help people with disabilities 
into employment have been strength-
ened, as indicated below. In Austria, 
invalidity benefits are granted only for 
two years at a time and before entitle-
ment is given or is renewed, efforts 
need to have been made to get the 
people concerned into work through 
rehabilitation measures. 
Early retirement 
pensions 
Along with recipients of disability ben-
efit, the number of people retiring 
before reaching the official age at which 
a full old-age pension becomes due has 
also risen in the Union over the past 15 
to 20 years, as indicated in Chapter 1, 
for much the same reason. Indeed, 
expansion of early retirement pensions 
and disability benefits are alternative 
responses to the problem of long-term 
unemployment. In some countries, like 
the UK and the Netherlands, the latter 
occurred, in others, such as France or 
Germany, the former. Just as for dis-
ability benefit schemes, the growing 
cost of early retirement, together with 
the prospective growth of people above 
retirement age, has led governments 
across the Union to seek to reverse pol-
icy and encourage older people to stay 
longer in the labour force rather than to 
withdraw prematurely. In most Member 
States, requirements for eligibility have 
been tightened and levels of benefit 
reduced. 
In Denmark, in 1999, the years of con-
tribution to an unemployment fund 
required to be eligible for an early retire-
ment were increased (from 20 out of the 
last 25 years to 25 out of the last 30) and 
the amount of benefit reduced slightly, 
while payment has also been cut if the 
person concerned has a supplementary 
pension, whether they postpone actual-
ly taking this up or not. In addition, tax 
allowances were introduced for those 
over 60 who have the option of retiring 
early but who decide to remain in work 
and, for those working part time, the 
limit to the income they can earn whilst 
receiving a pension was abolished. 
Similarly, in Austria, the minimum 
number of years of contributions for 
those retiring early because of losing 
their job has been raised from 15 to 20 
and for those taking early retirement for 
non-economic reasons, from 35 to 37'/2 
years. 
In Germany, the minimum age for eligi-
bility for an early retirement pension is 
in the process of being progressively 
raised to 63 (those aged 62 who are 
long-term unemployed and receiving a 
social insurance benefit who wish to 
retire will still be able to do so up to 
2012 but will have their pension cut by 
some 11 %). From 2012 on, no one will 
be able to retire before the age of 63. In 
Italy, the years of contribution pay-
ments required for early retirement are 
being gradually increased to 36 for all 
employees, including civil servants, 
who in the past needed to have paid 
contributions for only 20 years. 
In three countries, Luxembourg, 
Portugal and Ireland, however, the pos-
sibility of early retirement has been 
extended, though in the first, with the 
aim of encouraging people to continue 
working on a part-time basis rather than 
retiring completely and in the last to a 
fairly limited extent. In a number of 
other countries, including France, 
Germany, Denmark, Finland and 
Austria (see Social protection in Europe 
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1997, Chapter 5), employees over a cer-
tain age can reduce their hours of work 
progressively until they reach retire-
ment age in exchange for a partial pen-
sion. In Luxembourg, this possibility 
was extended to employees over 57, but 
under very restricted conditions, such 
as being employed in a firm having to 
make people redundant or on the verge 
of going bankrupt. In addition, as in 
Austria and Germany, employers are 
entitled to a reduction in social contri-
butions if they take on someone who 
has been unemployed to compensate for 
the reduced hours. In Austria, the age 
limit for eligibility for a part-time pen-
sion has been reduced from 58 to 56 to 
diminish pressure on early retirement 
schemes. In Finland, to encourage 
people to remain in work longer, the 
minimum age for a part-time pension 
has been temporarily lowered from 58 
to 56 between July 1998 and end-2000. 
In Portugal, a more flexible retirement 
system was introduced in 1999, with 
people being able to take early retire-
ment as long as they are 55 or older and 
have 30 years of contributions. Those 
who have been unemployed for a long 
time and whose period of entitlement to 
benefit has elapsed, providing they 
were 55 or more when they lost their 
job and have at least 20 years of contri-
butions, are also eligible for an early 
retirement pension. 
In Ireland, from 1997, older people who 
cease to be eligible for 'Carers' 
allowance' or 'One-parent family 
payment', because they no longer have 
caring responsibilities or a dependent 
child, can claim 'Pre-retirement 
allowance' immediately rather than 
having to wait the usual 15 months 
before being able to do so. Early retire-
ment schemes in Ireland, however, are 
of relatively minor importance, with 
only around 14 000 people a year 
receiving benefit. 
Sickness benefits 
The same kind of scrutiny of disability 
benefits has also been applied to sick-
ness benefit schemes over the 1990s. In 
two Member States, the Netherlands 
and the UK, responsibility for adminis-
tering and funding the scheme was in 
effect shifted some time ago (in the for-
mer, in the mid-1990s, in the latter from 
the late-1980s on) to employers who are 
considered to be better placed to control 
and monitor sick leave. In the 
Netherlands, employers are further 
obliged to pay statutory amounts for 
extended periods of time to employees 
who are too ill to work, so giving them 
an incentive to discourage unwarranted 
periods of absence. Moreover, employ-
ers have to continue to pay at least 70 % 
of the employee's salary in the first year 
of disability. In other countries, such as 
Spain, efforts have been directed at 
intensifying the detection of fraudulent 
claims (with seeming success in this 
particular case in view of the progres-
sive decline in expenditure). 
Nevertheless, more recently, systems 
have been made more generous in two 
Member States at least. In Germany, 
where short-term sickness benefits had 
been reduced from 100 % of net salary 
to 90 %, the rate was increased back to 
100% at the beginning of 1999. In 
Sweden, where expenditure on sickness 
benefits fell markedly in the three years 
1993 to 1996, both because of reduc-
tions in rates of benefit and lower levels 
of paid absence, the benefit rate was 
raised from 75 % of income loss to 80 % 
at the besinning of 1998 in the context 
of economic recovery, while shortly 
after, the period of sick leave which 
employers have to pay was shortened 
from 28 weeks to 14. 
Family benefits and 
support to help reconcile 
work and family 
Social protection policy towards the 
family and children takes three main 
forms. The first is to compensate, at least 
in part, for the additional costs of having 
children by paying child benefits or 
family allowances or by granting tax 
allowances. The second is to enable 
women to take time off work when they 
give birth and to receive a replacement 
income for a period of time, though en-
titlement to leave is being increasingly 
extended to both parents both immedi-
ately after the child is born and during 
the first few years when the child falls ill. 
The third is to provide help with child 
care and with caring for family members 
with disabilities or who are elderly and 
frail, either directly or through 
allowances. All three forms are impor-
tant means of improving the income 
security of people with famil-ies. The 
third form, the provision of help with 
caring responsibilities, is also an impor-
tant aspect of ensuring social inclusion 
for the people concerned. 
Equally, all three have a potential effect 
on work incentives. Assistance with 
child care can be critical in many cases 
in determining whether it is possible, or 
financially viable, for people with 
caring responsibilities — predominantly 
women, in practice — to work at all. 
Maternity benefit arrangements and 
parental leave entitlement can also 
adversely affect work effort, though, at 
the same time, they can make it easier to 
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reconcile having children with the pur-
suit of a working career, quite apart from 
their beneficial effect on the health and 
well-being of the parents concerned. 
Family allowances, by providing house-
holds with additional income, reduce the 
financial pressure on both parents to 
work and make it possible for one of 
them — again usually the woman — to 
stay at home to look after the children. 
At the same time, the potential impor-
tance of benefits on the incentive to work 
depends in large measure on their differ-
ential effect on household income if both 
partners work rather than just one. 
In practice, in most countries in the 
Union, the same amount of family 
benefit is paid irrespective of whether 
one, both or neither parent is in paid 
employment and irrespective of the 
level of earnings from this. In these 
cases, benefits do not affect the dispos-
able income earned by the second par-
ent working and, to this extent, there-
fore, benefits have a neutral effect on 
the decision to work or not to work. 
In Greece, the amount of family 
allowance payable used to vary with 
household income as well as with the 
number of children but, in 1999, it 
ceased to be dependent on the former. In 
Ireland, support provided to families has 
been increased significantly in recent 
years, through raising universal child 
benefits (by over 20 % in the three years 
1997 to 1999) rather than through 
increasing the numerous add-on pay-
ments for children which benefit recipi-
ents are eligible for, so reducing poten-
tial work disincentives. Similarly, in the 
UK, child benefit was raised substantial-
ly in 1999 and 2000, especially for the 
eldest or only child, with much the same 
aim of increasing the incentive to work 
of people with children. 
In Germany, child benefits for the first 
and second children were raised by 
almost 14 % at the beginning of 1999 and 
are due to be raised by another 8 % in 
2000 together with child tax allowances. 
At the same time, the tax-free income of 
taxpayers, which is set to secure a mini-
mum level of subsistence for households, 
was raised in 1999 to around EUR 6 650 
a year for a single person and around 
twice this level for a married couple. In 
Luxembourg, there has been a deliberate 
shift in the targeting of support towards 
low-income families with a reduction in 
child tax allowances (which tend to 
favour higher income earners who pay 
higher rates of tax and, therefore, gain 
proportionately more than those earning 
less) coupled with an increase in child 
benefits of an equivalent amount (some 
EUR 300 a year per child). Family 
allowances have also been increased in 
Austria. Though these are not dependent 
on income, a means-tested supplement 
was introduced in 1999 for the third and 
each subsequent child. 
In Italy and Portugal, benefits are 
reduced if income exceeds a certain 
level, though in the latter case, in par-
ticular, the number of families affected 
is relatively small (see Social protection 
in Europe 1997, p. 42, for details). A 
similar policy was introduced in France 
at the beginning of 1998 (op. cit.) but 
was cancelled at the beginning of 1999 
because of its unpopularity. Instead, the 
maximum value of tax allowances for 
children was reduced from around FRF 
16 400 a year (EUR 2 500) to FRF 
11 000 (EUR 1 677), although the age 
limits for children to give entitlement 
to the various benefits were raised by 
one year (from 19 to 20 for a family 
with two children) together with the 
age limit for entitlement to increases 
(to 11 instead of 10 and 16 instead of 15). 
In Italy, as in Austria, a new means-
tested benefit was introduced in 1999 
for all families with more than three 
children below 18, which, while provid-
ing increased assistance to low income 
households, also increases the financial 
disincentive to work for the people who 
qualify. 
The main developments in this area, 
however, have been aimed at improving 
child-care support and parental leave 
possibilities, the latter encouraged by 
the recent Community directive on this. 
Both developments are motivated by a 
concern to make it easier for people, 
whatever their family circumstances, to 
take up paid employment. 
Parental leave provisions to take care of 
young children were extended in a 
number of Member States. In Austria, 
where entitlement to leave had been 
reduced from 24 months to 18 in 1997 
if only one person exercised the option, 
an additional element of flexibility has 
been introduced starting in 2000, 
enabling receipt of the parental leave 
allowance to be postponed for six 
months up until the child is seven years 
old, in line with the Union directive. In 
Denmark, where leave entitlement was 
already one of the most generous in the 
Union, enabling a parent to stay at 
home for up to one year after the birth 
of a child, an additional paternity leave 
entitlement of two weeks at the end of 
the period of parental leave was intro-
duced in 1998, on top of the two weeks 
entitlement immediately following the 
birth, and in 1999, the benefit payable 
during this period was increased to 
100 % of the person's wage. 
In Luxembourg, a new paid parental 
leave provision was introduced in 1999 
for parents who have worked in the 
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same firm for at least a year, enabling 
one parent to take six months off after 
the birth of a child or to work part time 
for 12 months. The benefit payable is 
flat rate and not taxable and is halved 
for those working part time. The second 
parent may also take a leave in the same 
conditions till the child is five. In addi-
tion, parents have the right to take time 
off if a child is sick and to receive 
replacement income from government 
at the same time, though entitlement is 
limited to two days a year for each child 
under 15. 
In Belgium, legislation was introduced 
at the beginning of 1999 giving more 
people (3 % of private sector employ-
ees) the right to interrupt their careers 
than before (1 %). This applies in three 
different kinds of circumstance: firstly, 
each parent is entitled to six months 
leave (previously three months) after 
the birth or adoption of a child; second-
ly, one person in a household has the 
right to leave to provide terminal care 
for relatives (two periods of one 
month); thirdly, they are also entitled to 
take time off (one year full time or two 
years part time) to look after relatives in 
need of care. In each of these circum-
stances, the monthly allowance was 
increased to around EUR 500 for full-
time leave and half this for part-time 
leave. 
In the Netherlands, the entitlement to 
six months unpaid part-time leave for 
each parent was extended in 1997 from 
children up to the age of four to chil-
dren up to the age of eight and the max-
imum number of hours which someone 
could take off during this period was 
increased to the number of hours nor-
mally worked in a 13-week period. 
Legislation on work and care is in 
preparation to combine the right to 
maternity leave and the right to take 
time off to look after a sick child with 
the right to flexible working hours in a 
single, coherent scheme. The proposed 
scheme consists of entitlement to 10 
days leave a year, paid at 70 % of 
salary, with employers, who will be 
responsible for paying, being compen-
sated through fiscal concessions. 
In Ireland, an unpaid parental leave 
scheme was introduced at the end of 
1998, giving those with at least a year's 
continuous employment with the same 
organisation entitlement to up to 14 
weeks of unpaid leave in respect of 
children born or adopted after May 
1998. The leave, which must be taken 
before the child reaches five, can be 
taken in one go or over a period. 
Entitlement to force majeure leave — 
paid leave to enable employees to deal 
with family emergencies such as injury 
or illness to a family member — of up 
to three days in any 12-month period or 
five days in any 36 months, was intro-
duced at the same time. 
In two Member States, Italy and the UK, 
where entitlement to leave was rela-
tively limited before, legislation was 
introduced in 1999 to extend this signifi-
cantly. In Italy, a draft bill has been pre-
sented to parliament in order to estab-
lish the right to 10 months leave for 
either parent until the child is eight, 
together with benefits of 80 % of earn-
ings up to the age of five months and 
30 % up to the age of three. In addition, 
in July 1999, maternity benefit was 
extended, on a means-tested basis, to 
women who were not in the labour 
force. In the UK from December 1999 
employees will have the right to three 
months unpaid leave in respect of each 
child under five. Benefits will be avail-
able under the normal rules, but with in-
come support also available to couples 
on a low income who take statutory 
unpaid child-care leave. In addition, all 
employees will have the right to take 
reasonable time off in family emergen-
cies. People who exercise their right to 
parental leave and emergency time off 
will have their employment protected. 
In addition, the minimum maternity 
leave entitlement has been increased for 
all employed women, including those 
working part time and the self-
employed, from 14 weeks to 18 weeks. 
In Portugal, maternity leave was raised to 
110 days in 1999 and will be further in-
creased to 120 days in 2000. At the same 
time, parental entitlement to special 
leave to care for children has been 
increased from six months to two years, 
and up to four years if the child is 
handicapped and under 12, in which 
case a special allowance is payable. In 
Spain, new legislation will allow both 
parents to take parental leave and will 
increase the possibility of taking time 
off to care for adopted children or other 
family members. It will also make it 
illegal for employers to dismiss women 
because they are pregnant. 
Child-care arrangements have also been 
improved in a number of Member 
States, especially in those where sup-
port has been limited in the past. In the 
Netherlands, from 1999, lone parents 
who are looking for a job or undergoing 
training and are in receipt of a social 
transfer are entitled to reimbursement 
of after-(primary) school child-care 
costs if their income falls below a 
certain level. Moreover, temporary 
measures are being taken to extend care 
places for children between 4 and 16, 
with extra subsidies being paid to 
municipalities for these, while a long-
term solution is sought. 
55 
Chapter 2: Recent developments in the modernisation of social protection 
In the UK, as noted above, a new 
child-care tax credit was introduced in 
October 1999 for low-income families 
claiming 'Working families tax credit', 
giving a maximum amount of GBP 70 
a week (around EUR 105) for one 
child and GBP 105 a week (EUR 158) 
for two, so assisting both lone parents 
and couples to work. In addition, the 
objective has been announced of 
increasing out-of-school child-care 
places by 40 000 by 2003 in England 
alone, with additional expansion in 
other parts of the UK. 
In Spain, the maximum deduction 
allowable in the computation of 
income tax for child-care costs for 
children under the age of three with 
both parents working was raised from 
ESP 25 000 (EUR 150) to ESP 50 000 
(EUR 300), the average allowance 
increasing by some 25 %. At the end of 
1998, however, there was a shift from 
tax credits to tax allowances, so 
favouring the better off (i.e. those 
paying tax at higher rates and so enjoy-
ing a larger reduction in the amount of 
tax paid). 
In Greece, a pilot project has been 
launched to extend the time children 
spend in nursery and elementary 
schools to the whole day and to open 
State day-care centres in the afternoon 
as well as the morning, in order to 
enable mothers to have full-time jobs 
(there are fewer part-time jobs in 
Greece than anywhere else in the 
Union). It is also planned to have a 
small number of State day-care cen-
tres, mainly in the large urban centres, 
operating late at night. Similarly, in 
Portugal, the network of nurseries has 
recently been expanded. 
Key objective: 
promoting social 
inclusion 
Policy in each of the broad areas of social protection considered above 
can contribute to preventing social 
exclusion and ensuring that everyone 
can fully participate in society. Whereas 
previously the main, and, in some cases, 
the sole objective, was to provide an 
acceptable level of income to those of 
working age who, through no fault of 
their own, were unable to work and earn 
a living, the emphasis of policy across 
the Union has shifted increasingly 
towards helping such people find a job 
and to end their dependence on benefits. 
At the same time, the lack of a job is 
only one aspect of social exclusion, 
though it may be the most evident and 
the most important problem to address 
in tackling the issue. Nevertheless, 
social exclusion also stems from other 
factors, including, in particular, a lack 
of access to education and vocational 
training, on which the chances of 
obtaining a secure, well-paid job as 
well as being able to play a full role in 
society depend, a lack of access to a 
decent place to live and to adequate 
levels of health care and social services 
to provide support for those with caring 
responsibilities. Addressing these prob-
lems is an equally important part of a 
policy for social inclusion and, as noted 
above, there has been an extension of 
support for people with caring responsi-
bilities in a number of Member States. 
People who are unemployed, particularly 
those who have been out of work for a 
long time, are a primary target of policy. 
In all Member States, governments have 
committed themselves to increasing the 
effort devoted to active programmes, 
aimed at providing job search assistance 
and improving employability, in relation 
to passive measures of income support. 
But efforts have also been targeted at 
people with disabilities, whose handicaps 
are not so severe to prevent them from 
working, and older people, who in grow-
ing numbers have opted for early retire-
ment, in many cases because they have 
lost their job and could not find another 
one. Equally, they have also been applied 
to those who, because of personal cir-
cumstances, have difficulty in working, 
such as lone parents with young children 
or people with social problems, and who 
are reliant on social assistance or mini-
mum income guarantee schemes. 
In the case of young people and the 
long-term unemployed, following the 
adoption of the employment guidelines 
for 1998 and 1999, all Member States 
have introduced measures to ensure that 
everyone out of work for more than a 
certain time (six months in the case of 
those under 25 and 12 months for those 
of 25 and over) has access to an active 
measure of some kind or a subsidised 
job. In a number of countries, to achieve 
this has involved much closer coordina-
tion between active and passive mea-
sures — and between the officials 
responsible for administering these. In 
the extreme, in the UK, the individuals 
concerned have a single point of contact 
with all the different agencies involved 
in providing assistance, both financial 
and practical. Individuals are also 
required to take part in work-focused 
interviews as a condition of benefit. 
These measures have also been accom-
panied by efforts to tailor the assistance 
offered more closely and systematically 
to individual needs in order to increase 
the effectiveness of policy in getting 
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people into work. In a number of 
Member States, therefore, individual 
action plans are drawn up at an initial 
stage, setting out the concrete steps to 
be taken to give the person concerned 
the best chance of finding a job, and 
regular meetings are then held to moni-
tor their progress. 
employment. Where this is not the case, 
measures have been introduced in a 
number of countries to give the people 
concerned a second chance of acquiring 
such qualifications, such as in Austria, 
Denmark, Germany and France, for 
example (see Chapter 4 below for 
details). 
ate 4 500 'senior'jobs in the public sec-
tor specifically for those of 50 and over 
who are long-term unemployed. As part 
of the establishment of a more accom-
modating labour market, a goal has 
been set of creating 30 000 to 40 000 
flexi-jobs by 2005, all them covered by 
collective agreements. 
Such measures are not confined to those 
registered as unemployed but have also 
been applied to people with disabilities 
in some countries (such as Belgium, 
France, Ireland, Finland and the UK), 
where steps have been taken to provide 
personal advice on employment or 
training options and to integrate them 
into active labour market programmes 
(see Chapter 4 below for details). These 
measures have been supplemented by 
action to improve the working environ-
ment for people with disabilities and 
provide better access to buildings and 
means of transport. Similarly, in the 
Netherlands and the UK, in particular, 
the same kind of assistance has recently 
been introduced for lone parents, es-
pecially those with children over five. 
In the Netherlands, since 1996, lone 
parents receiving social assistance and 
whose youngest child is over five are 
required to look for a job as well as to 
participate in active programmes. In the 
UK, active assistance is combined with 
tax credits to ensure a guaranteed level 
of income from work and to help with 
the costs of child care. 
A primary objective has been to 
improve the employability of those 
unable to find a job through the provi-
sion of training and, in the case of 
young people, to try to ensure that those 
entering the labour market have at least 
a minimal level of education and some 
initial vocational qualifications to give 
them a reasonable chance of obtaining 
These measures have been supplement-
ed by the significant growth of sub-
sidised jobs in the private sector or job 
creation measures in the public sector in 
many countries, including, in particular, 
in Belgium, Denmark, Germany, 
France and the Netherlands. In 
Belgium, subsidies have taken the form 
of the direct activation of unemploy-
ment benefits, in the sense that the 
transfers which would have been paid 
to the unemployed, especially the long-
term unemployed, are paid instead to 
employers providing jobs for them (so-
called 'SMET jobs'), who are also 
exempt from paying social contribu-
tions. In addition, unemployment 
benefits and minimum subsistence 
allowances — or, more specifically, the 
saving of these — have also been used 
to create additional jobs for the long-
term unemployed in the public sector, 
in cooperation with the regions and 
local authorities, in recreational, cultur-
al and environmental activities. 
In Denmark, 'flexi-jobs' were intro-
duced at the beginning of 1998 as a 
response to the increasing difficulty of 
getting people off benefit or social 
assistance and back into work, as unem-
ployment was reduced and the more 
employable of those affected found 
jobs. Such jobs are subsidised in rela-
tion to the estimated reduction in the 
capacity of the person concerned to 
work. In addition, in 1999, the govern-
ment and municipalities agreed to cre-
In Germany, more autonomy has been 
given to municipalities and 'job cre-
ation associations' to initiate schemes, 
which have been extended to those 
unemployed for 6 out of the last 12 
months in order to prevent them becom-
ing long-term unemployed. Moreover, 
the range of structural adaptation mea-
sures for which employers can receive 
subsidies if they create new jobs for the 
unemployed has been extended (to 
business and tourist infrastructure, for 
example) and the period for which 
subsidies are payable lengthened to 
a maximum of five years in certain 
areas (in the new Lander and regions of 
high unemployment). 
In France, the aim was announced in 
1998 of creating 700 000 new jobs for 
young people, half of them in the public 
sector, paid at the minimum wage and 
lasting for five years, and directed at 
meeting local needs which have so far 
not been met by the market, especially 
in cultural, education, recreational and 
environmental activities. By the 
summer of 1999, 200 000 jobs had been 
created. The other 350 000 jobs are to 
be created in the private sector, but so 
far no precise information is available 
on progress. 
In the Netherlands, over 65 000 people 
who had previously been unemployed 
were employed in 'Melkert jobs' in 
1996, some two thirds of them in the 
public sector. In 1998, the existing job 
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creation schemes were integrated into 
the WIW (Act on the mobilisation of 
job-seekers) for the long-term unem-
ployed and labour market participation 
of people with disabilities was stimulat-
ed through REA (Act on reintegration 
of handicapped persons) programmes. 
In addition, schemes were no longer 
confined to young people and the long-
term unemployed but became open to 
everyone out of work unable to find a 
job. The subsidies granted are intended 
to lead either to the person concerned 
being able to find a normal job or to the 
provision of socially useful services. 
Working hours are 32 a week, payment 
is at the minimum wage and jobs can 
last for a maximum of four years. 
The provision of subsidised jobs, train-
ing and other active labour market pro-
grammes designed to get people into 
employment has been complemented in 
a number of Member States in recent 
years by measures to ensure access to a 
high standard of health care for every-
one as well as by an extension of child-
care support, as noted above. 
Ensuring health care to all 
In Sweden, there was growing concern 
about the possibility that some low 
income households, especially those 
with children, would avoid using the 
service to the detriment of their health 
and so to their life chances. Charges for 
children were, therefore, abolished in 
1998 by the county councils. In Spain, 
parliament decided in 1999 that all 
immigrants, legal and illegal, should 
have access to health care on the same 
conditions as Spanish nationals. In 
France, similar concerns led to the ex-
tension of basic health care to another 
150 000 people in summer 1999, 
through making membership of the 
social insurance system compulsory 
and so achieving universal coverage. At 
the same time, free supplementary 
health insurance was granted to around 
6 million people with a monthly income 
of below FRF 3 500 (EUR 534). 
In Belgium, structural measures were 
introduced in 1998 in order to improve 
access to health-care insurance for the 
whole population. Regulations govern-
ing membership of insurance schemes 
were relaxed by abolishing the waiting 
period and the requirement of six 
months residence in Belgium, while 
contributions of people on low incomes 
were reduced as was the cost borne by 
people who are chronically sick. 
Similarly, in a number of other coun-
tries, the charges paid by users of the 
service, which have generally risen 
across the Union over the years in order 
both to provide additional funding and 
to discourage excessive demand for 
treatment and drugs, have been reduced 
in the recent past. This is the case in 
Germany and the Netherlands, both 
because of concerns about maintaining 
access to health care to all and because 
of the lack of cost effectiveness of co-
payment measures. 
In the UK, the government has been 
studying the findings of a report into 
health inequalities, published by an inde-
pendent scientific advisory group in 
November 1998, which concluded that 
although average mortality has fallen 
over the past 50 years, there were still 
unacceptable inequalities in health 
which, in some cases, had widened in 
recent decades. These were related to 
income levels, education, employment 
and ethnic origin, as well as to the envi-
ronment and lifestyle and, therefore, 
called for a policy response in a number 
of different areas rather than simply 
health care. Three aspects were re-
garded as crucial: 
• all policies likely to affect health 
should be evaluated in terms of their 
impact on health inequalities; 
• high priority should be given to the 
health of families with children; 
• further steps should be taken to 
reduce income inequalities and 
improve the living standards of poor 
households. 
In addition to the action taken to help 
people find employment and to make it 
easier for them to reconcile family 
responsibilities with having a job, 
changes have also been made to income 
support measures in a number of Mem-
ber States, not only to try to eradicate 
deprivation and ensure that all house-
holds do not fall below the poverty 
level, however defined, but also with 
the explicit aim of encouraging those in 
receipt of social benefits to find a job. 
In Denmark, for example, from mid-
1998 on, receipt of income support has 
been made dependent on people partici-
pating in schemes designed to increase 
their self-reliance. In France, the poten-
tial disincentive for people to find a job 
caused by the withdrawal of several 
social assistance allowances was allevi-
ated in 1998. The possibility, which 
already existed, for some means-tested 
benefits (allocation de solidarité spéci-
fique, revenu minimum d'insertion) to 
top up wages has been increased. The 
periods over which this is possible have 
been extended and the levels of income 
permitted raised. This possibility has 
also been extended to other categorical 
allowances for lone parents and widows 
(allocation de parent isolé, allocation 
d'assurance veuvage). At the same 
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time, a national observatory for poverty 
has been set up and a commission estab-
lished. Some tapering of benefit with-
drawal as the income earned increases 
has also been introduced in Belgium, 
together with increases in allowances 
and the provision of training for those on 
minimum income support. 
In Italy, a pilot scheme for a new 
means-tested benefit to guarantee a 
national minimum level of income for 
the first time in the country (defined in 
relation to a poverty threshold and 
adjusted for the number of people in a 
household) was launched in 39 local 
communities in June 1998. The 
income against which the need for 
support is assessed is subject to an 
earnings disregard of 25 % in order to 
maintain a financial incentive to work, 
while, at the same time, recipi-
ents of benefit who are not in work but 
capable of working are obliged to 
participate in a training course. 
Elsewhere, concern has centred on 
reducing the incidence of poverty by 
improving or extending income sup-
port measures for people whose 
income falls below what is regarded as 
an acceptable level. This is the case in 
Austria, where, following a working 
group report in 1999, a model has been 
presented for safeguarding minimum 
standards. 
In Ireland, reducing poverty and social 
exclusion have been accorded an 
important place in public policy, not 
only for their own sake, but also 
because it is considered that social 
deprivation has a damaging effect on 
economic competitiveness. All cash 
transfers have therefore been raised to a 
level commensurate with the minimum 
recommended by the Commission on 
Social Welfare when it reported in 
1986, and planned expenditure on 
inclusion measures have been 
increased substantially for the three 
years from 1999. In addition, signifi-
cant new policy initiatives and govern-
ment measures introduced during the 
year from September 1998 were sub-
ject to a process of assessment in terms 
of their likely impact on poverty and 
inequalities for a one-year trial period. 
The results of this pilot phase will 
shortly be reviewed. 
In Finland and Sweden, changes have 
recently been made to the arrange-
ments for social support in order to 
improve the coordination between 
national and local authorities and to try 
to ensure that everyone in need 
receives a minimum level of income. 
At the same time, however, in both 
countries, efforts have been made to 
reduce expenditure. In Finland, ben-
efits have been reduced, especially for 
large families, and housing cost 
allowances have been cut. The aim has 
also been to increase both the financial 
incentive to take up a job by reducing 
the income received from benefits as 
compared with income from work and 
personal responsibility for housing 
costs by introducing a self-risk compo-
nent. In Sweden, reform of the housing 
benefit system took place during 1998 
and 1999, with the aim of improving 
the targeting of assistance but also of 
reducing spending, the main change 
being the awarding of benefits accord-
ing to estimates made by recipients of 
their income for the coming year, with 
penalties imposed if the estimate turns 
out to be too low. 
Key objective: 
making pensions 
safe and pension 
systems sustainable 
The prospective ageing of the popu-lation throughout the Union and 
the significant growth in the number of 
people above retirement age in 10 to 15 
years time has focused attention in all 
Member States on the consequences for 
expenditure on old-age pensions and its 
funding. At the same time, there is 
growing evidence in a number of coun-
tries of an increase in real income of 
those in retirement relative to other age 
groups which seems to have occurred in 
recent years as a result of the spread of 
occupational and supplementary pen-
sions taking effect. While there is a con-
tinuing concern to ensure that people 
have adequate levels of income in their 
retirement, this is coupled with a con-
cern to make sure that pension commit-
ments in future years can be met and 
that their funding will not impose an 
unsustainable cost on future gener-
ations, especially those in work, in tenns 
of the transfer of income required. 
The measures introduced, or being con-
templated, have taken a number of dif-
ferent forms, with the common empha-
sis, however, being either on limiting 
the future transfers which will be neces-
sary, particularly those which future 
governments will be responsible for 
effecting, or increasing the finance 
available. In particular, the measures 
taken in recent years include increasing 
the official age of retirement or the 
number of years of contributions 
required to qualify for a full pension, 
reducing the amount of benefit paid in 
relation to past earnings or relating pen-
sion entitlement more closely to the 
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contributions paid, and creating special 
funds to finance future pension pay-
ments. The latter essentially means mov-
ing from a 'pay-as-you-go' system, 
under which present pension payments 
are financed from present contributions, 
towards a 'funded' system, under which 
present contributions are fixed in relation 
to future pension liabilities — so that, in 
some sense, the present generation funds 
its own pension entitlements rather than 
those of the previous one — without 
going all the way to full funding. 
At the same time, in a number of 
Member States, especially those in the 
south of the Union but also in Ireland, 
where there are significant gaps in cover-
age, there has been some increase in the 
effective income support provided, while 
in others, access to a reasonable level of 
pension has been widened to include 
groups who, largely because of caring 
responsibilities, have difficulty in build-
ing up the necessary contributions record. 
In Germany, Belgium, the UK and 
Austria, steps have already been taken 
to increase the retirement age of women 
to 65 to bring it into line with that of 
men, as in a number of other Member 
States, though in Austria this process 
will start only in 2018 and will not be 
completed until 2034. At the same time, 
the reference period for the calculation 
of civil servant pensions has been 
brought into line with those in the pri-
vate sector, the basis being changed 
from final salary to the salary over the 
best 15 years, so in effect reducing the 
amount significantly in many cases 
(though in all other respects the special 
provisions applying to civil servants 
have been maintained). 
Similarly, in both Italy and 
Luxembourg, the rules applying to the 
determination of pensions in the public 
sector, in terms of age and contribution 
requirements, have been harmonised 
with those for employees in the rest of 
the economy instead of being more 
favourable (though, in both cases, 
there are transitory arrangements for 
current civil servants). In addition, in 
Spain, the basis for calculating pension 
entitlement for all employees is in the 
process of being progressively ex-
tended, by one year each year, from 
salary in the best eight years to that 
in the best 15 years. 
In Sweden, housing supplements to low 
income pensioners have been improved 
twice since 1997. so that they now 
cover up to 90 % of housing costs of 
between around EUR 12 and 500 a 
month. Moreover, the first piece of leg-
islation resulting from the major 1994 
reform was passed in January 1999, 
though the first payment under the new 
system will not be made until 2001 
because of delays in implementation. 
The new system (described in the 1997 
Social protection in Europe report) is 
based on defined contributions of 
18.5 % of earnings, 16 % of earnings 
going towards financing current pen-
sions on a pay-as-you-go basis, the 
remainder, 2.5 % of earnings, being 
deposited in personal pension schemes 
on a funded basis. These arrangements 
are intended to cope better with varia-
tions in economic growth and demo-
graphic changes, in that the amount of 
pension received will be related more 
closely to earnings over a person's life, 
though they will be introduced only 
gradually so that they will apply in full 
only to people born in 1954 or later. 
In Denmark, substantial changes have 
been made to both State pensions and 
special early retirement schemes with 
the aim of postponing retirement and 
making it more gradual. The age for 
eligibility for State pensions has been 
lowered from 67 to 65 for those turning 
60 on or after July 1999, who will 
therefore be entitled to a full pension in 
2004. In addition, the calculation of 
pension will take account of part of any 
personal pension receivable. Both 
changes should lead to a reduction in 
public spending on pensions. At the 
same time, since people become eli-
gible for the special early retirement 
scheme from age 60, new rules have 
been introduced to encourage them to 
remain in work until at least 62, while 
the tax allowance for pensioners with 
earnings from work has been increased 
to give them an incentive to continue 
in employment after 65. Apart from 
these changes, contributions were 
raised in 1998 by incorporating an 
extraordinary charge of 1 % levied in 
1997 on all income from work and 
social transfers into the system for 
funding supplementary pensions on a 
long-term basis. These contributions 
go into a special account which 
becomes payable to the people con-
cerned when they retire. 
In Italy, the indexing of the highest 
pensions (those exceeding EUR 1 800 
or so per month) was frozen com-
pletely for 1998 and will have less 
favourable indexing rules applied to 
them for the years 1999-2001, while in 
Germany, the growth of expenditure on 
pensions has been reduced by indexing 
the rate to price inflation rather than to 
increases in wages for both the years 
2000 and 2001. At the same time, how-
ever, the 1999 reform, aimed at gradu-
ally reducing pensions from 70 % of 
the average net wage to 64 % in future 
years has been temporarily suspended 
until the end of 2000. 
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In order to provide more funding for 
pensions, the contributions paid by 
higher and middle income earners in 
Spain have been increased without com-
pensating rises in future pension entitle-
ment, while in Italy, contributions paid 
by the temporary self-employed who 
were not members of an ad hoc occupa-
tional insurance fund have been 
increased from 10 % of income to 12 %. 
In the Netherlands, by contrast, a ceil-
ing on contributions for employees and 
the self-employed of 17.9 % of earnings 
was imposed in 1999 in respect of the 
State pension (AOW) and any addition-
al funding required to cover expendi-
ture will come directly from govern-
ment. At the same time, however, to 
meet the possible need for this, the gov-
ernment has set up a special fund, into 
which it contributes a specified amount 
each year, the level being fixed accord-
ing to the peak in expenditure, which is 
forecast to occur in the years after 2020. 
Accordingly, therefore, there has been 
an effective shift of financing from con-
tributions to taxes. 
In France, where the number of years of 
contributions required to qualify for a 
full pension in the private sector was 
raised from 37.5 to 40 in 1993 and the 
amount of pension payable was related 
to the best 25 instead of 10 years, a 
report commissioned by the government 
has proposed that the years of contribu-
tions required for a full pension should 
be increased further to 42.5 and that the 
contribution requirement for public sec-
tor pensions should be brought into line 
with that in the private sector. A fund 
was created in 1999 to consolidate the 
finance available for pensions by amal-
gamating the income from social soli-
darity contributions and the surpluses of 
the old-age solidarity funds. There are 
also signs of a softening of attitudes 
towards private pension schemes. 
In Ireland, in order to help cover the 
future costs of both State old-age and 
public service retirement pensions, the 
establishment of a social welfare pen-
sion fund and a public service pension 
fund was announced in mid-1999. In 
addition to most of the proceeds from 
the recent privatisation of the State 
telecommunications company, it is pro-
posed that tax revenue representing 1 % 
of GNP be apportioned to these funds 
annually. The first steps to encourage 
personal responsibility for pensions 
have also been taken, though so far 
these have centred on increasing aware-
ness of the need. Here, however, large-
ly because of the high rate of economic 
growth achieved in recent years and the 
increased revenue which this has gener-
ated, the full rate of employees' social 
contribution was reduced by 1 percent-
age point in 1997. At the same time, the 
basic State pension was increased by 
more than other elements of social pro-
tection in both 1998 and 1999 (by 
around 6 % and 7 % respectively). A 
new pensions bill, to be published early 
in 2000, will create the legislative 
framework for increased supplementary 
pension provision. 
In Italy, social and minimum pensions 
were raised at the beginning of 1999. 
Moreover, a new legislative framework 
for supplementary pensions has been 
established, providing significant tax 
incentives for the transformation of the 
company-based schemes into proper 
funded schemes for the payment of sup-
plementary pensions. 
In Spain, an agreement between the 
government and the trade unions in 
September 1999 led to a substantial 
increase in minimum and non-contribu-
tory pensions, involving an additional 
cost of ESP 1 000 million (around EUR 
6 000 000). This was triggered by uni-
lateral decisions on the part of the 
regions to increase non-contributory 
pensions in late 1998 and early 1999. In 
addition, a small fund was set up in 
September 1999 in order to help cover 
the future cost of retirement pensions. 
In Greece, reform of pensions began in 
1997 with the creation of a contributory 
basic pensions scheme for farmers and 
continued, in 1998, with special 
arrangements aimed at combating 
social contribution fraud. In 1999, the 
focus shifted to rationalising the 
extremely fragmented system which 
exists. So far, three pension funds for 
the self-employed have been merged 
into one, another 68 supplementary 
schemes have either been wound down 
or amalgamated and there are negotia-
tions taking place to create a single fund 
for bank staff from the present five. The 
next step, still under discussion, is like-
ly to be consideration of a major reform 
with the aim of safeguarding future 
pensions and ensuring that pension 
schemes are sustainable in the long 
term. A new regulation due to come into 
force after 2001 is directed at control-
ling the payment of pensions to people 
who are still in employment, with pen-
sions being suspended for those under 
55 who start working again and being 
reduced by 70 % for those over 55. 
In the UK, where private pension provi-
sion has gone further than elsewhere in 
the Union and where, accordingly, funds 
have been created to a greater extent to 
meet future pension liabilities, there has 
been considerable debate on pensions 
since the present government took office 
in 1997. A process of reform has been 
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launched, broadly aimed at encouraging 
people to save for their old age, so 
reducing the cost falling on the State, 
and at changing the present 60^10 split 
between public and private funding to 
40-60 in favour of the private element. 
The new second pillar State pension 
which is planned will give recipients on 
low earnings around twice the amount 
they receive under the existing scheme 
(SERPS). In addition, contributions will 
be credited to those caring for children 
or people with disabilities. For wage 
earners on slightly higher income (i.e. 
those with earnings above GBP 9 000 or 
around EUR 13 500 a year) who do not 
have an occupational or personal 
pension (estimated at around 3 million 
people) or whose personal pension is 
inadequate (a further 1 million or so), 
the proposed 'Stakeholder pension' 
scheme is intended to encourage people 
to take out private pensions, which need 
to conform to the minimum standards 
which the government will define and 
monitor. 
Nevertheless, so far, the only concrete 
change to have been made is the intro-
duction of a minimum income guaran-
tee for pensioners in 1999, the income 
in question being higher than under 
income support and increasing at the 
age of 75 and again at 80. The hope of 
the government is to make an early 
impact on poverty among the elderly, 
especially the very old who may well 
have additional expenses to meet caring 
needs. Moreover, unlike income sup-
port, it will be linked to increases in 
wages rather than prices, so maintain-
ing the relative income of pensioners 
rather than just the real income. 
Legislation introduced in 1999 also 
ensures equitable pension rights for 
both partners in cases of divorce or 
separation. 
At the same time as efforts in most 
countries have been centred on making 
pension systems sustainable over the 
long term, improvements have been 
made in a number of Member States in 
the prospective level of entitlement for 
disadvantaged groups. In addition to 
the UK, credit for periods spent look-
ing after children or adults in need of 
care has been extended in 
Luxembourg, Germany and Austria. 
Moreover, people on non-standard 
contracts of employment, especially 
those working part time, have been 
accorded increased pension rights in 
Germany, Spain and Luxembourg. 
Similarly, in Finland, social insurance, 
including entitlement to pension, was 
extended to everyone in employment 
in 1998, even those with temporary 
jobs of less than a month and/or whose 
monthly salary is below the minimum 
wage. 
Key objective: 
ensuring high quality 
and sustainable 
health care 
The pressure on systems of social protection across the Union mani-
fests itself in a growing demand for 
health care and social services. In virtu-
ally all Member States, attempts have 
been made in recent years to limit the 
rise in health expenditure without 
reducing the quality of service or 
restricting access to treatment and care. 
These have taken a number of different 
forms, in line, in part, with the histori-
cal development of the system in place, 
the way that it is organised and funded 
and the prevailing standard of service, 
all of which differ significantly from 
country to country, making it difficult to 
transfer policy which has been success-
ful in one to others. 
However, there is evidence of a number 
of common developments in Member 
States. In particular, responsibility for 
managing services and expenditure and 
for determining the allocation of 
resources has been devolved from the 
centre to the regional or local level or 
even to individual hospitals or practi-
tioners in most countries, the aim being 
to improve efficiency by enabling the 
services provided to be adjusted more 
closely to local needs. At the same time, 
central government has tended to exer-
cise tighter control over overall spend-
ing, either directly through limiting 
budget allocations in countries where 
there is a national health service or indi-
rectly through limiting contribution 
rates or the fees charged in those where 
there is an insurance-based system. This 
has intensified the pressure on 
providers to increase cost effectiveness. 
In addition, as noted above, there has 
been a widespread tendency to extend 
co-payment for pharmaceuticals and 
treatment, increasing the cost borne 
directly by the consumer, or patient, so 
encouraging them to take this into 
account when deciding their needs. 
In most Member States, operational 
responsibility is more and more exer-
cised at the regional or local level. In the 
Netherlands, an important means of 
tackling long waiting lists for treatment 
and home care for the elderly has been to 
address the problem at the regional level 
and provide support for improved man-
agement as well as an increase in fund-
ing. At the same time, attempts have 
been made to prevent the health insur-
ance funds from taking financial risks in 
respect of hospital fixed costs, over 
which they have no control. To this end, 
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a new budgetary procedure was intro-
duced in 1996, distinguishing between 
the costs of hospital care that insurance 
funds can and cannot influence, and 
specifically dividing the fixed costs of 
hospital care from the variable costs. 
In Spain, 7 of the 17 regions have direct 
responsibility for health care in their 
area, while in the other 10, health ser-
vices are managed by Insalud (the cen-
tral health authority). Up until 1998, 
funds for both systems were transferred 
from the Insalud central budget on a per 
capita basis, but since then, in order to 
increase cost effectiveness, elements 
such as morbidity patterns, the age 
composition of the population, migra-
tion between regions and the teaching 
needs of hospitals have been explicitly 
taken into account. In Ireland, the eight 
regional authorities became fully 
responsible for all operational decisions 
affecting services in their areas at the 
beginning of 1999, while in Italy, the 
operating autonomy of local health 
enterprises and hospitals was increased 
in mid-1999. At the same time, how-
ever, the role of the centre in planning 
and setting standards was strengthened. 
In Greece, proposals for reform of the 
health-care system have recently been 
made, aimed at improving cost effec-
tiveness. The intention is to create an 
autonomous national board, including 
the main health social insurance funds 
and accountable to the Minister for 
Health, for managing health services. 
This new unified body will receive 
funding from the public budget which 
should be an incentive for smaller social 
insurance funds to join. Because of 
their involvement, some equalisation of 
the services provided by the five largest 
funds is also expected to occur. In addi-
tion, the board will allocate resources to 
new regional boards with responsibility 
for managing resources in their respec-
tive regions. The national board, how-
ever, will be responsible for contracts 
with suppliers and for monitoring and 
evaluating the health services provided. 
The introduction of price signals and 
quasi-market mechanisms to create a 
more structured and more clearly 
demarcated relationship between 
providers and purchasers, or con-
sumers, has taken place in a number of 
countries. This includes the drawing-up 
of formal contracts between them speci-
fying their respective obligations and 
the terms for different kinds of treat-
ment and services. In Spain, Insalud 
launched a strategic plan for the period 
1998 to 2000 at the beginning of 1998 
to extend quasi-markets into health-care 
provision and to introduce some com-
petition between suppliers, though this 
has led to some resistance from unions. 
Quasi-markets and managed competi-
tion had already been introduced by 
regions with direct responsibility for 
health care, such as Catalonia in 1990. 
At the same time, tax concessions for 
personal private health-care insurance 
were withdrawn, though they were 
introduced for companies providing pri-
vate insurance for their employees. In 
addition, expenditure on pharmaceuti-
cals was reduced, through allowing 
generic medications to be prescribed 
and publishing a new list of drugs for 
which public funding will not be avail-
able, though this last measure has met 
some resistance from the regions. 
In Italy, a new system of patient co-pay-
ment, based on the income as well as 
the medical condition of the person 
concerned, was introduced in some 
areas on a trial basis towards the end of 
1999. In June 1999, a broad reform bill 
was finally approved providing a legis-
lative framework for the establishment 
of 'mutual integrated funds', financed 
by ad hoc contributions from employers 
and employees, managed by firms, 
trade unions or regional authorities and 
aimed at reimbursing non-essential 
treatment not routinely provided by the 
health service. A controversial point in 
the bill concerns doctors employed by 
health service hospitals, who if they opt 
for a full-time contract of employment 
with a hospital, will be prohibited from 
drawing fees from treating patients out-
side the hospital. The intention is, 
instead, that hospitals should be respon-
sible for fee-for-service care provided 
by doctors on top of their contractual 
obligations. 
In Austria, the austerity measures 
implemented in 1996 to contain the cost 
of health insurance included for the first 
time, as from 1997, a fee for doctors' 
certificates, though children, the elderly 
and those with contagious diseases are 
excluded. Similarly, in Luxembourg, 
the deficit on health-care provision in 
1997 led to increases in insurance 
contributions and a reduction in the 
reimbursement of the cost of certain 
medications. However, when revenue 
exceeded expenditure in 1998. contribu-
tions were reduced again. 
In Sweden, where charges for treatment 
had been increased significantly during 
the 1990s, concern grew about the pos-
sibility of low income households 
avoiding using the health service to the 
detriment of their children's health and, 
accordingly, to their life chances. 
Charges for children were, therefore, 
abolished by county councils in 1998. 
This, however, then attracted criticism 
that it could lead to the excessive con-
sumption of costly treatment or care 
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and that the same objective could have 
been achieved by lowering charges 
rather than abolishing them completely, 
so retaining an incentive for people to 
economise on their use of the service. 
Councils are now considering whether 
fees should be reintroduced or not. In 
addition, concern has been expressed 
about the effect on other elements of 
public expenditure which might be cut 
back to make room for the higher costs 
of health care. The response has been to 
transfer more earmarked revenue to the 
councils responsible for the provision 
of services and to get broad political 
agreement to shift resources from 
defence expenditure to health care in 
the years 2002 to 2004. 
In the Netherlands, a 20 % charge on all 
treatment and drugs, except visits to 
hospitals and GPs, levied in order to 
encourage people to use services more 
prudently, was withdrawn at the begin-
ning of 1999, largely because it seems 
to have had little effect on dampening 
demand while involving heavy admin-
istrative costs. (The scheme was com-
plicated by the large number of exemp-
tions and the annual limit of around 
EUR 40 on the total amount any indi-
vidual could be asked to pay.) 
In Germany, where expenditure on health 
care is among the highest in the Union, 
charges have also been reduced in the 
recent past. At the beginning of 1999, a 
number of measures introduced to 
increase the cost of treatment falling on 
patients were withdrawn. In particular, 
the co-payment for prescriptions was 
lowered, people who were chronically ill 
became exempt from any co-payment at 
all after a year and a flat-rate contribution 
to hospital funding (of around EUR 10) 
levied on every person insured was sus-
pended for 1998 and 1999. Moreover, 
some provisions which had been intro-
duced in statutory sickness insurance 
schemes in the past, enabling people on 
higher incomes, for example, to opt out 
of contributing to certain services, and 
which seemed to reflect private insurance 
principles, were abolished on the grounds 
that they might undermine solidarity. 
Ceilings on doctors' fees have, however, 
been maintained. 
At present, a complex bill to reform the 
health insurance system is under discus-
sion and is a source of controversy. A 
major aim is to contain cost increases in 
the health sector and to avoid further 
increases in contribution rates. Pro-
posals include improving coordination 
between different providers (general 
practitioners, specialists and hospitals) 
and limiting patients' freedom of 
choice, unifying the funding of hospi-
tals (at present split between the Länder 
and sickness insurance funds), restrict-
ing the drugs that can be prescribed and 
reducing their cost and, most controver-
sially, imposing ceilings on expenditure 
not only overall but also on that of dif-
ferent services as well as of general 
practitioners. The latter has provoked a 
hostile reaction from medical associa-
tions which argue that doctors with 
elderly or chronically ill patients who 
are costly to treat will be disadvantaged 
and may be tempted to drop such 
people or refuse to take them on. 
In the UK, the present government has 
so far left the system reformed by its 
predecessor broadly unchanged but has 
proposed changes because of dissatis-
faction with the outcome of the intro-
duction of market mechanisms. 
Specifically, it plans to 'replace the 
internal market with integrated care' 
(White Paper, 'The new NHS', 
December 1997), with an emphasis on 
quality and efficiency. Key new ele-
ments include evidence-based national 
service frameworks, a national institute 
for clinical excellence to give guide-
lines on clinical and cost effectiveness 
and an independent commission for 
health improvement to assess local 
action to improve quality and pursue 
national objectives. 
In France, where expenditure is also 
relatively high, a detailed reform plan 
was presented by the health insurance 
funds in spring 1999, following a 'state 
of health' enquiry, aimed at increasing 
the efficiency of resource use and 
improving access. Among the proposals 
were measures to improve hospital 
management and to increase treatment 
in the home, though these are still under 
discussion. In 1999, fees for some prac-
titioners (dentists and masseurs, for 
example) were frozen and lowered for 
others (such as radiologists) and gener-
ic drugs were introduced to reduce 
prescriptions costs. 
Long-term care 
Health services across the Union play 
an important role in many cases not 
only in the medical treatment of the 
elderly but also in the provision of long-
term care. Indeed, it is often difficult to 
distinguish in practice between the two 
roles, though as the number of people 
needing care has risen and the difficul-
ties of providing this within the family 
have increased, the issue of long-term 
care as such has become an important 
question for policy. Already, three 
Member States, Austria, Germany and 
Luxembourg, have introduced long-
term care on a social insurance basis as 
a separate category of social protection, 
while in the UK, benefits to carers as 
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well as those requiring care have been 
available since the mid-1970s, though 
on a relatively restricted basis. In the 
Nordic countries, moreover, extensive 
social services exist to provide support 
(see Social protection in Europe 1997, 
Chapter 7, for details). In most Member 
States, however, long-term care still 
represents a major gap in the social pro-
tection safety net which can impose a 
heavy burden on families, in terms of 
either the direct provision of care or 
meeting the costs of private arrange-
ments, though one which is the focus of 
much debate. 
In Luxembourg, dependency insurance 
was introduced in January 1999 as part 
of the social protection system, following 
the example of Austria and Germany. 
Benefits both in kind and in cash are 
available to the elderly needing home or 
residential care. Benefits in kind, how-
ever, are given precedence over cash ben-
efits because of the priority attached to 
the provision of professional, and there-
fore, good quality, care. Nevertheless, all 
or part of the benefit in kind can be 
replaced by a cash benefit enabling peo-
ple to stay in their own homes. An 
allowance to cover pension contributions 
is also payable to informal carers, often 
family members, performing the task. 
In France, a new means-tested depen-
dency benefit (prestation spécifique 
dépendance) was introduced in 1997 
for frail elderly people. Just over half of 
the recipients remain in their own 
homes and, in that case, a minimum of 
90 % of the amount paid has to go to 
carers. Although the income ceiling 
applied to the means test is relatively 
low, the number of beneficiaries had 
risen to 100 000 by mid-1999, with a 
total of over 150 000 having received 
benefit since its introduction. 
There are also plans to introduce care 
insurance in the Flemish region of 
Belgium to cover the costs of non-
medical assistance and services, includ-
ing home help, meals-on-wheels, 
odd-job services, shopping services and 
transportation. The benefit will not be 
related to age and will cover both home 
and residential care. It will be funded 
from the general regional budget and 
personal contributions. 
In Portugal, a new long-term care benefit 
was introduced in 1999 in order to com-
plete the protection provided by invalidi-
ty, old-age and survivors' benefits. 
In Germany, several changes were 
made to the Long-term Care Insurance 
Act in summer 1999, including making 
it easier for informal carers (mainly 
other family members) to obtain pro-
fessional help for short spells. In 
Austria, the rates of long-term care 
benefit have remained unchanged 
since 1996, but in 1998 people who 
stopped working to look after someone 
requiring extensive care (around 11 % 
of the total number) became entitled to 
voluntary pension insurance, with the 
employer's part of the contribution 
being paid from public funds. Since 
1998, carers have also been able to 
reduce their hours of work with the 
agreement of their employer. 
In Spain, the provision of long-term 
care is the responsibility of the 
regions, a number of which have begun 
experimenting with the introduction of 
vouchers, allowing those in need of 
care to decide how to spend these 
(essentially either on providing income 
support to family members or to pro-
fessional carers). In Italy, a draft bill 
on the reform of social assistance and 
social services, which includes a pack-
age of benefits and services for those 
in need of care is currently before 
parliament. 
In the UK, where long-term care is pro-
vided in part by the national health ser-
vice and in part by local authorities, 
voluntary organisations and private 
concerns but is mainly the responsi-
bility of family members, a Royal 
Commission reported on the issue in 
March 1999. Its recommendations 
included State funding for all personal 
care, continued means testing for living 
and accommodation costs in residential 
care, but with the income threshold 
raised to GBP 60 000 a year (over EUR 
90 000) instead of the present GBP 
16 000 (EUR 25 000), the establish-
ment of a national care commission and 
extra financial support for people living 
at home with carers. This, however, rep-
resents a starting-point for debate rather 
than a blueprint for government action. 
In Ireland, a carer's allowance is 
payable to those on low incomes who 
look after people at home who are in 
need of full-time care. Following a 
detailed review of this, a range of mea-
sures was introduced in the 1999 bud-
get, at an additional annual cost of over 
IEP 18 million (around EUR 23 mil-
lion), to improve the position of carers, 
an increase of 40 % on total expenditure 
in 1998. In addition to increasing the 
number of people qualifying for the 
allowance, an annual 'Respite care 
grant' and free travel and telephone 
rental was introduced for all carers in 
receipt of the allowance. Carers are now 
also entitled to work for up to 10 hours 
a week without losing the allowance 
and, when their time spent caring is 
over, are eligible for back-to-work 
incentive schemes, formerly available 
only to those who were unemployed. 
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Concluding remarks 
The various developments described above indicate that, while there are 
broad similarities in the changes to 
social protection systems which are 
taking place across the Union, they dif-
fer in detail between Member States, in 
large measure reflecting the differ-
ences which exist in the organisation 
of systems and in the extent and level 
of coverage provided. These differ-
ences have their roots in the way that 
systems were initially conceived and 
have developed over time, though they 
also reflect some differences in the 
structure of society and in social atti-
tudes towards the collective provision 
of support and care. These are most 
notable between the Nordic countries, 
on the one hand, where social services 
are more extensive than elsewhere, and 
the southern Member States, on the 
other, where the extended family is 
still the main means of support for 
those in need. 
Much of the focus of policy attention 
in the latter has, therefore, been on 
closing the gaps in the system, on 
extending coverage to those who have 
been inadequately protected in the past 
— such as in Italy, with the introduc-
tion of an unemployment benefit 
scheme similar to that which exists in 
most other Member States and the pro-
posal to establish a more comprehen-
sive minimum income scheme or in 
Greece, with the plans for a ratio-
nalised and more equitable pension 
system. This is also the case in Ireland 
in some degree, where general 
improvements have been made in many 
aspects of the social protection system, 
funded by the substantial econ-
omic growth which has occurred in 
recent years. 
Nevertheless, in all parts of the Union, 
in the south as well as the north, com-
mon trends are evident in the broad 
direction of change as countries face the 
same kinds of problem and the same 
kinds of social and economic develop-
ment, even though the detailed response 
may differ. In particular, in all Member 
States, efforts are being made to shift 
the emphasis of policy towards those of 
working age who, for one reason or 
another, are not in paid employment 
from passive measures of income sup-
port to active programmes designed to 
improve their employability and to help 
them to find a job. Such efforts are 
coupled with a tightening up of the ben-
efit system, a reduction in the availabil-
ity of social transfers and an increase in 
the pressure on individuals to work if 
they are able to do so, as well as with 
extended assistance over child care and 
other kinds of support facility. 
Secondly, there is an equally common 
focus on old-age pension schemes and 
on ways of limiting the transfers which 
these will involve as the significant 
growth in the number of people over 
retirement age occurs in future years. 
This has led to increases in the official 
age of retirement, designed as much to 
reduce the cost to public budgets of 
people withdrawing from the work-
force prematurely as to postpone the 
actual age at which they retire, changes 
in the formula used to calculate pen-
sions (which in effect reduce the 
amount payable relative to earnings), 
increases in the funds set aside to 
finance future pension liabilities, and 
incentives to encourage people to take 
out personal pensions, so again re-
lieving the prospective burden on the 
State. 
Thirdly, in all Member States, there 
have been attempts to contain the 
growth of public expenditure on health 
care while at the same time maintain-
ing the standard of service and broad-
ening the range of treatment available 
as medical know-how increases. The 
main focus has been on finding ways 
of reducing costs and improving effi-
ciency, which has led to the reorgani-
sation of service provision, decentrali-
sation of decision-making and man-
agerial responsibility, and increased 
charges to consumers. 
Fourthly, there is widening concern 
across the Union about the growing 
need for long-term care consequent on 
an ageing population and the extent to 
which systems of social protection 
should be adapted to respond to this. 
While changes have been made in a 
few Member States to provide greater 
support to those in need of care, in 
many countries it remains an issue of 
ongoing debate, with the prospective 
costs entailed in introducing any com-
prehensive scheme being a major 
obstacle to its development. 
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Chapter 3: Trends in social expenditure 
and its financing 
Ahighly developed social protection system is a cornerstone of the 
European model of society. It has long 
come to be expected in most parts of 
Europe that people should receive sup-
port in their retirement or if they are 
unable to work for any reason when 
they are below retirement age or look-
ing after children or dependent relatives 
in need of care, and that they should 
have access to high quality health care 
if they need it. An extensive safety net 
of this kind implies important redistrib-
ution. On average, expenditure on 
social protection in the Union, as 
defined by the Esspros system of 
accounts (the European System of 
integrated Social Protection Statistics), 
amounted to 28'/2 % of GDP in 1996 
(the latest year for which a full set of 
data are available) or to just under 
271/2 % of GDP if the costs of adminis-
tering the systems are excluded. 
These figures, however, need to be 
interpreted with caution. Most of the 
cost entailed is not a drain on economic 
resources as such but involves realloca-
tion of the purchasing power over the 
goods and services produced with those 
resources or, in other words, a redistrib-
ution of income between individuals 
and households in society. A significant 
part of this redistribution is between 
generations, particularly between those 
in paid employment and those who 
have retired from work, who do not 
only require income support but also, in 
many cases, health and long-term care. 
But part also comprises an effective 
reallocation of income over a person's 
life, from periods when they are work-
ing (and typically build up entitlement 
to benefit through the social contribu-
tions they pay out of their gross earn-
ings or have paid for them by their 
employer) to periods when they are 
unemployed or sick or when they even-
tually retire. This part can in some sense 
be regarded as equivalent to a personal 
insurance or pension scheme, though 
there are clearly differences because of 
the element of compulsion entailed in 
the payment of contributions, or taxes, 
the limited degree of discretion over the 
scale of the entitlement to benefit built 
up and the social solidarity nature of the 
system. Nevertheless, because of this 
and the entitlement to benefit and 
deferred income which constitute the 
compensation of them, payments of 
contributions are different in kind from 
other charges levied by the State which 
do not involve any direct benefit as 
such. 
It is difficult to distinguish these differ-
ent aspects of the system. Nevertheless, 
it is important to keep them in mind and 
to pay due regard to the distinctive 
nature of social protection when con-
sidering the costs involved. In practice, 
such costs stem, on the one hand, from 
the action taken to bring about the 
redistribution entailed — specifically, 
from the effect on the economy of the 
taxes and social contributions levied to 
fund systems of social protection. On 
the other, they arise from the different 
pattern of consumption of goods and 
services, and, therefore, the effect of 
this on the configuration of output pro-
duced by the economy, which results 
both from the redistribution of income 
towards benefit recipients and from the 
direct expenditure on health and social 
services, as well as on other benefits 
provided in kind rather than cash. At the 
same time, these potential costs need to 
be set against the potential gains, econ-
omic as well as social, of having a high-
er degree of cohesion in society and a 
higher level of support and assistance, 
practical as well as financial, for those 
not in work. 
These gains, or at least the action being 
taken across the Union to provide effec-
tive social protection to those in need in 
the context of changing economic and 
social circumstances, were considered 
in the previous chapter and are con-
sidered in more detail in relation to 
employment objectives in the following 
chapter. The concern here is with quan-
titative aspects, with the scale of expen-
diture on social protection in different 
Member States, with its division 
between the main functions and with 
the way that it is financed, as well as 
with the changes which have occurred 
in these aspects over the 1990s. In 
addition, three major elements of social 
protection, old-age pensions, unem-
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ployment benefit and health care, are 
examined in more detail. 
There are further reasons for interpret-
ing the figures for expenditure on social 
protection analysed here with caution, in 
addition to the special nature of the costs 
that such spending imposes on the econ-
omy. In the first place, the Esspros fig-
ures for expenditure, as is conventional, 
are measured in gross terms, i.e. in 
terms of the gross value of the social 
transfers distributed to recipients. This 
means that any taxes or charges levied 
on the amounts that are paid, which both 
reduces the net worth to beneficiaries of 
what they receive and diminishes the 
effective cost to government of making 
the transfers (in the sense that part of the 
costs are directly covered by the revenue 
yielded by the taxes or contributions 
concerned), are left out of account. 
Accordingly, the figures analysed tend 
to overstate the costs involved, or more 
accurately, the amount of income which 
is transferred between individuals as a 
consequence of the social protection 
system in operation. 
Secondly, the Esspros data cover only 
the expenditure side of the accounts and 
exclude transfers which are in effect 
made through tax concessions or 
allowances rather than through direct 
spending. These are potentially of no 
less benefit to recipients and equally 
entail a need by government to cover 
the financing cost involved, in this case, 
because of forgone revenue instead of 
actual outlays. Prime examples are tax 
allowances for children, which apply in 
some Member States and which are 
equivalent in their effect to child bene-
fits, and tax breaks for contributions to 
private pension schemes, which are a 
means of encouraging people to provide 
support for themselves in their old age 
and which have to be financed in the 
same way as State pensions. 
Some estimates of the quantitative 
importance of these two factors are 
given below when examining the scale 
of expenditure, but their omission from 
the analysis needs to be borne in mind 
throughout the chapter. 
The scale of social 
expenditure 
A verage (gross) spending on social protection in the Union in 1996 
amounted to around ECU 5 100 per 
head of population. In terms of purchas-
ing power standards (PPS) — i.e. taking 
account of differences in the goods and 
services a given unit of currency is 
capable of purchasing (which are not 
wholly reflected in exchange rates) — 
expenditure varied from around 8 300 
PPS per head in Luxembourg (a third 
higher than anywhere else in the Union) 
and 6 900 PPS per head in Denmark, to 
2 700 PPS per head in Greece and just 
over 2 500 PPS per head in Portugal. In 
between these extremes, six Member 
States had a level of expenditure per 
head of between 5 600 PPS and 6 350 
PPS, three (Finland, the UK and Italy) 
between 4 600 PPS and 5 300 PPS and 
the remaining two (Spain and Ireland), 
expenditure of just over 3 000 PPS. 
(These figures come from the latest 
Esspros data collected by Eurostat from 
Member States, which differ in some 
degree from the data presented in Social 
protection in Europe 1997 because of a 
number of improvements in the collec-
tion process which have served to 
reduce problems of comparability 
between countries. Nevertheless, some 
problems of comparability remain as 
indicated in the 'Notes and sources' at 
the back of this report, which also con-
tains details of the expenditure covered 
by the Esspros database.) 
These differences are broadly in line 
with differences in GDP per head 
between Member States measured in 
the same terms (i.e. using the household 
consumption-based measure of PPS 
rather than the conventional output-
based one) (Graph 25). This is only to 
be expected given the greater capacity 
of the more prosperous countries to 
finance social protection programmes. 
The variation in social expenditure per 
head, however, is wider than the differ-
ence in GDP per head — the gap in the 
former between Denmark and Portugal 
was just under three to one in 1996 as 
compared with a difference of just 
under two to one in respect of GDP per 
head — which suggests that countries 
tend to spend proportionately more on 
social welfare as their income rises. 
Nevertheless, this tendency is not com-
pletely systematic, nor, as shown below, 
is it continuous, in the sense that social 
spending does not appear to keep grow-
ing in relation to GDP once it has 
reached a particular level. Three coun-
tries, in particular, stand out as having 
levels of expenditure on social protec-
tion which differ from the general rela-
tionship of this to GDP per head which 
seems to be obtained across the Union. 
In Italy, expenditure per head was sig-
nificantly lower (by as much as 1 000 
PPS or so, or around 20 %) than would 
have been expected given its level of 
GDP per head, while in both Sweden 
and Finland, expenditure per head is 
higher in relation to their comparative 
levels of GDP per head than would be 
expected. This is especially the case in 
Sweden, where expenditure per head 
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was only just below the level in 
Germany in 1996 and almost 20 % 
above the Union average, whereas its 
GDP per head was some 4 % below 
average, measured in PPS terms. 
In Italy, the low level of expenditure 
reflects the underdeveloped nature of 
much of the social protection system, 
except in respect of retirement pen­
sions, a matter which has been the sub­
ject of a good deal of policy concern in 
recent years, as indicated in Chapter 2. 
This is associated, as in other parts of 
southern Europe, with greater reliance 
being placed on the extended family for 
support than in most parts of northern 
Europe, which, in turn, tends to influ­
ence the structure of households, as 
shown in Chapter 1. In both Sweden 
and Finland, it reflects, to a major 
extent, the marked fall in GDP which 
occurred in the early 1990s, before 
which GDP per head in Sweden at least 
was well above the Union average. It 
also, however, reflects the relatively 
extensive nature of social protection 
systems in these two countries and the 
wide availability of support services, in 
particular. This remains the case even 
though the loss of GDP in the recession 
years, especially in Sweden, and the 
relatively slow recovery in the latter, 
has led to efforts being made to limit or 
reduce expenditure. 
At the bottom end of the scale, Ireland 
spends significantly less on social protec­
tion than would be expected given its 
level of GDP per head — less, for exam­
ple, than Spain in 1996, the GDP per 
head of which was some 15 % lower. 
This reflects several factors, in particular: 
firstly, the steep decline in unemployment 
over the last decade and the proportion of 
people over age 65 in Ireland, which is 
among the lowest in the EU, mean less 
25. Social protection expenditure and GDP per head in Member 
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pressure on the social protection budget; 
secondly, the lagged response on the 
social welfare front to its continued high 
level of economic growth (estimated at 
almost 8 % a year over the period 1990 to 
1999) and the time it takes to develop 
systems of social protection; thirdly, the 
level of GDP per head in Ireland arises to 
a large extent from the activities of multi­
national companies, much more so than 
elsewhere. If account is taken of the 
income accruing to them, which is not 
necessarily available for funding social 
protection expenditure (specifically, by 
deducting net transfers abroad from the 
GDP figures), this reduces the country's 
apparent prosperity markedly (in other 
Member States, adjusting for this makes 
only a marginal difference to the results). 
Indeed, the level of national income (or 
GNP) per head in Ireland, measured in 
terms of PPS, was less than 3 % higher 
than in Spain in 1996 and well below the 
Union average. 
-69-
Chapter 3: Trends in social expenditure and its financing 
The relationship between expenditure 
on social protection (again measured 
gross of any revenue from charges 
levied on transfers) and relative levels 
of prosperity can be seen more clearly 
by relating expenditure directly to 
GDP. With the sole exception of Italy, 
the eight Member States with the high-
est level of GDP per head in the Union 
all had a level of spending equivalent 
to around 30 % of GDP in 1996, with 
relatively little difference for the most 
part between them (Graph 26). In 
Sweden and Finland, in both of which 
expenditure per head was below the 
Union average, expenditure exceeded 
30 % of GDP, in Sweden (where it was 
close to 35 %) markedly so. 
In the UK, where GDP per head was 
slightly below the EU average, social 
expenditure was just under 27 % of 
GDP, less than in the more prosper-
ous Member States, while in the four 
southern Member States, spending 
ranged between 21'/2% (Portugal) 
and 25 % (Italy) of GDP and broadly 
in line with relative levels of pros-
perity. Finally, in Ireland, expendi-
ture was only around I8I/2 % of GDP 
in 1996, well below the level any-
where else in the Union, though 
reflecting the factors noted above. 
(In terms of national income rather 
than GDP, the level in Ireland was 
very similar to that in Portugal, at 
around 21 VT % of GNP) 
Net social spending 
As indicated previously, the figures 
for gross expenditure on social pro-
tection presented above are liable to 
give a misleading impression of both 
the cost to government and the scale 
The OECD estimates of net social expenditure 
The estimates of net social expenditure, or more precisely of the revenue from 
taxes and social contributions levied on social transfers and of the value of tax 
concessions and allowances (or tax breaks as they are called in the study), 
come from Willem Adema, Net social expenditure, Labour Market and Social 
Policy Occasional Papers, No 39, OECD, 1999. The estimates tend to be 
country-specific and so there is question about their comparability across the 
Union. 
In the study, estimates are also made for the revenue yielded by indirect taxes 
on the expenditure by beneficiaries from the transfers they receive. These are 
not included in the estimates presented in the text since there is a question 
mark over whether it is appropriate to do so. Although the revenue from such 
taxes can be used to finance social expenditure, the taxes concerned are not 
unique to benefit recipients or levied on them at differential rates, but apply 
generally to all consumers. As such, they are incorporated in the prices at 
which goods and services are sold and, therefore, in GDP measured in terms 
of market prices, as in the present analysis. 
of transfers involved. This is because 
they leave out of account any charges 
(taxes and social contributions) levied 
on the amounts transferred which 
reduce the effective financing cost as 
well as the net worth of benefits to 
recipients. It is also because they 
exclude tax concessions or reduced 
contributions which have the same 
effect on government budgets and 
recipient net income as money trans-
fers. It is difficult, however, to esti-
mate the effect of these two elements. 
Although work carried out by the 
OECD (see Box) provides some 
insight into their relative importance 
in different countries, the provisional 
— and partial — nature of the results 
obtained needs to be stressed, not 
least because there are a number of 
methodological as well as practical 
issues still to be resolved. (In particu-
lar, it is unclear at present how far the 
estimates made are comparable 
between countries since different 
methods have been used according to 
the data available, which also affects 
the coverage achieved, though this 
should not detract from the value of 
the work.) 
The OECD estimates indicate that 
charges levied on social transfers tend 
to be most important in the Member 
States where the level of gross expen-
diture relative to GDP is relatively 
high — in Denmark, Sweden and the 
Netherlands (in each of these, charges 
on transfers are estimated in 1995 at 
around 5 to 6 % of GDP or around 15 
to 20 % of total gross expenditure). In 
countries where expenditure is rela-
tively low they tend to be small (only 
around VT % of GDP in the UK and 
Ireland, for example). The implication 
is that taking account of these charges 
serves to reduce the gap in social 
expenditure between Member States 
relative to GDP. 
The inclusion of the value of tax con-
cessions and allowances is perhaps 
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27. Gross and net expenditure on social protection, 1996 
even more problematic, though in 
practice these do not appear to be all 
that important in most countries in the 
Union. (One of the main areas in 
which they are applied is labour mar­
ket policy, where, as noted in Chapter 
4 below, reductions in the social con­
tributions paid by employers are a 
means of diminishing labour costs in 
a number of Member States. Labour 
cost subsidies, however, are not part 
of social protection expenditure as 
normally defined, and as defined here, 
and such measures are, therefore, not 
relevant in this context.) They do, 
however, appear to be significant in a 
number of Member States in respect 
of pensions — specifically, in encour­
aging people to take up occupational 
or private pension plans. Unfortunately, 
the OECD study includes estimates 
for these only for five Union coun­
tries. (In the UK, the value of these is 
estimated to have amounted to almost 
3 % of GDP in 1995, while in Ireland 
and the Netherlands, they are estimat­
ed at around 2 % of GDP.) 
Deducting estimates of the revenue 
yielded by charges on transfers and 
adding the value of those tax conces­
sions which can be identified (though 
not those in respect of pensions 
because of the restricted coverage) 
results in expenditure on social pro­
tection in 1996 being reduced to 
around 30% of GDP in Sweden, much 
the same as in Germany (just over 
30 % of the OECD estimates), and to 
26 to 27 % of GDP in Denmark and 
Finland, much the same as in the UK 
and slightly above the level in the 
Netherlands (Graph 27). Although the 
gap between the level of expenditure 
relative to GDP in these countries and 
that in Italy and Ireland is narrowed, it 
remains significant. 
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xpenditure on social protection 
/benefits increased markedly in the 
Union in relation to GDP over the first 
six years of the 1990s, from an average 
of just over 24'/2 % of GDP in 1990 to 
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increase was common to most Member 
States, the only exceptions being 
E 
L NL A Ρ FIN S UK EU-15 
Ireland, where GDP growth averaged 
6/4 % a year in real terms over this peri­
od, Luxembourg, where it averaged 5 % 
a year, and the Netherlands, where it 
was also above average (over 2 % a year 
as against only around VT % a year). The 
increase, however, was concentrated in 
the first three years of the period, when 
GDP growth in the European economy 
was very slow, averaging under 1 % a 
year, and, during the recovery from 
1994 on, expenditure fell slightly in 
relation to GDP. Only in Portugal. 
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Greece, Germany, Austria, Belgium and 
Luxembourg did spending continue to 
rise relative to GDP over these three 
years. In the first two, this reflected the 
ongoing development of the social pro­
tection system, in the second three, the 
failure of their economies to recover as 
in most of the rest of the Union. 
The experience of the three years 1993 
to 1996 is in line with that during the 
previous period of economic recovery 
in the second half of the 1980s, when 
expenditure fell in most Member States 
in relation to GDP. Indeed, contrary to 
popular wisdom, spending on social 
protection systems has not shown any 
significant long-term tendency across 
the Union to grow faster than economic 
output, at least since 1980, if the expe­
rience during the recession of the early 
1990s is regarded as a special episode 
which is likely to be reversed as recov­
ery takes place. Although a complete set 
of data for Union countries during the 
1980s is not available, the figures for 
the 10 Member States where there are 
data show an average increase in expen­
diture on social benefits of only around 
VT % of GDP over these 10 years. In 
four of the countries, there was a fall in 
expenditure in these terms and only in 
Spain, Italy and the Netherlands did 
expenditure rise by more than 2 % of 
GDP. 
The fall in expenditure relative to GDP 
after 1993 was not only a direct reflec­
tion of economic recovery and the rise in 
GDP. It was also due to a marked slow­
down in the rate of expenditure growth 
itself in real terms. Between 1990 and 
1993, spending on social protection in 
the Union, as well as the real value of 
benefits, went up on average by just 
under 5 % a year (Table 3). In the subse­
quent three years, it rose by under 2 % a 
year. This slowdown was common to all 
Member States, with the sole exception 
of Greece, even to those countries where 
the ratio of expenditure to GDP contin­
ued to increase over the period. 
In terms of the real value of benefits to 
recipients (i.e. excluding administrative 
expenditure — which tended either to 
decline or rise by very little — and 
deflating spending on benefits by the 
consumer price index), the growth of 
spending averaged under 1 VT % a year in 
six Member States and in three of these, 
it either fell (Spain and the Netherlands, 
but see below for Spain) or remained 
unchanged (Sweden) between 1993 and 
1996 (Graph 28). In only five countries 
did the real value of benefits increase by 
over 3 % a year over this period — four 
of the five in which expenditure rose in 
relation to GDP. the exception being 
Austria, plus Ireland. 
Some of the slowdown in spending 
growth over the period after 1993 can be 
attributed to the fall, or at least stabil­
isation, in rates of unemployment, just 
as the relatively high growth during the 
early 1990s was a result of the steep rise 
in unemployment as the recession took 
hold. This is, in part, reflected in the 
figures for expenditure on unemploy­
ment compensation. Excluding this 
from total spending reduces the growth 
over the period 1990 to 1993 in the 
Union as whole by around VT % a year 
and increases the growth in the subse­
quent three years by about the same 
amount. In some Member States, it has 
a more pronounced effect. This is espe­
cially so in: 
• Denmark, where it reduces growth 
over the recession years by over 1 % 
a year and increases that in the 
recovery years by over 1 'Λ % a year, 
so that spending on benefits other 
than unemployment grew by signifi­
cantly more in the second period (by 
5 % a year) than the first (3 VT % a 
year); 
• Spain, where it lowers growth in the 
first period by 1 Vi % a year and 
raises it in the second by almost 3 % 
a year, revealing that spending on 
other social benefits rose by 2 % a 
year between 1993 and 1996, much 
the same as the Union average, 
rather than falling; 
• the Netherlands, where despite the 
(small) fall in unemployment after 
1993, excluding spending on unem­
ployment benefits increases the 
extent of the fall in the real value of 
expenditure from VT % a year to 
1 Vi % a year, a point examined in 
more detail below; 
• Finland, where it reduces growth in 
the recession years, when unemploy­
ment spiralled from 3 % to 16Vi %, 
by almost 4 % a year and increases it 
in the recovery period by 1 % a year. 
Simply taking account of changes in 
spending on unemployment benefit, 
however, does not reveal the full effects 
of changes in levels of economic ac­
tivity and in rates of unemployment on 
social spending. Some of the effects 
will tend to show up in other areas, such 
as social exclusion or disability benefits 
as well as housing benefits, in part 
because inadequate rates of job growth 
often lead to people withdrawing from 
the labour force entirely instead of reg­
istering as unemployed, especially if 
they are not eligible for unemployment 
benefit or have little chance of getting 
another job. (Withdrawal has been 
encouraged in the past in some Member 
States under such circumstances, partly 
in order to reduce the unemployment 
figures, and this in some cases was 
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Β DK D EL E F IRL I L NL A Ρ FIN S UK EU-15 
Total expenditure on social protection 
Expenditure in real terms (i.e. adjusted by GDP deflator) 
1990-93 3.3 
1993-96 3.1 
1990-96 3.2 
Change in relative prices (consumei 
1990-93 - 0 . 8 
1993-96 0.2 
1990-96 - 0 . 3 
4.8 
3.3 
4.0 
prices 
0.2 
0.3 
0.3 
Expenditure in purchasing power terms (i.e 
1990-93 4.1 
1993-96 3.0 
1990-96 3.5 
4.6 
3.0 
3.8 
4.1 - 0.4 6.9 
3.5 4.4 - 0 . 6 
3.8 2.0 3.1 
4.2 
1.7 
2.9 
relative to GDP deflator) 
-0 .1 0.2 - 0 . 6 -
0.1 - 0 . 1 0.3 
0.0 0.1 - 0 . 1 
-0.1 
0.4 
0.2 
6.5 
5.4 
5.9 
- 0 . 3 
1.1 
0.4 
adjusted by consumer prices) 
4.2 - 0 . 6 7.5 
3.4 4.5 - 0 . 9 
3.8 1.9 3.3 
4.3 
1.3 
2.7 
6.7 
4.2 
5.5 
2.8 
0.3 
1.5 
- 0 . 3 
- 0 . 1 
- 0 . 2 
3.0 
0.4 
1.7 
8.6 
4.9 
6.7 
1.1 
- 0 . 2 
0.5 
7.4 
5.1 
6.2 
2.8 
- 0 . 2 
1.3 
0.9 
0.4 
0.6 
1.9 
- 0 . 6 
0.7 
4.5 
2.8 
3.6 
0.0 
0.1 
0.1 
4.4 
2.7 
3.6 
11.9 
3.8 
7.8 
- 0 . 8 
- 0 . 6 
- 0 . 7 
12.7 
4.4 
8.5 
7.5 
0.7 
4.1 
1.6 
- 1 . 1 
0.3 
5.8 
1.8 
3.8 
η.a. 
- 0 . 6 
η.a. 
η.a. 
- 0 . 6 
η.a. 
η.a. 
0.0 
η.a. 
8.3 
1.5 
4.9 
- 0 . 6 
0.3 
- 0 . 2 
9.0 
1.2 
5.0 
4.7 
1.8 
3.2 
- 0 . 1 
0.1 
0.0 
4.8 
1.7 
3.2 
Expenditure on benefits 
Expenditure in purchasing power terms (i.e 
1990-93 3.8 
1993-96 3.0 
1990-96 3.4 
Excluding unemployment benefits 
1990-93 3.5 
1993-96 3.0 
1990-96 3.2 
4.7 
3.0 
3.8 
3.6 
4.7 
4.1 
adjusted by consumer prices) 
4.2 0.0 7.5 
3.5 4.6 - 0 . 8 
3.8 2.3 3.3 
3.7 0.1 5.8 
3.9 4.4 2.1 
3.8 2.2 4.0 
4.0 
1.3 
2.7 
3.6 
1.8 
2.7 
6.8 
4.3 
5.5 
5.7 
4.4 
5.1 
3.0 
0.8 
1.9 
2.7 
1.0 
1.8 
7.5 
5.0 
6.2 
7.5 
4.7 
6.1 
1.9 
- 0 . 5 
0.7 
1.5 
- 1 . 6 
0.0 
4.5 
2.7 
3.6 
4.1 
2.6 
3.3 
12.5 
5.3 
8.9 
11.5 
5.0 
8.2 
6.1 
1.7 
3.9 
2.2 
2.5 
2.4 
η.a. 
0.0 
η.a. 
η.a. 
0.5 
η.a. 
9.2 
1.4 
5.2 
8.7 
1.8 
5.2 
4.8 
1.8 
3.3 
4.2 
2.3 
3.2 
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The Esspros data used in the analysis 
The data on social protection expenditure and receipts come from the database 
of Esspros statistics which has been compiled by Eurostat on a new system of 
classification since 1997. Data are at present available for all Member States for 
the years 1990 to 1996 and for some for the 1980s as well. The database is 
designed to provide a comparable indication of the scale of expenditure and 
receipts in different Union countries as well as of developments over time. 
However, in part because of the relatively short experience with the new classi-
fication system but also because of marked differences in the systems them-
selves, the data are not fully comparable between Member States in a number of 
respects, especially as regards the division of spending between functions, 
although also in some cases as regards the total amount of expenditure included. 
In particular, data for survivors' benefits are in most cases not clearly distin-
guishable from those for old-age pensions; data for disability benefits include 
those paid to people in retirement in two countries (France and Ireland) or early 
retirement (Denmark), whereas data for early retirement benefits are also 
included in old-age pensions in many countries, instead of being included with 
unemployment benefits when they are paid to those retiring for economic 
reasons and with disability benefits when they go to those no longer capable 
of working. 
The data for unemployment benefits raise significant problems of comparabil-
ity, in part because of the difficulty of distinguishing between social transfers 
to individuals and those to enterprises or organisations paid to provide support 
to individuals, which is outside the scope of the Esspros definition of social 
protection. In Germany, in particular, expenditure on wage subsidies paid to 
those employing certain people at risk is included in unemployment benefits, 
whereas according to the Esspros methodology, it should not be included as 
part of social protection spending at all. The sums involved are, therefore, 
excluded from the figures analysed here, which means that they differ from 
those in the published Esspros tables. In other countries, however, such as 
Denmark and France, where such expenditure is also included, the amount 
involved is not specified so that it cannot be excluded in the same way. Further 
details of comparability problems are set out in the 'Notes and sources' at the 
back of this report. For instance, in the case of Denmark, unemployment ben-
efits include 'start-up incentives and direct job creation aspects'; in France, 
they include various allowances paid to people in employment on special con-
tracts which are akin to subsidies. 
A further drawback of the Esspros data as they exist at present — apart from 
the fact, emphasised in the text, that they are measured gross of taxes or social 
contributions levied on benefits, which are not distinguished, and exclude data 
on tax expenditures (the equivalent value of tax concessions or allowances 
granted for social protection reasons) — is that they do not include data on 
beneficiaries. This makes it difficult to assess the underlying reasons for the 
continued on p. 75 
associated with a growth of people 
claiming disability benefits.) The rela-
tively small scale of expenditure on 
unemployment benefits (8 % of total 
spending on social protection, as noted 
below) does not, therefore, adequately 
reflect the potential consequences for 
overall spending of rises or falls in the 
number of people without work. 
The pattern of social 
expenditure 
Over the Union as a whole, as well as in almost all Member States, 
spending on old-age benefits (including 
survivors' benefits) accounts for by far 
the largest element of total expenditure 
on social protection. In 1996, this 
amounted to an average of almost 43 % 
of the total spent, or to just over 12 % of 
GDP. Indeed, only in two Member 
States was the proportion of spending 
going on pensions less than a third of 
the total - Ireland and Finland, in both 
cases partly reflecting their relatively 
high levels of unemployment (which 
has come down since then) and the 
associated high level of spending on 
related benefits, as well as, in Ireland, 
the relatively small number of people 
above retirement age (Table 4 - varia-
tions between countries in the division 
of spending should be interpreted with 
caution in so far as there are still some 
differences in the way that expenditure 
on particular programmes is classified 
(see Box)). In Italy, the figure was over 
63 % of the total, and over 15 Vi % of 
GDP, much higher than in any other 
Member State, so tending to push up the 
Union average (excluding Italy, the 
average is reduced to 40 % of the total 
and to 11 Vi % of GDP). Spending on 
old-age pensions is examined more 
closely below. 
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changes which the data show and the extent to which spending reflects, for 
example, growing needs, such as an increased number of people in retirement, 
as opposed to changes in average benefit levels, or how far the coverage of 
social protection on a particular function is encompassing more or less of those 
in need. 
Health care is the second largest com-
ponent of total expenditure, accounting 
for just over 21Vi% of the overall 
amount spent on social protection in 
the Union in 1996, equivalent to just 
over 6 % of GDP. Only in the three 
Nordic countries was the proportion 
much below 20 %, partly reflecting the 
high level of spending in other areas, 
partly perhaps the greater ability in 
these countries to distinguish expendi-
ture on the provision of care from that 
on health as such, because of the devel-
oped nature of social services. For the 
opposite reasons, the share of spending 
going to health care in Ireland and 
Portugal was well above the Union 
average, but still below the Union aver-
age in relation to GDP. 
In 1996, health care and old age to-
gether were responsible for an average 
of around 65 % of expenditure in the 
Union (and for over two thirds of 
spending on benefits — i.e. excluding 
administrative costs) and in all of the 
four southern Member States, as well 
as in Austria and France, for more than 
this — in Italy, for as much as 83 % of 
spending. Since at least half of spend-
ing on health care tends to go on those 
of 65 and over and since these also 
account for some of the spending in 
other areas, especially housing and 
social exclusion, the implication is that, 
on average, the larger part of expendi-
ture on social protection is devoted to 
older people who have either retired 
from paid employment or, in the case 
of women, in particular, who have not 
worked for many years. The Nordic 
Member States, however, are possible 
exceptions, since in all three cases, 
spending on these two functions 
amounted to only around half of total 
expenditure (in Denmark and Finland) 
or only slightly more (in Sweden). 
The corollary of this is that in most 
countries in the Union significantly 
less than half of expenditure is devoted 
to those under retirement age. 
Nevertheless, such spending still 
amounted to an average of around 8 % 
of GDP in the Union in 1996 and for 
around 13 % of GDP in Denmark, 
Finland and Sweden. In Italy, on the 
other hand, it amounted to only just 
over 3 % of GDP and in the other three 
southern Member States, to only 
around 6 %. If family, child-care and 
maternity benefits are excluded, it 
means that, on average, social protec-
tion transfers to those of working age 
were equivalent to an estimated 6 % of 
GDP in the Union and in the three 
Nordic countries to 9 to 10 % of GDP, 
though to only 4 % of GDP in Greece 
and 2 Vi % in Italy. 
Within this, disability and unemploy-
ment benefits were of a similar size in 
terms of expenditure, each accounting 
for just over 8 % of total outlays, 
though in 9 of the 15 Member States in 
1996, a larger sum was transferred to 
those with disabilities than to those who 
were unemployed. (It should be noted 
that spending on disability includes 
transfers to those in retirement in 
Denmark, France and Ireland.) In four 
countries — the Netherlands, Finland, 
Sweden and the UK — spending on dis-
ability benefits amounted to 12% or 
more of total expenditure, and in the 
first three of these, to over 4 % of GDP 
(3 % in the UK). By contrast, in six 
Member States, transfers to those with 
disabilities totalled under 2 % of GDP 
and in Ireland, to under 1 %. Such large 
variations cannot easily be explained by 
differences in the number of people 
with disabilities across the Union. 
While they reflect, in part, differences 
in the average value of benefits, they 
mostly seem to be due to the differing 
extent of coverage of such schemes and 
the way that disabilities are defined. As 
noted in Chapter 2 above, in some 
countries, the Netherlands and the UK 
especially, disability benefits in effect 
became in the 1980s an effective substi-
tute for unemployment benefits, partic-
ularly in respect of the long-term unem-
ployed, and while the schemes have 
been tightened up in recent years, they 
still account for a relatively large share 
of total spending. 
Although differences in the amount 
spent on unemployment benefits in part 
reflect differences in the rate of unem-
ployment across the Union, the rela-
tionship between the two is not par-
ticularly close. Three of the Member 
States with among the highest expendi-
ture on such benefits, in relation to both 
total outlays and GDP — Belgium. 
Denmark and the Netherlands — all 
had below average rates of unemploy-
ment, especially the latter two, while in 
Italy, where the rate was above the 
Union average, spending on unemploy-
ment amounted to under 2 % of the 
total and to only Vi % of GDP. well 
below the figures elsewhere in the 
Union. Unemployment compensation 
in relation to the numbers out of work 
is examined in more detail below. 
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s Table 4 — Division of current expenditure on social protection by function, 1996 
Sickness 
Health 
Disability 
Old age and survivors 
Family and children 
Unemployment 
Housing 
Social exclusion 
Administration 
Other 
Total expenditure 
Sickness 
Health 
Disability 
Old age and survivors 
Family and children 
Unemployment 
Housing 
Social exclusion 
Administration 
Other 
Total expenditure 
Β 
4.5 
19.8 
5.8 
40.6 
7.5 
13.6 
0.0 
2.2 
4.1 
1.9 
100.0 
1.4 
5.9 
1.8 
12.2 
2.2 
4.1 
0.0 
0.7 
1.2 
0.6 
30.0 
D K 
3.5 
13.8 
10.4 
37.8 
12.1 
13.4 
2.3 
■1.0 
2.7 
0.(1 
100.0 
1.1 
4.3 
3.3 
11.S 
3.8 
4.2 
0.7 
1.2 
0.8 
0.0 
31.3 
1) 
6.2 
22.4 
7.1 
39.6 
9.0 
9.2 
0.6 
2.2 
3.4 
0.2 
100.0 
1.9 
6.9 
2.2 
12.1 
2.8 
2.8 
0.2 
0.7 
1.1 
0.1 
30.6 
KL 
3.5 
21.7 
8.3 
47.0 
8.0 
4.1 
2.3 
1.1 
3.8 
0.3 
100.0 
0.8 
5.1 
1.9 
11.0 
1.9 
1.0 
0.5 
0.2 
0.9 
0.1 
23.4 
E 
5.1 
23.2 
7.6 
44.2 
1.9 
14.2 
0.5 
0.8 
2.3 
0.2 
100.0 
1.2 
5.2 
1.7 
9.9 
0.4 
3.2 
0.1 
0.2 
0.5 
0.0 
22.5 
F 
3.0 
24.5 
5.8 
41.2 
8.3 
7.6 
2.9 
1.6 
4.0 
I.I 
100.0 
0.9 
7.5 
1.8 
12.6 
2.5 
2.3 
0.9 
0.5 
1.2 
0.3 
30.6 
IRL 
4.2 
28.6 
4.6 
24.9 
12.3 
16.0 
3.2 
1.9 
4.1 
0.1 
100.0 
0.8 
5.3 
0.9 
4.6 
2.3 
3.0 
0.6 
0.4 
0.8 
0.0 
18.5 
I 
0.8 
19.9 
6.7 
63.3 
3.4 
1.9 
0.0 
0.0 
3.0 
1.1 
100.0 
0.2 
4.9 
1.7 
15.7 
0.9 
0.5 
0.0 
0.0 
0.7 
0.3 
24.8 
L 
2.7 
19.5 
11.3 
37.7 
22.2 
3.0 
0.1 
0.0 
2.5 
0.9 
100.0 
0.8 
5.6 
3.3 
11.0 
6.4 
0.9 
0.0 
0.0 
0.7 
0.3 
29.0 
N L 
7.1 
19.8 
14.5 
36.6 
4.2 
11.4 
I.I 
0.4 
3.7 
1.2 
100.0 
2.2 
6.0 
4.4 
11.2 
1.3 
3.5 
0.3 
0.1 
1.1 
0.4 
30.6 
A 
3.7 
20.7 
7.8 
47.0 
10.6 
5.6 
0.3 
1.2 
2.0 
1.2 
100.0 
I.I 
6.1 
2.3 
13.9 
3.1 
1.6 
0.1 
0.3 
0.6 
0.3 
29.6 
V 
2.6 
26.8 
10.4 
38.7 
5.0 
5.2 
0.0 
0.6 
3.7 
7.1 
100.0 
0.6 
5.8 
2.2 
8.4 
1.1 
1.1 
0.0 
0.1 
0.8 
1.5 
21.6 
FIN 
3.9 
16.8 
14.2 
32.9 
12.1 
13.5 
1.2 
2.3 
3.1 
0.0 
100.0 
1.2 
5.3 
4.5 
10.4 
3.8 
4.3 
0.4 
0.7 
1.0 
0.0 
31.5 
S UK EU-15 
% total expenditure 
4.3 
17.4 
11.8 
38.4 
10.4 
10.1 
3.1 
3.1 
1.4 
0.0 
100.0 
1.5 
6.1 
4.1 
13.4 
3.6 
3.5 
1.1 
I.I 
0.5 
0.0 
35.0 
3.5 
21.0 
11.7 
38.7 
8.4 
5.6 
6.9 
0.6 
3.5 
0.0 
100.0 
0.9 
5.6 
3.1 
10.3 
2.2 
1.5 
1.8 
0.2 
0.9 
0.0 
26.7 
4.2 
21.7 
8.2 
42.8 
7.7 
8.1 
1.9 
1.5 
3.3 
0.6 
100.0 
lo GDP 
1.2 
6.2 
2.3 
12.2 
2.2 
2.3 
0.6 
0.4 
1.0 
0.2 
28.5 
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Chapter 3: Trends in social expenditure and its financing 
Expenditure on the other three kinds of 
benefit paid to those of working age — 
for sickness, housing and social exclu-
sion — is of a similar size in total to 
that on unemployment or disability, 
averaging around 7 Vi % of overall 
spending on social protection in the 
Union in 1996, or just over 2 % of 
GDP, with spending on sickness bene-
fits amounting to over twice that on the 
other two put together. Again, howev-
er, there were significant variations 
between countries in the relative 
importance of each of these. 
Sickness benefits ranged from 6 to 7 % 
of the total in the Netherlands and 
Germany (around 2 % of GDP) to 
under 3 % in Luxembourg, Portugal 
and Italy (where it was under 1 %), or 
well under 1 % of GDP. 
Outlays on housing benefits varied from 
7 % of the total in the UK, where they 
were larger than spending on unem-
ployment benefits — reflecting the 
reliance on them as a complimentary 
means of providing support in addition 
to cash transfers and a way of directing 
expenditure to those most in need since 
they are means-tested — and over twice 
as large as in any other Member State, 
to zero or close to zero in Italy and 
Portugal (expenditure on housing bene-
fits is not known for Belgium). 
Spending on social exclusion was sig-
nificantly larger in Denmark and 
Sweden than anywhere else — 3 to 4 % 
of overall expenditure or just over 1 % 
of GDP — and very small (0.3 % of 
GDP or less) in the four southern 
Member States, though also in 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the 
UK. This might perhaps reflect the rela-
tively extensive nature of the social pro-
tection system in the former two coun-
tries and the effort devoted to ensuring 
that everyone has at least a minimum 
level of income, but since this category 
in the Esspros accounts includes all 
transfers which cannot be classified to 
specific functions, such an interpretation 
should be treated with caution. 
This leaves expenditure on the family 
and children, which, as noted above, was 
of a similar scale, on average, to that on 
disability and unemployment benefits in 
1996, and which covers maternity bene-
fits and child-care support as well as 
child benefits. Spending on this category 
was relatively high in the three Nordic 
Member States, in each of which it 
amounted to just under 4 % of GDP. In 
each case, much of the expenditure was 
on benefits in kind, i.e. on support facil-
ities in Denmark and Sweden, more than 
half the total, whereas in most other parts 
of the Union, these accounted for well 
under a third of spending. 
Elsewhere, family benefits were 
responsible for a relatively large share 
of total spending in Ireland (over 12 % 
of the total, though only around aver-
age in relation to GDP), reflecting the 
importance attached to them as a 
means of income support (very little of 
the spending went on benefits in kind), 
and a relatively small share in all the 
southern Member States (5 % or less of 
the total), apart from Greece. This is, in 
part, a reflection of the reliance on the 
extended family for child support in 
these countries, though in Spain it is 
also a consequence of income support 
being provided through child tax 
allowances, which illustrates the 
importance of taking account of ben-
efits delivered through tax concessions 
when assessing both the scale and div-
ision of social protection in different 
Member States. 
Growth of social 
expenditure by 
function 
Despite the ageing of the population across the Union, the main change 
in the pattern of spending on social pro-
tection over the seven years 1990 to 
1996 was not in a relative growth of 
old-age pensions or in health care but in 
most benefits other than these. Indeed, 
both old-age pensions and health care, 
at least on average, were responsible for 
a slightly smaller proportion of total 
social expenditure in the Union in 1996 
than in 1990, though in both cases their 
share increased in the second part of the 
period. In part, this reflects the reces-
sion and the steep rise in unemployment 
in the early 1990s and the consequent 
growth of spending on unemployment 
benefits (the share of which went up 
from just over 7 Vi % of the total in the 
Union to just over 9 % between 1990 
and 1993) as well as housing benefits, 
social exclusion and disability benefits. 
Expenditure on disability benefits and 
social exclusion, however, continued to 
grow relative to that on other functions 
after the recession came to an end. At 
the same time, spending on sickness 
benefits declined in relative terms 
throughout the period (from just over 
5 % of the total, on average, in 1990 to 
just over 4 % in 1996). 
In terms of the change in the real value 
of transfers, housing benefits showed 
the highest rate of growth between 1990 
and 1996 in the Union as a whole, aver-
aging just over 5 Vi % a year, much of 
the growth being concentrated in the 
earlier part of the period, in large mea-
sure because of the steep rise in spend-
ing in the UK especially, as unemploy-
ment increased, though also in Finland, 
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Denmark, Germany and Greece (Table 
5). The growth in disability benefits 
(4 % a year) and unemployment bene-
fits (just over 3 Vi % a year) was also 
relatively high, in the latter case being 
wholly concentrated in the recession 
years when spending went up markedly 
in all countries except for Greece. 
Spending on unemployment benefits, 
however, fell in real terms after 1993 in 
the Union as a whole, but it continued 
to increase in seven Member States and 
went up as well in Greece. In all coun-
tries apart from Spain, the real value of 
benefits in 1996 was less than in 1990, 
in part reflecting the generally higher 
level of unemployment (but see below). 
Outlays on disability benefits also 
increased at a relatively high rate during 
the first part of the period, by almost 6 % 
a year on average, with only Greece again 
and Belgium showing a fall and with a 
particularly large rise in the UK (of 
16Vi % a year, almost as large as the rise 
in unemployment benefits, almost cer-
tainly reflecting their role as an effective 
substitute for the latter). In contrast to 
unemployment benefits, however, outlays 
continued to grow, on average, after 1993 
(by 3 % a year) and declined only in Italy, 
Portugal and the Netherlands, in the latter 
as a result of the restrictions imposed on 
the eligibility for benefits over this period. 
While spending on long-term invalidity 
has risen, that on short-term sickness 
benefits has fallen in the Union since 
1993, though the fall has not been gener-
al to all Member States, with 8 of the 15 
of them showing a rise between 1993 and 
1996. In Italy, on the other hand, it 
declined by 8Vi % a year and in Sweden, 
by 11 % a year. 
Old-age pensions and health care, the 
two largest programmes, are the ones 
which, by common consent, are likely 
to show the highest rate of increase in 
spending in future years and which 
have been the subject of the most stren-
uous attempts to limit expenditure. The 
growth of spending between 1990 and 
1996, however, was much the same as 
on social protection as a whole, averag-
ing around 3 % a year in the Union over 
the period. Nevertheless, the rise in 
expenditure on both was more than 3 % 
a year in almost all Member States. In 
the case of old-age pensions, spending 
increased by 3 % a year or more over 
these six years in all countries, except 
Greece and the Netherlands — and in 
the former, it rose by more than this 
over the last three years of the period — 
and in the case of health care, in all but 
Denmark, Italy and Finland. As shown 
below, much of the growth in pensions 
seems to be attributable to an increase 
in the average amount paid to those 
over retirement age, while the rise in 
health spending included as part of 
social expenditure appears to have been 
accompanied by a similar growth in 
private spending. 
Means-testing 
A feature of the growth of expendi-ture on social protection over the 
1990s has been the increase in means-
testing in a number of Member States, 
in an attempt to limit the growth while 
at the same time concentrating 
resources on those most in need (i.e. 
those households with income below a 
certain level). Although, on average, 
expenditure subject to means-testing 
accounted for only around 10Vi % of 
the total in 1996 and was under 1 per-
centage point greater than six years ear-
lier, in Ireland it amounted to almost 
35 % of the total and in the UK, 20 %, 
and in both it had increased between 
1990 and 1996, in the latter markedly so 
(by 3 % of the total) (Graph 29). 
In the rest of the Union, under 10 % of 
spending was subject to means-testing 
except in two Member States, Spain 
(13Vi %) and Finland (16 %), where it 
increased by more than anywhere else 
in the Union over the period (almost 5 
percentage points). In both Germany 
and France, however, it was only just 
under 10 % of total spending in 1996 
and in both it had become more impor-
tant over the preceding six years, 
though in France only slightly so. Its 
importance also increased in five of 
the remaining eight Member States 
(there are no data for Luxembourg). 
Nevertheless, in three of these — 
Belgium, Denmark and Austria — it 
was still very small (under 5 % of total 
spending). 
The growth of means-testing has affected 
a number of different areas of social pro-
tection, though its incidence varies 
between Member States. In all countries, 
apart from Ireland, little if any expendi-
ture on either sickness benefits or health 
care is subject to means-testing (in 
Ireland, 15 % of spending on health care 
was means-tested in 1996). By contrast, 
all of expenditure on housing benefits, as 
might be expected, was means-tested in 
all Member States, this accounting for 
around a third of all means-tested ben-
efits in the UK and France, some 40 % in 
Sweden and a quarter in Denmark. 
Similarly, most of the spending on social 
exclusion was means-tested in most 
countries — all or nearly all, in Germany, 
Spain, Ireland, the Netherlands — but, 
perhaps unexpectedly, none of it in 
Belgium or Denmark and under a quarter 
in Greece (reflecting the residual nature 
of this category). 
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29. Means­tested benefits in relation to total expendi­
ture on benefits in Member States, 1990 and 1996 
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Means-tested benefits in kind 
■ Means-tested cash benefits 
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In the case of unemployment benefits, 
around half or more of expenditure was 
means­tested in 1996 in Ireland (almost 
75 %). the UK and the Netherlands, and 
in the first two, the proportion had 
increased since 1990, while in Spain. 
Austria, Portugal and Finland, means­
testing applied to 20 to 25 % of spend­
ing. By contrast, none of the expendi­
ture under this head was means­tested in 
Belgium, Denmark and Sweden, all 
countries where total spending on 
unemployment benefits was relatively 
high, and only around 17 % in Germany, 
though here the proportion had risen 
progressively from 9 % in 1991, reflect­
ing the growth of long­term unemploy­
ment and the rising numbers ineligible 
for insurance­based benefits. 
Part of expenditure on disability ben­
efits is means­tested in all Member 
States, except Belgium and Denmark, 
though under 10 % in 1996 in Portugal 
and under 5 % in the Netherlands, 
Austria and Sweden. In Italy, over half 
of spending was means­tested and in 
Ireland, some 35 %, while in the 
remaining countries, the proportion 
was between 15 % and 25 %. A signif­
icant share of expenditure on family 
and related benefits was also means­
tested in Italy and Ireland (around 
40 % in both cases), though this was 
also the case in Germany, Spain, 
Portugal and the UK (around 30 to 
40 %), while in most of the remaining 
countries (all except Greece and 
France ­ around 20 % in each case), 
very little (under 3 %) was means­
tested. 
Finally, in respect of old­age benefits, 
more than 10 % of expenditure was 
subject to means­testing in 1996 in 
only three Member States — Spain 
(HVi%), Finland (20%) and Ireland 
(24Vi %), in the first two of which it 
accounted for a large part of total 
means­tested spending (around 40 %). 
Elsewhere, it accounted for only 3 % 
of expenditure or less (none at all in 
Denmark and the Netherlands), except 
in Portugal (5 %) and the UK (8 %). 
The figures presented above, though 
indicative of the extent to which 
income tests are applied to social 
transfers in different Member States, 
give only a partial picture of the 
importance of targeting across the 
Union, since they leave out of account 
fiscal measures taken to claw back 
some of the amounts paid to higher 
income groups. As noted above, the 
revenue yielded by taxes and contri­
butions levied on benefits is relative­
ly large in Denmark, the Netherlands 
and Sweden, all countries in which 
the extent of means­testing is below 
the Union average, and relatively 
small in Ireland and the UK, where 
means­testing is most important. 
Benefits and 
beneficiaries 
Given the present availability of data, it is difficult to disentangle 
the different factors underlying the 
changes in expenditure which have 
occurred and, in particular, to distin­
guish changes in the number of people 
receiving benefits — and within this, 
changes in coverage as opposed to 
changes in the number 'at risk' — 
from changes in the average amount 
of benefit paid. Although there are no 
data as yet on the number of benefit 
recipients, it is possible in the case of 
old­age pensions and unemployment 
compensation to relate the figures for 
expenditure to estimates of the 
number of people 'at risk', to obtain 
an indication at least of the relative 
generosity of systems in different 
countries and how this has changed 
over recent years. 
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Old-age benefits 
Over the seven years 1990 to 1996, 
expenditure on old-age benefits (includ-
ing survivors' benefits but, in this case, 
excluding early retirement pensions 
because of problems of comparability 
between countries) increased on average 
by 3 Vi % a year in the Union in real value 
terms. The number of people above retire-
ment age (taking the official retirement 
age in each of the Member States) went 
up by 1 Vi % a year, so that by implication 
the average benefit per person rose by 
2 % a year (Graph 30, in which Member 
States are ordered in terms of the rise in 
the number above retirement age). 
This, it should be emphasised, is a very 
approximate estimate of the growth in 
average benefits, given that there is 
unlikely to be a one-to-one relationship 
between the number of people above 
retirement age and the number of people 
receiving benefits (not least because 
many of the women above retirement 
age may not have been in paid employ-
ment beforehand and so, in some coun-
tries, may not be entitled to benefit in 
their own right). Moreover, it makes no 
allowance for the increase in the number 
of people over the period retiring before 
the official age who may be in receipt of 
a normal rather than an early retirement 
pension (or at least, what in the Esspros 
accounts is classified in the same way as 
other pensions). Accordingly, the 
increase so calculated could be a result 
of a rise in the relative number of those 
above retirement age being eligible for 
benefit rather than — or as well as — 
individual pensioners receiving more. 
In practice, there is not much sign of 
any systematic relationship across 
Member States between the growth in 
the number of people over retirement 
age and the growth of expenditure on 
old-age benefits. The increase in num-
bers was smaller in Denmark than any-
where else in the Union and yet the rise 
in expenditure under this head was 
above the Union average, implying one 
of the largest increases in the average 
amount of benefit per person. Equally, 
in Greece, the number above retirement 
age went up by more than in all other 
countries except Spain, but the growth 
in expenditure was lower than any-
where else apart from the Netherlands 
and the implied average level of benefit 
per person declined (as it did in the 
Netherlands). Moreover, the largest rise 
in spending on old-age benefits 
occurred in Portugal, where the growth 
in numbers was also below average 
(partly because of an increase in the 
retirement age of women from 62 to 63 
over the period). As a result, the implic-
it average benefit per person increased 
by 8 % a year, twice the rate in any 
other country and reflecting the general 
improvement in pension arrangements 
which took place over this period. 
Despite the lack of an apparent relation-
ship between changes in those above 
retirement age and in expenditure, there 
seems to be an inverse association 
between the growth in the former and 
the change in average benefit per per-
son. Luxembourg apart, all the coun-
tries in which benefit per person went 
up by more than average between 1990 
and 1996 had below average increases 
in the number above retirement age, 
while all of the countries with above 
average growth in numbers had below 
average increases in benefit per person. 
Although this is consistent with 
restraints being imposed on average 
benefit levels in countries with rela-
tively large increases in the number 
above retirement age, such an interpre-
tation is hazardous given the nature of 
the estimates of beneficiaries. 
The implications for average benefit 
levels of the above exercise can be 
summarised by relating the resulting 
figures to GDP per head in the different 
countries. This indicates that average 
payments of old-age benefits in 1996 
ranged from over 80 % of GDP per 
head in the three Nordic Member States 
and around 60 % to 80 % in most of the 
other Union countries to below 40 % in 
Ireland and Portugal (Graph 31). It also 
indicates that average benefit levels 
increased in these terms in most 
Member States between 1990 and 
1996, the main exceptions being 
Ireland and Finland. 
Unemployment 
compensation 
A similar exercise can be carried out for 
unemployment benefits, though in this 
case the estimate of beneficiaries 
involves perhaps an even greater margin 
of error because of differences between 
national definitions of the number of 
unemployed and the international stan-
dard definition (adopted by Eurostat to 
compare unemployment rates between 
Member States). At the same time, there 
are more serious doubts about the com-
parability of the data on expenditure. 
The latter arises in part from the inclu-
sion not only of cash transfers to the 
unemployed but also of certain active 
labour market programmes from which 
they benefit, especially training courses 
aimed at improving their employability. 
In practice, the amounts entered under 
this head seem to be affected significant-
ly by classification problems and by the 
difficulty of distinguishing such spend-
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31. Average expenditure on old­age benefits per 
person above retirement age relative to GDP 
per head, 1990 and 1996 
% GDP per head 
32. Change in expenditure on unemployment 
compensation and number of unemployed, 
1990­96 
Annual average % change 
Number of unemployed 
Unemployment compensation 
■ Estimated average benefit per person 
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ing from other labour market measures. 
(In the Netherlands, for example, no 
expenditure at all is classified to this 
category, despite the training courses 
available for the unemployed, while in 
Germany, it includes job subsidies paid 
to employers, which are outside the 
scope of Esspros.) To try to reduce the 
effect of this on the comparisons, the 
analysis below is confined to unem­
ployment compensation in cash terms, 
excluding any expenditure on 
allowances for training, since this 
seems to include training costs in many 
countries as well as support for those 
undergoing training. Two other ele­
ments of cash transfer are also exclud­
ed, early retirement benefits and redun­
dancy compensation, in both cases 
because they do not bear any clear rela­
tionship to the number of unemployed, 
as well as in the former case because 
the data are incomplete in many cases 
and in the latter because spending fluc­
tuates a lot from year to year. The 
resulting figure, therefore, can be 
regarded broadly as income support for 
the unemployed. 
Unemployment compensation defined 
in these terms increased by just under 
4 % a year in the Union in the seven 
years 1990 to 1996, while the number 
of unemployed defined according to 
ILO conventions went up by just over 
5 Vi % a year. Average compensation, 
therefore, declined by almost 2 % a 
year (Graph 32). 
A decline in the implied real value of 
compensation is apparent in most 
Member States (8 of the 14 for which 
data are available) and was particularly 
marked in Spain. Greece, France, 
Belgium and Germany (as well as in 
Sweden between 1993 and 1996). All of 
these were countries where the number 
of unemployed increased by more than 
average. This, however, is not necessar­
ily a result of a reduction in average 
benefit. lust as for old­age benefits — 
indeed, perhaps even more so — it 
could equally reflect a change in cover­
age, in this case, of a reduction as ben­
efit entitlement was made more restric­
tive. (In both Germany and Sweden, 
benefit rates were reduced during this 
period, while in Sweden and Spain, 
there is evidence that eligibility criteria 
were tightened; see Social protection in 
Europe, 1995 and 1997, Chapter 2.) It 
could also result from a change in the 
composition of the unemployed, in par­
ticular, from growth in the relative num­
ber of long­term unemployed who are 
no longer eligible for insurance­based 
benefits but have to rely on social assis­
tance, which tends to be lower in value. 
On the other hand, there was a substan­
tial increase in the implied value of 
compensation per person unemployed 
in Ireland, Portugal and the Netherlands 
over this period (by around 5 % or 
more). In Ireland, this seems to have 
been due in part to an increase in the 
average rate of benefit, while in 
Portugal, and apparently in the 
Netherlands, it appears to be a result of 
an increase in effective coverage (in 
Portugal from a very low level, see 
Chapter 4 below), in the sense that the 
number of people receiving income 
support seems to have gone up by more 
than the figures for unemployment on 
the ILO definition. (It is also possible 
that in the Netherlands, the Esspros fig­
ures for unemployment compensation 
include spending on benefits in kind 
since, as noted above, no expenditure is 
reported under this head.) 
Indeed, in the Netherlands, the impli­
cation of the exercise is that average 
unemployment compensation in 1996 
was 20 % higher than average GDP per 
head and had risen appreciably in rela­
tion to the latter over the preceding six 
years (Graph 33). Elsewhere, the 
implied average compensation ranged 
from around 80 % in Belgium and 
Denmark and around 60 % in Austria, 
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Finland and Sweden, to 20 % or less in 
the four southern Member States and 
the UK. This pattern of variation is 
broadly in line with estimates of 
replacement rates (see Chapter 4), 
though in the case of the UK, as noted 
above, the effective value of compen­
sation is understated because of the 
exclusion of housing benefits which 
are a significant additional element of 
support (but one which it is hard to 
estimate the scale of because of the 
lack of detailed data on how much of 
these go to the unemployed as opposed 
to other groups). 
Public and private 
health expenditure 
The figures cited above on spend­ing on health care across the 
Union relate only to the socially 
funded element of this. In practice, 
this amounts to most of the expendi­
ture incurred in all Member States. In 
all countries, however, a significant 
part of health care is delivered by the 
private sector or is privately funded 
(through, for example, co­financing 
arrangements under which people 
pay directly towards the cost of their 
treatment, as in the case of the pre­
scription of drugs). The main ques­
tions considered here concern the rel­
ative scale of this in different coun­
tries and the way that it has changed 
in recent years as constraints have 
been widely imposed on the public 
component of expenditure. (Unlike 
the rest of this chapter, the analysis 
below is based on OECD rather than 
Eurostat data since these contain esti­
mates of private expenditure. 
Accordingly, since the coverage is 
not precisely the same, the figures for 
public spending in relation to GDP 
33. Average unemployment compensation per person unemployed 
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may differ somewhat from those pre­
sented above.) 
In 1997, private expenditure on health 
care in the Union amounted to 24 % of 
the total, adding some 30 % to spend­
ing on health included as part of social 
protection. This was slightly higher 
than in 1990 (22 %), so that, on aver­
age at least, there appears to have been 
a relative growth of private spending 
(Graph 34). In the US, by contrast, 
where most of expenditure is private, 
L NL A P FIN S UK EU-15 US JP 
the proportion declined from 59 Vi % to 
53 Vi % over the period. As a result, in 
1997, public spending on health care in 
the US was only slightly less than in 
the EU and higher than in most 
Member States, while total spending 
was considerably higher. (In the US, 
public spending amounted to just under 
6Vi % of GDP as against just over 
6 Vi % of GDP in the EU on OECD def­
initions, while total expenditure in the 
US was over 13 Vi % of GDP as com­
pared with 8Vi % in the EU.) 
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The importance of private health 
expenditure in 1997 varied from 40 % 
of total spending in Portugal (where it 
had risen slightly since 1990) and 30 % 
in Italy (where it had also increased) to 
just over 15 % in Sweden (where it had 
risen markedly) and the UK. just under 
15 % in Belgium (where it had also 
risen) and Denmark, and to only 8 % in 
Luxembourg. Overall, the general ten-
dency over the period was for private 
spending to grow in relation to public, 
with eight Member States showing a 
rise and five — Germany, France, 
Ireland and the UK as well as Portugal 
— a decline. In four of these, all except 
France, social expenditure on health 
care, as defined in the Esspros accounts 
and discussed above, increased by sig-
nificantly more than average. In Italy, 
Finland and Sweden, growth in private 
expenditure accompanied a fall in pub-
lic spending in real terms (as shown by 
OECD data for Sweden since there are 
no Esspros data before 1993). In the 
latter countries, therefore, constraints 
on public health expenditure may have 
led to a growth of private provision — 
perhaps even directly, since the 
increased use of co-financing may have 
been one of the ways of achieving a 
reduction in public spending. 
In most Member States, however, 
growth of public and private spending 
on health care occurred in parallel. 
Sources of finance 
A s indicated in Social protection in Europe 1997 (pp. 73-74), there 
are marked variations in the relative 
importance of different sources of 
funding for social expenditure. 
Whereas on average some 63 % of total 
finance in 1996 came from social con-
tributions, this proportion ranged from 
two thirds or more in France, Belgium, 
the Netherlands, Germany, Italy and 
Spain, and only slightly below in 
Austria to just over half in Luxembourg 
and Sweden and just under half in 
Finland, around 40 % or less in 
Portugal, the UK and Ireland and only 
25 % in Denmark. This variation essen-
tially reflects the extent to which sys-
tems are based on social insurance 
principles and centred on those in paid 
employment (the first group of coun-
tries), as opposed to being based on 
universal coverage of citizens, whether 
they are in work or not. 
Since methods of financing are rooted 
in the way that systems have developed 
historically and are linked closely with 
the way that the expenditure side is 
managed and entitlement to benefits is 
controlled, they tend to be slow to 
change. Despite the increasing concern 
to limit or reduce the charges falling on 
income from employment, therefore, 
Member States have found difficulty in 
accomplishing this. It should be 
emphasised that, while social contribu-
tions represent the major part of total 
taxes on employed labour, other taxes 
account for more than one third of this 
total on average in the EU. (It should 
be also emphasised that social contri-
butions as defined here include those 
paid voluntarily by employers, or 
employees, to the extent that they go to 
funding schemes which are classified 
as social protection and therefore 
included in expenditure; see 'Notes and 
sources'.) 
The relative importance of social con-
tributions over the Union as a whole, 
therefore, declined only marginally 
between 1990 and 1996 (from just 
under 64Vi % of the total to just over 
63 %). All of this reduction, moreover, 
occurred in the first three years of the 
period, and after 1993 there was a small 
increase in their relative importance 
(Graph 35). This was also the case as 
regards employers' contributions, their 
share of total funding falling from 42 % 
in 1990 to just under 39Vi % in 1993, 
but remaining at this level over the sub-
sequent three years. These changes are 
mirrored by changes in the revenue 
from taxes, which increased from 30 % 
of the total in 1990 to 33 % in 1993 and 
then fell to 32 % in 1996. Within this, 
while there was some increase in rev-
enue from earmarked taxes (i.e. those 
linked specifically to social protection), 
this remains very small — only IVi % 
of the total — although this may reflect 
the difficulty of distinguishing such 
revenue in some countries. 
Despite the difficulties involved, the 
share of revenue collected from social 
contributions changed significantly in 
a number of Member States between 
1990 and 1996, though not uniformly 
downwards and more in countries 
where the share was relatively small 
initially rather than in those where it 
was large. In Portugal, it declined 
from 57 % to 43 % over the period, in 
Ireland and the UK by some 4 per-
centage points (from 44 % or just over 
to just under 40 %) and in Germany 
(where it was over 70 % in 1990) by 
3Vi percentage points. On the other 
hand, social contributions became a 
more important source of funding in 
Denmark (where their share rose from 
13 % to 25 %) and the Netherlands 
(from 59 % to 67Vi %), as well as. 
more modestly, in Finland, Belgium 
and Austria. Overall, therefore, there 
is little sign of any convergence in the 
proportion of revenue yielded by 
contributions over this period. 
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There is, however, some sign of a shift 
within social contributions from 
employers to employees (or others who 
are being protected). In 1990, 65 % of 
the revenue yielded by contributions 
came from employers, in 1996, 62 %. 
Such a shift occurred in the majority of 
Member States, especially in Denmark 
and Finland, where total contributions 
were below the Union average, but was 
by no means general. Indeed, in most 
countries, there was comparatively little 
change over the period. 
Since overall funding for social protec­
tion has broadly kept pace with expen­
diture (though there are some differ­
ences between countries as noted 
below), it has also risen in relation to 
GDP over the 1990s, as has the revenue 
from social contributions. Since, how­
ever, the share of wages and salaries in 
GDP has tended to fall over this period, 
particularly since 1993 and the end of 
the recession, the revenue from contri­
butions has risen significantly in rela­
tion to wages and salaries. Despite the 
concern of Member States to limit or 
reduce the pressure on labour costs 
from social charges, therefore, contri­
butions increased from an average of 
33 Vi % of labour costs (as measured by 
compensation of employees) in 1990 to 
37 % in 1996, and employers' contribu­
tions from 21 Vi % to 23 % (Graph 36). 
The increase, moreover, occurred in all 
Member States, except Portugal, where 
the relative scale of contributions 
remained much the same, and Ireland 
and Luxembourg, where it fell slightly. 
Furthermore, apart from the latter two 
countries and Spain, social contributions 
also continued to rise relative to labour 
costs in the second part of the period, 
though in a number of countries — 
Portugal, Sweden, Finland and Greece 
35. Financing of social protection expenditure by source of 
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as well as these three — there was some 
fall in the employers' component. This 
fall, however, seems to have been 
largely the result of a reduction in the 
voluntary element of this, since in most 
countries, this declined over the period 
(on average from 26Vi % to 24 %). 
Nevertheless, the apparent increase in 
social contributions relative to overall 
labour costs needs to be treated with 
some caution. Although it is in line with 
the change shown by national accounts 
data, there is a question mark over the 
treatment of reductions in social contri­
butions made for labour market or other 
policy purposes (i.e. concessions made 
to employers aimed at reducing the cost 
of labour). In some countries, these may 
be treated straightforwardly as a reduc­
tion in contributions, diminishing the fig­
ures for revenue shown. In others, how­
ever, they may be treated, quite ration­
ally and perhaps most appropriately, as 
an explicit subsidy, which, therefore, 
appears on the expenditure side of the 
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37. Total social protection expenditure and receipts in relation to GDP 
in Member States, 1996 
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public sector accounts, leaving the fig­
ures for social contributions unaffected 
even though actual revenue from these 
has declined. To the extent that countries 
adopt the latter procedure, the scale of 
social contributions in relation to labour 
costs will be overstated. 
Receipts relative 
to expenditure 
While the figures examined earlier in the chapter give an indication 
of the overall cost of spending on social 
protection and the total amount of trans­
fers, they do not reveal the full picture. 
In most countries in the Union, govern­
ments collect more in revenue for social 
protection than they spend, largely 
because of a concern to build up 
reserves against future liabilities (the 
difference may also come from omis­
sions and errors remaining in data pro­
vided on expenditure and receipts). In 
1996, total finance for social protection 
amounted on average to 29 Vi % of 
GDP, 1 % of GDP more than expendi­
ture (Graph 37, in which countries are 
ordered in terms of revenue). In 
Denmark, it was 38 % of GDP, some 7 
percentage points more than spending, 
in Finland, 36 % of GDP, 4Vi percent­
age points more than spending, while in 
three other Member States, Sweden, the 
Netherlands and the UK, revenue 
exceeded expenditure by over 3 % of 
GDP. In all of these countries, the social 
protection accounts had been in signifi­
cant surplus throughout the 1990s. 
By contrast, revenue was less than 
spending in Spain, Italy and France and 
about the same level in Austria. In 
these countries, therefore, the social 
protection accounts were in deficit. 
Moreover, according to Esspros data, 
in France, the account had been in 
deficit in each of the years 1992 to 
1995; in Italy, for all the years 1990 to 
1995, except one; and in Spain, in four 
of the six years 1990 to 1995. These 
deficits are covered by borrowing in 
the short term, but may imply a need 
for increased taxes or social contribu­
tions in the longer term. 
In terms of revenue, therefore, there is 
a somewhat different ordering of 
Member States as regards the level of 
social protection and the amount of 
transfers it involves than in terms of 
expenditure. The three Nordic coun­
tries still had the highest levels in 1996 
relative to GDP (though the order is 
changed) and the four southern 
Member States together with Ireland 
the lowest levels (though Portugal 
moves ahead of Spain), but between 
these two extremes, the Netherlands 
moves ahead of Germany and France 
and the UK ahead of Luxembourg and 
Austria, both of which fall below the 
Union average. 
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Recent developments in sources of finance 
The data on receipts analysed in the text goes only up to 1996. In a number of Member States, measures have been intro-
duced to change the pattern of financing social protection since then. Indeed, a widespread tendency, especially in 
Member States where they represent the major means of financing systems of social protection, has been to seek to limit 
the rate of social contributions levied on income from employment and more generally to limit all taxes on employed 
labour, in order to reduce the charges falling on labour costs, and to replace revenue from this source by general taxation 
or earmarked taxes. 
In addition, a great many countries have introduced special reductions in social contributions for employers taking on 
people who were previously long-term unemployed or other particularly disadvantaged groups on the labour market, as 
described in Chapter 4 below. These, however, are not intended to change fundamentally the structure of funding for 
social protection and are limited in both their incidence and duration. 
The attempt to shift the main source of funding from contributions to taxes, in some cases to 'earmarked' taxes levied 
specifically to fund certain benefits, has perhaps been pursued furthest in France, where the CSG (contribution sociale 
généralisée) was introduced as a 'solidarity tax' in 1991 to replace part of the contributions levied for old-age pensions 
and family benefits and has, more recently in 1998, been extended to replace part of health insurance contributions, 
enabling these to be reduced significantly on both employers and employees. Since the tax is levied on all sources of 
income, including capital and social transfers, it essentially represents a shift away from wage earners and employers to 
other income recipients. In 1998, therefore, the rate was increased from 3.4 % to 7.5 % (with a reduced rate of 6.2 % on 
social benefits). As a result, the revenue yielded by the CSG has increased eleven-fold in just seven years and in 1999 is 
higher than personal income tax. At the same time, the CRDS (contribution au remboursement de la dette sociale), an 
additional charge levied at a rate of 0.5 % on income, introduced in 1995 to contribute to reducing the deficit of the social 
protection system, has been extended until 2014, while the tax levied on tobacco for a similar reason has been increased. 
As a consequence of this shift, social contributions decreased from 23 % of GDP in 1996 to 20Vi % in 1998 whereas ear-
marked taxes levied to fund social protection increased from just over 2 % of GDP, accounting for more than 15 % of 
total funding for social protection. 
In addition, the exemption of low earnings from social contributions, introduced in 1993, has been continued, though the 
maximum level of earnings it applies to has been recently reduced slightly from 133 % of the minimum wage to 130 %. 
However, this maximum level of earnings is due to be raised substantially to 180 % of the minimum wage from 2000 on 
as a result of new legislation aimed at reducing working time. 
In Belgium, social contributions levied on employers were reduced in two stages in 1998 and 1999, with those on low 
earnings (just over EUR 1 500 a month), as well as on the earnings of part-time workers, reduced disproportionately. The 
reduction is linked to agreements on expanding employment and training, which are being monitored sector by sector, 
with the possibility that the reduction could be postponed in sectors where no agreements have been reached. In addition, 
it is planned to reduce employees' contributions for those on low earnings from the beginning of 2000, in order to increase 
their take-home pay (by around EUR 38 a month) and reduce the unemployment trap (i.e. the incidence of cases where 
take-home pay is not much if any higher than unemployment benefit). 
In Germany, efforts have focused on preventing social contributions from increasing any further. Federal transfers to pen-
sion funds were, therefore, raised from lune 1999 and the proposed 'ecological tax reform' will provide extra finance. In 
1999, the contribution rate for pensions was reduced from 20.3 % to 19.5 %. At the same time, those working part time 
continued un p. 88 
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continued front p. 87 
(under 15 hours a week) and earning below a certain amount (DEM 630 (EUR 322) a month), who were previously not 
covered by compulsory sickness and pension insurance, have been brought into the system. From April 1999 onwards, for 
these workers, employers have to pay a pension contribution rate of 12 % of gross wages and a sickness contribution rate 
of 10 %, slightly less than for those on earnings above this (19.5 % for pensions), but not unemployment insurance, the 
entitlement to a pension being reduced proportionately. 
In Austria, workers on low wages (around EUR 285 in 1999) can opt to pay voluntary pension and sickness contribution 
as from 1998, for a flat-rate sum of around EUR 39 a month. Employers of those earning more than 1 Vi times this are now 
required to pay pension and sickness insurance contributions at a combined rate of 16.4 % of their gross earnings, while 
the rate for employees is slightly less. The new provisions, however, apply to only some 6 % of employees, most of them 
women. 
In Italy, the pact signed by the government with the social partners at the end of 1998 included a commitment to reform 
the whole system of financing of social protection, shifting from contributions to general tax revenue in respect of mater-
nity and family benefits, with the aim of both reducing the charges falling on labour in order to improve cost competi-
tiveness and explicitly recognising the 'national solidarity' nature of the benefits concerned. 
Elsewhere, in Ireland, the full rate of employees' contributions was reduced in 1998 from 5.5 % to only 4.5 %. In the UK, 
the lower limit for the payment of both employers' and employees' contributions is in the process of being substantially 
raised in order to align them to the tax threshold. In the Netherlands, as noted above, a ceiling has been imposed on the 
rate of social contributions for financing the State pension, any increase in funding need being met from general taxation. 
88 
Chapter 4: Making social protection systems more employment-friendly 
Chapter 4: Making social protection systems 
more employment-friendly 
I n its recent communication, 'A con-certed strategy for modernising 
social protection', the Commission 
emphasised the role of social protec-
tion systems in helping to raise 
employment levels, an objective which 
is a central element of overall econ-
omic policy in the Union. The potential 
importance of this role is emphasised 
in both the broad economic policy 
guidelines (where it is recognised that 
tax and benefit systems need to support 
employability and job creation) and, 
more specifically, in the employment 
guidelines, where there are a number of 
references to the way in which social 
protection systems need to develop. 
Both of these guidelines have been 
endorsed by Member States. 
Under the third employment guideline, 
Member States are committed to rais-
ing the number of people benefiting 
from active measures to improve their 
employability. This may imply focus-
ing on the needs of individuals and 
establishing a close link between the 
administration of benefits and the 
employment services, whose essential 
function is to help to get people into 
work. They are also committed to 
ensuring that there is an appropriate 
balance between an individual's enti-
tlement to benefit and their availability 
for training or other measures. 
Under the fourth guideline, Member 
States have agreed to ensure that tax 
and benefit systems provide incentives 
both for the unemployed actively to 
seek work and for employers to create 
new jobs. In addition, they have agreed 
to develop measures, including in 
respect of social protection, so that 
older workers are also able to partici-
pate actively in working life. 
The concern of the chapter is to examine 
each of these aspects of policy, to con-
sider the approach which Member 
States are following in each case and the 
specific action they have taken in the 
recent past to achieve the objectives 
which have been set. As such, it updates 
the review of policy in this area inclu-
ded in Social protection in Europe 1997 
(Chapter 4). 
In so doing, it also draws attention to 
the development and acceptance 
across the Union of a wider interpret-
ation of the role of social protection, 
which is conceived less in terms of 
simply providing income support for 
people who, for one reason or other, 
are unable to work or who wish to 
retire from the labour force and more 
in terms of both encouraging them to 
find a job or to keep working and 
assisting them to do so. As a corollary, 
there is increasing emphasis on the 
provision of benefits in kind rather 
than cash transfers — much as in the 
case of health care, efforts are concen-
trated more on treating ailments or 
preventing them occurring in the first 
place than on providing sickness ben-
efits to those who fall ill. 
Accordingly, it is becoming increas-
ingly difficult to draw a neat distinction 
between social protection measures, on 
the one hand, and labour market and 
employment measures, on the other. 
Indeed, labour market measures are 
becoming an ever more important 
aspect of social protection, though the 
convention at present is generally to 
exclude from its definition measures 
such as job subsidies, which benefit 
firms as well as individuals. The same 
convention has been adopted in the rest 
of the report, but in what follows active 
measures which take the form of job 
subsidies or similar kinds of assistance 
are included in the analysis in order to 
present a complete picture of develop-
ments in this area. 
Outline of analysis 
The analysis is divided into three main parts. In the first, the level of 
unemployment benefits relative to earn-
ings in the different Member States is 
examined, in order to assess the poten-
tial financial incentive, or disincentive, 
they imply for people to remain in 
employment or actively to seek work if 
they are unemployed. This is based on a 
recent empirical (as opposed to theoreti-
cal) study of replacement rates, which 
used the results of the first two waves of 
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the European Community Household 
Panel (ECHP) to assess what people 
actually received when they were 
unemployed and compared this with 
their take-home pay when they were 
working. Changes in benefit systems 
which have occurred since the ECHP 
data were collected (wave 1 relates to 
1993, wave 2 to 1994) and their poten-
tial effect on the replacement rates 
calculated are also examined. 
The second section considers the mea-
sures which Member States have taken 
to shift the emphasis of policy from 
passive income support to active assis-
tance to the unemployed to find work, 
including measures to alter the condi-
tions governing entitlement to unem-
ployment benefit to encourage job 
search activity or participation in 
labour market programmes. Such con-
ditions need to be taken into account in 
any assessment of the effect of replace-
ment rates on incentives and temper the 
conclusions which are liable to be 
reached from merely comparing levels 
of replacements rates between coun-
tries. This section is based in part on 
the national action plans for employ-
ment published by Member States. 
The third section examines the empiri-
cal evidence on the expenditure on 
labour market policies actually 
incurred by Member States and, in par-
ticular, the extent to which there has 
been a shift in spending from passive to 
active measures, taking account of 
changes in unemployment which have 
taken place. It also considers the div-
ision of spending between different 
types of active measure — training as 
opposed to job placement services or 
employment subsidies, for example — 
and the way that this has changed over 
recent years. 
Social benefits and 
incentive effects 
There is a widespread recognition across the Union that systems of 
social protection need to take account of 
the changing nature of the labour mar-
ket, of the high level of long-term unem-
ployment, on the one hand, and of the 
continuous need for the updating of 
skills and know-how, on the other. This 
is very different from the situation over 
most of the post-war period when social 
protection systems for the unemployed 
were largely developed, when their main 
function was to provide a temporary 
source of replacement income while the 
person concerned looked for a job, when 
labour shortages rather than job scarcity 
were the major problem and when peo-
ple could expect to do the same kind of 
job throughout their working lives. 
The concern then, in the interest both of 
labour market balance and social jus-
tice, was to ensure that someone unem-
ployed received a sufficient level of 
benefit to give them enough time to find 
a suitable job, that they did not suffer 
unduly because they could not find 
employment. In present circumstances, 
the aim is to ensure that people have a 
financial incentive to look for work, that 
they do not spend so long out of work 
that it harms their chances of finding a 
job and creates an attitude of dependen-
cy, that their employability is enhanced 
rather than damaged during their spell 
of unemployment. Accordingly, the 
focus is on making sure that people are 
always better off in work than if draw-
ing benefits, that the level of benefit 
itself, as well as the conditions applying 
to entitlement, encourages people to 
find a job as soon as possible and that 
they are helped to do this through 
appropriate active measures. 
At the same time, benefits still need to 
perform their main function of pro-
viding an acceptable level of income 
and preventing people sinking into 
poverty when they are unable to work 
through no fault of their own. The 
challenge facing Member States is to 
set benefit levels and the regulations 
governing entitlement to them so that 
these two objectives are achieved 
simultaneously. The details of the 
schemes in place, however, suggest 
that views on where the appropriate 
balance lies vary markedly across the 
Union, though they also reflect social 
attitudes towards the unemployed — 
and redistribution generally — the 
way that the system has developed 
historically and, of course, the level 
of economic prosperity. 
In practice, both the proportion of the 
unemployed receiving benefits and the 
amount of benefits received seem to 
differ significantly between Member 
States, the main divide for the former 
being between the north and south of 
the Union. This is indicated by the first 
two waves of the ECHP, which provide 
data on what respondents actually 
received when unemployed and which 
throw light on both coverage rates (the 
proportion of the unemployed in 
receipt of benefit) and replacement 
rates (the net amount of benefit 
received relative to net earnings when 
the person was in work). Specifically, 
the data used relate to people aged 
between 16 and 54 who were unem-
ployed for at least three months over 
the two years 1993 to 1994 and who 
had previously been in paid employ-
ment (three months was used in order 
to exclude the very short-term unem-
ployed who might not have had time or 
did not bother to claim benefit). It 
should be emphasised that only the first 
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38. Unemployed (aged 16-54) not receiving unemployment 
or social benefits in Member States, 1993/94 
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ment benefit in Member States, 1993/94 
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two waves of the ECHP have been used 
in these analyses and that the results 
will become more reliable over time, in 
particular because of the increased 
number of transitions between unem-
ployment and paid employment that 
will be observed. The results reported 
here, therefore, are exploratory and 
should be interpreted with caution. 
They will need to be compared with 
evidence from other studies and to be 
further investigated as data from new 
waves become available for analysis. It 
should also be kept in mind that it is 
always difficult to gather high quality 
information on income and transfers 
through interviews. 
Data from the first two waves of the 
ECHP, which indicate what respon-
dents actually received when they were 
unemployed (see Box for a description 
of the data), show that in Italy, Greece 
and Portugal, over half of those who 
were unemployed for at least three 
months over the two years 1993 to 
1994 and who had been in work before 
did not receive any unemployment 
benefit at all. Moreover, only a small 
proportion of these seem to have 
received any other form of social trans-
fer, including social assistance or bene-
fits paid to the household (Graph 38). 
These findings, however, need to be 
treated with some caution, since it 
remains to be verified from the data for 
waves 3 and 4 and by more detailed 
investigation of the cases concerned, 
whether all social transfers are, in fact, 
included in the answers given. It should 
be noted that the benefits included 
cover all social transfers, even family 
or child allowances, which are payable 
whether or not the person concerned is 
unemployed, which again tends to 
increase the coverage rates in relation 
to the actual situation. 
In Denmark, Germany and Belgium, in 
contrast to the southern Member States, 
only around 10 % or less of the unem-
ployed received no unemployment ben-
efit and most of these obtained some 
other form of social transfer, leaving 
very few (only 4 % in Germany and 
Belgium and around 1 % in Denmark) 
without any kind of State support. 
In between these two extremes, around 
15 % of the unemployed received no 
unemployment benefit in France and 
Ireland and just over a third in Spain 
and the UK. In all these countries 
except Spain, however, a large propor-
tion of these received some other form 
of social transfer, leaving only 7 % 
without State support in France and 
Ireland and only 4 % in the UK. In 
Spain, on the other hand, some 30 % of 
the unemployed appear not to have 
received any kind of social benefit, 
though again this finding needs to be 
verified by further investigation. 
These figures are affected by the fact 
that eligibility for benefit is dependent 
in most countries on having been 
employed before for a minimum period 
of time — and, therefore, having 
acquired the necessary contributions 
record — and, in some countries, on 
being above a certain age. In particular, 
those without a suitable employment 
record tend not to be eligible for unem-
ployment benefit but to be reliant on 
social assistance, which in Greece and 
Portugal as well as France is not 
payable to anyone under 25, while in 
Spain and Italy, it is available only at 
the regional level and so varies 
between different parts of the country. 
In consequence, around 90 % of young 
people aged 16 to 25 who were unem-
ployed in 1993 to 1994 received no 
unemployment benefit in Italy, 80 % in 
Greece, 75 % in Portugal, 50 % in 
Spain and around 30 % in France, 
reflecting the large numbers who had 
never worked before (Graph 39). 
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The European Community Household Panel data 
used in the analysis 
The European Community Household Panel (ECHP), which consists of a sam-
ple of households and persons across the Union surveyed each year, is intend-
ed to give an insight into social conditions in Member States and how these are 
changing over time. The survey combines questions on employment status and 
personal circumstances with questions on income and the sources from which 
it comes, including social transfers as well as earnings from work and private 
income. It, therefore, provides a means of examining the benefits actually 
received by unemployed people and comparing these with the income they 
earned when they were in work. This, it should be noted, is different from the 
usual approach to estimating replacement rates, based on the standard amount 
of benefit payable under social protection regulations to people in particular 
circumstances and comparing this with the theoretical net earnings from work 
of someone on the average wage or some proportion of this, given the tax 
schedules in operation. 
The analysis in the text is essentially a summary of the results of a study car-
ried out in 1999 by the Centre for Social Policy at the University of Antwerp 
for the European Commission, which was based on data from the first and sec-
ond waves of the ECHP relating to 1993 and 1994. In order to exclude those 
who might have been unemployed for too short a time to receive benefits, the 
study focused on people who had been unemployed for at least three months 
during these two years. Their average benefit was estimated by dividing the 
total amount of benefit received by the number of months of unemployment, 
which, it should be noted, gives the average amount of benefit received during 
their period of unemployment, which may differ from the average amount 
received for the months in which they were in receipt of benefit. Benefits are 
measured net of any direct taxes or social contributions payable on them which 
are deducted at source (but not necessarily those not deducted at source). 
Earnings from employment, with which benefits are compared, are also mea-
sured net of taxes (except in France: both those deducted at source and those 
possibly deducted later) and social contributions. The possibility that in some 
countries benefits are measured gross of taxes and/or contributions means that 
replacement rates may be over-estimated in these cases, though, in most 
Member States, some or all benefits are not subject to tax. 
Only 12 Member States (excluding Austria, Finland and Sweden) were inclu-
ded in both the first and second waves of the ECHP, while Luxembourg, for 
which the sample size is too small to give reliable results, and the Netherlands, 
where not all the data required for the analysis are available, were excluded 
from the analysis reported here. 
Nevertheless, even for those aged 25 
and over, it was still the case in the 
four southern countries that a large 
proportion of the unemployed seem 
not to have been eligible for unem-
ployment benefit — around 60 % in 
Italy, around half in Greece and 
Portugal and a quarter in Spain. 
The average level of unemployment 
benefit (including those receiving no 
benefit at all) varied from almost 80 % 
of take-home pay (or net earnings) 
when the person concerned was in 
work in Ireland and 70 % or above in 
Germany, Belgium and Denmark to 
under 25 % in Italy and the UK and 
under 10 % in Greece, with France 
(around 60 %), Spain and Portugal 
(around 35 %) in between. It should be 
emphasised again that these and subse-
quent figures need to be treated with 
some caution for the abovementioned 
reasons and in particular because they 
do not cover social transfers other than 
unemployment benefit. The latter is 
especially important in countries 
where social assistance or transfers to 
households rather than individuals, 
such as housing benefits, represent 
a large share of the income support 
provided to the unemployed. 
The average differed in some degree 
according to age and between men and 
women. As regards the latter, the aver-
age replacement rate for women (ben-
efits relative to take-home pay) was 
much the same as for men in Germany, 
Belgium, Greece and Spain and higher 
than for men in all the other countries 
covered except Ireland (Graph 40). 
These differences reflect the nature of 
the benefit system in force and, in par-
ticular, the relationship between the 
wage received when the person con-
cerned was in work and the ceiling 
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imposed on benefit payments. Because 
women tend to earn less than men, the 
benefits they receive, which in most 
countries are a proportion of previous 
earnings up to a maximum amount, 
will tend to be less affected by the ceil­
ing. Similarly, in the UK, where ben­
efits are a flat-rate amount irrespective 
of previous earnings, this amount will 
usually be higher in relation to take-
home pay for women than for men. 
It is more difficult to explain the dif­
ference in the average replacement rate 
in Ireland, where benefits are also 
mostly flat rate, but where men 
received much higher benefits in rela­
tion to previous earnings than women. 
The explanation, however, might lie in 
a large proportion of the men con­
cerned being on relatively low rates of 
pay when they were working or, per­
haps more likely, that, because they 
were the heads of households, they 
received more in the form of supple­
ments to the flat-rate benefit for depen­
dants than women. 
Average replacement rates, however, 
can by themselves give a misleading 
impression of financial incentives, or 
disincentives, to seek employment, 
since they reveal nothing about the 
extent to which rates vary between 
individuals. A rate of 80 %, for exam­
ple, is compatible with everyone hav­
ing a rate around this level or with 
most people having a lower rate but a 
few having a very high rate. What is 
important in this context is the relative 
number of the unemployed who 
receive benefits which are close to or 
above their take-home pay when they 
were working, who, therefore, have 
little financial inducement to find a 
job and perhaps some incentive to stop 
working. (This, of course, does not 
mean that there might not be other 
incentives to be in work, such as social 
or personal esteem as well as pressure 
to find a job from the authorities 
administering benefit payments.) 
The difficulty is to identify the level of 
replacement rate which represents 
enough of a financial disincentive to 
work that it affects individual behav­
iour. In practice, this is likely to differ 
between countries, as well as between 
areas within countries, and is likely to 
be influenced by social norms of behav­
iour (how far it is socially acceptable to 
be unemployed) as well as by the 
absolute level of benefit received, since 
a given percentage variation in net 
income will tend to be more significant 
at the bottom end of the income scale 
than further up. (In this regard, it is 
important to note that the great majori­
ty of the unemployed tend to have earn­
ings when in work well below the aver­
age.) Given our state of understanding 
of this issue, any figure taken is arbi­
trary, but it can perhaps be assumed that 
a replacement rate much below 80 % 
would not in most cases represent a 
financial inducement to be, or remain, 
unemployed while a rate much above 
this might do so. 
In practice, in most Member States, a 
relatively small proportion of men 
who were unemployed had a replace­
ment rate of 80 % or above in 
1993-94 (including those receiving no 
benefit at all). Only in Denmark 
(27%), Germany (25 %) and France 
(24 %) did more than 20 % of men 
have a rate this high. In Spain, the fig­
ure was only around 10 %, in Italy, 
8 % and in Greece and the UK, under 
4 % (Graph 41). Indeed, except in 
Denmark, over 65 % of men either 
had a replacement rate of under 65 % 
or did not receive any benefit, and in 
Italy, Portugal, Greece and the UK, 
well over 70 % of men had replace­
ment rates of under 50 % (in Greece 
and the UK, virtually everyone). 
40. Average replacement rate percentage of previous earnings 
replaced by unemployment benefit for unemployed men 
and women (aged 16-54) in Member States, 1993/94 
% previous earnings 
41. Proportion of unemployed (aged 16-54) with 
replacement rates below 80 % and 65 % in 
Member States, 1993/94 
% unemployed Left bar: men; right bar: women 
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In the case of women, a slightly higher 
proportion of the unemployed had 
replacement rates of 80 % or above in 
most countries. As for men, over 20 % 
of women had replacement rates of 
this level in Denmark (49 %), 
Germany (21 %) and France (30%), 
but also Belgium (23 %) and Ireland 
(21 %), while the figure was only just 
below 20% in Portugal (18%). In 
Italy and the UK, the proportion was 
well under 10 % and in Greece, virtu-
ally zero. Nevertheless, in all countries 
apart from Denmark and France, over 
60 % of unemployed women had a 
replacement rate of under 65 % or 
received no benefit at all, and in Italy, 
Greece and the UK, over 85 % of 
women had a rate of below 50 % 
(around two thirds in Portugal and 
68 % in Spain). 
This evidence suggests, therefore, that 
any financial incentive to be unem-
ployed or not actively look for work is 
relatively weak for most people in 
most Member Stales — or, at least, 
was a few years ago. Since 1993-94, 
moreover, while there is no evidence 
of significant changes in the levels of 
benefits, the conditions governing enti-
tlement to benefit have been tightened 
in many countries (particularly in rela-
tion to those refusing a suitable job 
offer, which itself has been more wide-
ly defined). These findings have to be 
taken with some caution. Further 
investigation should notably pay atten-
tion to specific groups such as low paid 
people who may face a financial incen-
tive to be unemployed or not actively 
look for work. 
At the same time, the calculation of 
replacement rates leaves a number of 
factors out of account. As noted above, 
the unemployed may well be under 
significant social or administrative 
pressure to find a job, and the regula-
tions governing eligibility for benefit 
mean in some countries that payments 
are withdrawn if a person does not 
actively seek employment or accept a 
suitable job if it is offered. 
In addition, explicit account needs to 
be taken of the fact that a significant 
number of the unemployed in most 
countries receive social assistance 
rather than unemployment benefits 
either because they have an insufficient 
previous employment record or 
because they have exhausted their enti-
tlement to benefit. Moreover, in a num-
ber of countries, such as the UK and 
Ireland, such benefits are means-tested 
and eligibility is based on household 
rather than personal income. In these 
cases, the financial incentive to work or 
not is determined by the effect of doing 
so on household rather than personal 
income. If there are two potential wage 
earners in a household, therefore, it is 
possible for the household to be worse 
off, or not significantly better off, if 
one partner works when the other is 
unemployed. Indeed, in the UK, for a 
household to be eligible for means-
tested support, partners are required to 
work less than 25 hours a week. 
Policy developments 
towards the 
unemployed 
The general consensus across the Union, as noted above, is that 
social policy towards the unemployed 
as well as others not in work should 
shift away from passive income sup-
port towards active measures to help 
get them into employment. Such mea-
sures can be divided into two broad 
categories: 
• those which are aimed at helping the 
unemployed find a job either by 
assisting them in their job search 
activities or by improving their 
employability through training or 
work experience; 
• those which provide the unemployed 
either with direct access to employ-
ment through subsiding jobs or reduc-
ing the taxes and/or social contribu-
tions which employers have to pay or 
with assistance to start up their own 
business and become self-employed. 
In addition, there is also widespread 
agreement on the need to coordinate 
active and passive measures to ensure 
that those who become unemployed or 
who have been out of work for some 
time are properly advised on the active 
programmes available as well as about 
their responsibility to find a job, an 
aspect emphasised increasingly in a 
number of countries. 
Information on government action in 
different Member States in this broad 
area is given in the national action plans 
(NAPs) — the annual reports of efforts 
being made in pursuit of the European 
employment strategy and, more specifi-
cally, in accordance with the employ-
ment guidelines. The following analysis 
is based in part on this information, 
though it is supplemented by reports 
from individual country experts. 
Restricting benefit 
payments 
The shift in emphasis towards active measures has been rein-
forced by efforts to make unemploy-
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ment benefit systems more efficient or 
cost-effective, in the sense of ensuring 
that support is confined to those who 
are genuinely unemployed and doing 
their best to find work. This has taken 
the form of devoting more resources 
to combating fraud and tightening the 
regulations governing eligibility for 
benefit, including widening the defin-
ition in many countries of what consti-
tutes a suitable job for the person 
unemployed to take up and, therefore, 
restricting the range of job offers 
which those unemployed can refuse 
without having their benefit with-
drawn. It has also taken the form of 
reducing the level of benefits and the 
period of time over which benefits are 
payable (see Box on activation mea-
sures for examples). 
Such measures are motivated in part by 
a desire to limit expenditure on unem-
ployment programmes and to encour-
age those receiving benefit to find a job 
as soon as possible or to participate in 
an active measure. They have been 
accompanied in a number of Member 
States by similar attempts to cut expen-
diture on related social transfers and to 
reduce the number of people dependent 
on State support, particularly those on 
disability benefits, those taking early 
retirement, lone parents and people 
with social problems. 
Examples of activation measures in Member States 
In Denmark, people are considered to have both a responsibility and an oblig-
ation to take part in active labour market measures from 1999 on after one year 
of being unemployed rather than two as before. In addition, those receiving 
unemployment benefit are expected, after being unemployed for three months 
out of any 12, to take 'reasonable' employment if it is offered (i.e. any job they 
are capable of doing with a minimum amount of training), even if this lies out-
side the area for which they were trained or have experience. The travel-to-
work time considered reasonable has also been lengthened (from 3 to 4 hours 
a day for a full-time job). 
In the Netherlands, new legislation was introduced in the 1990s enabling sanc-
tions to be imposed on the unemployed who do not comply with the obligation to 
accept a suitable job if they are offered one. Moreover, benefit rates have been 
reduced (from 80 % to 70 % of previous earnings), entitlement to unemployment 
benefit has become more restrictive and the right of young people to social assis-
tance has been replaced by them being offered jobs by municipalities. 
In the UK, under new legislation, people out of work — other groups as well 
as the unemployed — failing to attend interviews with their personal adviser, 
appointed under the Single Gateway approach (see text below), or to take up 
job offers or training options will risk having the benefit payments stopped. 
Although there will be exemptions for those with heavy caring responsibilities 
or lone parents with young children under five, for many of these a personal 
adviser will still be appointed to encourage them to start planning for work in 
the future when they are less constrained by personal circumstances. 
On the other hand, in Germany, legislation introduced in 1997 extending the 
definition of what constitutes a suitable job offer (see Social protection in 
Europe 1997, p. 106) has recently been reversed and the travel-to-work time 
deemed acceptable reduced from 3 hours a day to 2 VT hours for full-time work 
and from 2!/2 hours to 2 hours for part-time work. In order to combat fraud, 
however, agencies responsible for the payment of various benefits have been 
permitted, since January 1999, to exchange information about recipients. 
In the Netherlands and the UK, in par-
ticular, where the number of people 
receiving disability benefits increased 
markedly during the 1980s, in effect 
as a response to rising unemployment 
and the growing numbers of older 
workers losing their jobs and having 
little chance of finding another, the 
criteria for being assessed as being 
incapable of working were tightened 
considerably in the 1990s (see Social 
protection in Europe 1997, 
pp. 47-48). In both countries, in addi-
tion to stricter and more frequent 
medical examination, the definition of 
ability to work was broadened to 
cover all kinds of jobs rather than the 
one which the person concerned was 
doing before. In the Netherlands, this, 
combined with a policy of shifting 
some of the costs on to employers, 
has resulted in around half of the 
400 000 workers claiming benefit 
losing their entitlement and having 
to switch to unemployment benefit 
instead, which is payable for a much 
shorter period. In the UK, entitlement 
to 'Incapacity benefit' was tightened 
even further in late 1999, with the aim 
of excluding those who are really 
long-term unemployed. 
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The extension of 
benefit systems 
Although in most Member States, the emphasis of policy over the 
1990s has been on restricting entitle-
ment to benefit to those who really need 
it. on reducing the period over which 
benefit is payable and, in some cases, 
on lessening the amount of benefit in 
order to ensure that there is a clear 
financial incentive to working, in a 
number of countries steps have been 
taken to improve the income support 
provided. This is particularly the case in 
countries where the extent and avail-
ability of support has in the past been 
relatively limited. 
In Italy, as a consequence of the Onofri 
Commission report (see Social protec-
tion in Europe 1997, p. 51), the govern-
ment is in the process of introducing 
(by the end of 1999) an insurance-based 
unemployment benefit scheme similar 
to that in other countries, together with 
means-tested social assistance for those 
whose entitlement to benefit has 
expired. This will assist, in particular, 
those people not covered by the Cassa 
Integrazione Guadagni scheme, which 
was designed initially to deal with tem-
porary lay-offs but which in effect came 
to provide support more or less indefi-
nitely to people who nevertheless 
retained their contract of employment 
and therefore had little incentive to look 
for work (op. cit., p. 108). 
Similarly, in Portugal, the period of 
entitlement to unemployment benefit 
has recently been lengthened — to 12 
months for those under 30, 18 months 
for those between 30 and 40, 24 months 
for those between 40 and 45 and 30 
months for those over 45 — the amount 
received still being based on average 
earnings over the last 12 months of 
(contribution-paid) work, up to a maxi-
mum of three times the minimum wage. 
In Germany, compulsory unemploy-
ment insurance was extended in 1998 to 
cover those working over 15 hours a 
week rather than over 18 hours. In addi-
tion, entitlement to benefit, which is 
usually dependent on a person having 
worked and paid contributions for at 
least 12 months during the preceding 
three years, has recently been made 
more generous in respect of those who 
have been looking after children of up 
to three years old or dependent relatives 
in need of care by excluding the period 
over which care has been given from 
the calculation (i.e. if the person con-
cerned was eligible for benefit before 
the care period began, they remain eli-
gible afterwards). Moreover, spells of 
self-employment are allowed to length-
en the reference period up to a maxi-
mum of five years in order to provide 
additional encouragement to people to 
set up their own businesses (i.e. they 
remain entitled to claim benefit four 
years after being in a paid job, so long 
as this lasted for at least a year). 
To encourage the unemployed to take 
jobs, even if they pay less than their 
previous one, a special measure has 
been introduced to ensure that they do 
not lose out if they subsequently 
become unemployed again. Under the 
measure, those becoming unemployed 
after accepting a job paying less than 
their last one receive a level of benefit 
based on the earnings in the higher paid 
job, though the total amount of benefit 
is limited to the net earnings in their last 
job. Part-time unemployment benefits, 
payable for up to six months, have also 
been introduced to protect those with 
two or more part-time jobs who happen 
to lose one of them, though providing 
they worked for more than 15 hours a 
week in each of the jobs in question. 
The development of 
in-work benefits 
Benefits have also been extended to those in paid employment in a 
number of countries, both to assist the 
transition from unemployment into 
work and to ensure that those working 
always receive more by so doing than if 
they were not working. 
In Austria, from 1998 on, people have 
been allowed to work in temporary jobs 
of less than two months for up to 15 
days a month without losing their enti-
tlement to unemployment benefit so 
long as they earn less than a certain 
amount. Similarly, in Germany, to 
encourage the unemployed receiving 
means-tested assistance (i.e. typically 
the long-term unemployed) to gain 
work experience, a special flat-rate ben-
efit was recently introduced for those 
accepting fixed-term jobs of up to three 
months and was extended in August 
1999 to part-time jobs of over 15 hours 
a week. 
Moreover, under new provisions, peo-
ple can earn up to 20 % of their 
monthly unemployment benefit (but at 
most DEM 310, or EUR 158.50, in the 
western part of Germany and DEM 260. 
or EUR 133, in the eastern part) without 
suffering any loss of benefit. 
In Ireland and the UK, people on low 
wages with families have been entitled 
to in-work benefits for some time 
('Family income supplement' in the for-
mer, 'Family credit' plus housing ben-
efits and 'Council tax benefit' in the 
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latter). In the UK, a more generous 
scheme, the 'Working families' tax 
credit' replaced 'Family credit' at the 
end of 1999 (guaranteeing a minimum 
income of GBP 200 a week —just over 
EUR 300), and will, accordingly, mean 
that more people will qualify (raising 
total claimants to an estimated 1.3 mil-
lion, or around 5 % of the total in 
work). In addition, to assist lone parents 
in particular, the people concerned will 
also be entitled to claim 70 % of 
approved child-care costs (of up to GBP 
100 — EUR 150 — for one child and 
up to GBP 150 for two or more). 
At the same time, a new in-work benefit 
is to be introduced to encourage older 
people to continue working rather than 
opt for early retirement. Under the 
scheme, introduced in pilot areas in 
October 1999, people unemployed over 
50, who often have to accept a lower 
wage than before if they find a job, will 
receive an 'Employment credit', guaran-
teeing them a minimum income of GBP 
175 a week (around EUR 255) if they 
take a full-time job and a 'top up' of up 
to GBP 40 a week (around EUR 60) if 
they take part-time work. In addition, for 
people with disabilities, the 'Disabled 
persons' tax credit', introduced at the 
same time, provides a guaranteed mini-
mum income of GBP 155 a week 
(around EUR 235) for single people who 
move from benefit into full-time work 
on the national minimum wage (GBP 
3.60 an hour or GBP 144 for a 40-hour 
week) and GBP 230 a week (around 
EUR 340) for a single-earner couple 
with one child under 11. As further 
encouragement for such people to take 
up paid employment, there is an assur-
ance that they can return to 'Incapacity 
benefit' or 'Severe disablement allowance' 
with the same status and rates as before 
if the job does not work out. 
Nevertheless, when all the new schemes 
are in place in the UK, it is likely to be 
the case that more rather than fewer peo-
ple will be reliant on means-tested ben-
efits than before, even though more of 
them may be in work. Equally, more of 
those in work, though better off than 
before, will be in a position where they 
face relatively high effective deduction 
rates from any additional income they 
earn — the so-called 'poverty trap' — 
since they are liable to lose their entitle-
ment to benefit if their wages increase by 
too much. Accordingly, their incentive to 
increase their earnings or look for a 
better job is likely to be diminished. 
Although the new measures introduced 
attempt to alleviate this problem by 
reducing the extent to which benefits 
decline as wages increase, it is difficult 
to eradicate this inherent feature of in-
work benefits, and marginal deduction 
rates will remain high for many of the 
people being assisted. 
Moreover, in contrast to the scheme it 
replaces, the new benefit will generally 
be paid not directly to the people con-
cerned but, as the name implies, as a tax 
credit through employers. This means 
that unlike 'Family credit', employers 
will be aware of the payment being made 
and its effect on the take-home pay of the 
employees in question, which, in turn, 
may reduce their incentive to increase 
wages and so entrench low pay. 
The coordination of 
active and passive 
measures 
Three of the employment guidelines in particular relate to active labour 
market measures. The third guideline 
commits Member States to increase sig-
nificantly the number of persons bene-
fiting from active measures to improve 
their employability, while the first two 
commit them to prevent unemployed 
people from drifting into long-term 
unemployment by ensuring that active 
support is given to young people under 
25 before they have been unemployed 
for six months and to those of 25 and 
over before they have been out of work 
for 12 months. 
One of the aims, therefore, is to put in 
place a preventative policy which stops 
people from becoming long-term unem-
ployed before they actually do so. In 
three Member States — Sweden, 
Portugal and Luxembourg — a policy 
has been introduced of ensuring that all 
young people have access to active pro-
grammes before they reach three 
months of unemployment and older 
people before they reach six months. 
These countries, however, are ones in 
which long-term unemployment is rela-
tively low. In other countries, however, 
there is more difficulty in complying 
with the guideline as stated. In Ireland, 
for example, a staged approach has 
been adopted, implementing the activa-
tion strategy for successive 10-year age 
groups, starting with those aged 25 to 
34 in April 1999 and covering everyone 
before they are unemployed for 12 
months by mid-2000. From then on, it 
is planned to shorten the period of 
unemployment before people are guar-
anteed access to an active programme to 
nine months, adopting the same kind of 
staged approach. 
At the same time, there has been a move 
in many Member States to give more 
attention to people, of all age groups, as 
soon as they register as unemployed. In 
a number of countries, they are inter-
viewed by someone from the employ-
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ment services with the aim of determin-
ing a course of action for finding a job 
and/or improving their employability. 
The 'New deal' in the UK is a prominent 
example with the introduction of a 'sin-
gle gateway' approach, under which 
those out of work — lone parents or peo-
ple with disabilities as well as the unem-
ployed — have a single point of contact 
with the various services, in the form of 
a personal adviser, providing help on 
child-care arrangements and benefits as 
well as assistance with job search and 
advice on training programmes. At the 
same time, the people concerned are 
expected to take up the advice offered 
and will be more liable to lose their ben-
efits if they fail to cooperate. 
The intention, increasingly elsewhere as 
well as in the UK, is to take account of 
individual needs, to tailor personal sup-
port to these and to monitor progress 
through regular meetings. Extra 
resources are therefore being provided 
for additional staff to work in guidance 
and counselling roles — as in France 
and Spain. 
The greater attention paid to the indi-
vidual needs of the unemployed has 
been accompanied in many cases by the 
decentralisation of the employment ser-
vices and the granting of greater auton-
omy to local offices in decisions on the 
programmes to be offered to the unem-
ployed so that more account can be 
taken of local labour market conditions 
and needs. As a result, there has been 
increased interaction with local organi-
sations — both private and public — in 
the provision of work and training 
opportunities. (An example is the flexi-
ble promotion initiative in Germany, 
under which local employment offices 
are able to decide their own means of 
finding jobs for the unemployed.) 
The third employment guideline sets a 
target for Member States to increase the 
numbers of unemployed who are 
offered training or any similar measure, 
gradually achieving the average of the 
three most successful Member States 
and at least 20 %. In practice, though 
Member States have reported on their 
performance in achieving this, only a 
few at the moment have the data avail-
able actually to do so at all reliably. 
Although it seems to be the case that 
efforts have been stepped up to raise the 
proportion of the unemployed on active 
measures, there is, therefore, little real 
basis for verifying the results reported 
(which vary from exceeding the target 
by some way to falling well short). 
Measures to assist 
target groups 
The focus of policy is increasingly on 
the unemployed who have particular 
difficulties in finding work. Although 
unemployment remains persistently 
high across the Union, it is recognised 
that many of those who lose their jobs 
are capable of finding work relatively 
quickly and largely independently but 
that a significant proportion have major 
problems. Not only are their chances of 
getting a job relatively poor when they 
become unemployed, but they diminish 
even further the longer they are out of 
work, both because they lose their apti-
tude and confidence as well as becom-
ing unfamiliar with new techniques and 
because employers tend to be reluctant 
to take on people who have not been 
working for some time. 
The difficulty is to identify such people 
before they become long-term unem-
ployed. In practice, the approach in the 
past has been largely to concentrate assis-
tance on those out of work for a long 
time, whether young people looking for 
their first job or older people who have 
lost their job. Although a preventative 
approach is increasingly being adopted, 
as noted above, it remains the case that 
people need to have been unemployed 
for some time before they are given sig-
nificant assistance. Initial interviews, the 
provision of personal advisers and the 
formulation of a plan of action designed 
to get the person concerned into work are 
means of addressing this problem, but in 
many countries (as indicated in Chapter 
1 ), there is still a large backlog of difficult 
people to place who make up the long-
term unemployed. Inevitably, policy is 
being concentrated on these at the present 
time, though in the case of young people, 
efforts are also being made to ensure that 
they have at least a minimum vocational 
qualification before they enter the labour 
market. 
In the guidelines and in individual 
Member States the priority is given, as 
noted above, to young people with 
proven difficulty in finding a job; people 
of 25 and over who are long-term unem-
ployed; older people in their fifties, or in 
some countries younger, who lose their 
job; and women, both those returning to 
the labour market after interrupting their 
working career because of caring respon-
sibilities, but also women in general who 
might face discrimination simply 
because of their sex. 
Measures to assist 
unemployed young people 
The measures taken to help young peo-
ple into work tend to be very similar in 
different Member States and include 
most of the different kinds of labour 
market programme — further education 
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or vocational training; work experience 
in private, public and non-profit-mak-
ing sectors; a subsidised job and busi-
ness start-up grants for self-employ-
ment. Much of the emphasis, however, 
is on education and vocational training 
measures, on the premise that the main 
reason why someone under 25 cannot 
find a job is that they lack the necessary 
general education or their skills are not 
sufficiently relevant to the jobs on offer. 
In Germany, Austria and Denmark, the 
focus on training is particularly relevant 
because of the strong attachment to the 
apprenticeship — or dual — system, so 
that the main concern is to ensure both 
that they have the level of basic educa-
tional attainment required and that suf-
ficient training places are available (in 
firms as well as colleges). In Germany, 
the 'Emergency programme to reduce 
youth unemployment' was introduced 
in January 1999 to give 100 000 young 
people a training place or job during the 
year (by April, 117 000 had partici-
pated). The main effort was concentrat-
ed in the new Lander in the east and. 
throughout the country, directed at for-
eign immigrants and other disadvan-
taged people in the labour market. At 
the same time remedial courses, in the 
form of pre-work training programmes, 
have served to reduce the proportion of 
young people entering work without 
suitable qualifications from 9 % when 
they leave school to 5 to 6 %, so 
increasing their chances of being 
accepted into an apprenticeship. 
In Denmark, the "Faster route to jobs 
and training' programme provides train-
ing courses lasting up to 18 months for 
young people leaving school without 
qualifications, followed by a normal 
vocational training course if they fail to 
find a job. As an incentive, those under-
taking courses are paid grants at levels 
higher than the normal unemployment 
benefit. 
In France, the TRACE programme aims 
to help job seekers find a training 
course which suits their capabilities and 
experience. In addition, the TRACE 
programme was introduced in 1998 to 
provide a pathway into the labour mar-
ket for young people with family or 
social difficulties, starting with a skills 
diagnosis and following this with the 
provision of suitable training and close 
guidance for 18 months. 
In the UK, the 'New deal 18-24' offers 
a gateway of four options after six 
months of unemployment to young peo-
ple to take up further study, subsidised 
employment in the private sector or 
work experience in the voluntary or 
non-profit sectors. Failure to accept one 
of these can result in loss of benefit. 
In Greece, young people unemployed 
for six months or more have the option 
either of subsidised work experience 
with an employer lasting at least 12 
months (which can be extended for a 
further six months if the employer 
does not shed any labour during the 
initial 12 months) or a start-up 
allowance for self-employment that 
lasts between 16 and 30 months. 
Moreover, in Greece, as well as Italy 
— where, unlike in other Member 
States, rates of unemployment among 
those with university level education 
tend to be similar to rates for those 
with lower education levels — specif-
ic measures have been introduced to 
provide better employment opportuni-
ties for graduates. In Italy, SMEs are 
offered a tax credit for hiring unem-
ployed graduates, while in Greece 
graduates can participate in a training 
programme of 11 months work experi-
ence in the area in which they studied. 
Measures to assist the 
long-term unemployed 
For a number of Member States, the 
long-term unemployed adult now repre-
sents the main target group under the 
guidelines, especially since the number 
of unemployed young people is tending 
to decline partly because more young 
people are remaining longer in educa-
tion. In most Member States, the mea-
sures available to help the long-term 
unemployed of 25 and over are similar 
to those to assist young people — 
indeed, in Greece, the measures are 
identical. Generally, however, more 
emphasis is placed on reintegrating the 
people concerned into employment by 
means of job subsidies and work expe-
rience in the non-profit-making sector 
than on vocational training. 
Moreover, some Member States have 
specific options for those who have been 
unemployed for two or three years. In 
Sweden, larger job subsides have been 
introduced for people of 25 and over out 
of work for three years or more, giving 
employers hiring them a tax reduction 
equal to 75 % of their total wage cost 
during the first six months of employ-
ment and 25 % in the following 18 
months. In Belgium, those unemployed 
for two years or more are offered work 
experience in the public sector, while in 
Finland, they are offered subsidised 
work in the voluntary sector. 
In Finland also, support is provided for 
self-motivated training under the 
'Training guarantee system' under 
which participants can claim unemploy-
ment benefit during their studies. 
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Originally intended only for the long-
term unemployed, it has recently been 
extended to professionals who have 
been out of work for four months or 
more as a form of professional upgrad-
ing, but the scheme has had a poor 
take-up. A similar scheme, the 'Adult 
education initiative', was introduced in 
Sweden in July 1997 for the period up 
until 2002 and is designed to enable 
people of 20 and over who are unem-
ployed to make up deficiencies in their 
education to upper secondary level 
with the aid of a special grant equiva-
lent to unemployment benefit. Courses 
are full time and last for about 20 
weeks. 
In most Member States, remedial train-
ins programmes are in place for the 
lona-term unemployed whose lack of 
qualifications or often a basic level of 
education make it difficult for them to 
find a job. and in those where they are 
not. they are in the process of being 
introduced. In Spain, plans have been 
announced to offer the long-term 
unemployed of 25 and over with poor 
qualifications conipeirisatory education 
to improve their basic knowledge, 
while in Portugal, 'second-chance' 
education is being provided to the 
long-term unemployed aged 25 to 44 
with a lack of basic schooling. In 
Ireland, many of the training courses 
run by FAS ((the employment services) 
are not accessible to many of the long-
term unemployed because they are not 
sufficiently well educated to benefit. 
FAS has, therefore, embarked on a pol-
icy of extending the range of training 
schemes available to try to ensure that 
they meet the needs of the long-term 
unemployed, including, in particular, 
bridging programmes to help them 
reach standards for more advanced 
training. 
Older people, work and 
pensions 
Under the fourth employment guide-
line, Member States are committed to 
develop, in the context of a policy for 
active ageing, measures such as main-
taining working capacity, lifelong 
learning and other flexible working 
arrangements, so that older workers are 
also able to participate actively in work-
ing life. Over the years, a number of 
factors, such as attitudes towards age, 
industrial restructuring and the possibil-
ity of obtaining an early retirement pen-
sion, have pushed older workers out of 
the labour market. In a context of high 
unemployment, replacing older workers 
by younger employees was preferred by 
governments, employers, unions and 
older workers themselves. This trend 
has led to loss of know-how, lower 
labour market participation and further 
pressure on social protection systems. 
In a context of an ageing population and 
a prospective decline in the number of 
people of working age before too long, 
the emphasis of policy has generally 
shifted, though to varying degrees, 
towards trying to keep older people in 
employment, not only in their own 
interest but to reduce the cost of social 
transfers and to help prevent the labour 
force from contracting. 
Policy is taking three broad forms: 
• financial disincentives against early 
retirement, both by reducing the pen-
sions payable to the people con-
cerned and by imposing penalties on 
employers laying off older workers; 
• subsidies or reductions in social con-
tributions or taxes to encourage 
employers to recruit older workers or 
to keep on those who they already 
employ; 
• access to continuing training for 
older members of the workforce. 
Discouraging early 
retirement 
In many Member States, the statutory age of retirement and/or the number 
of years of contributions required to be 
eligible for a full pension has been 
increased in recent years (see Chapter 2 
above and Social protection in Europe 
1997, Chapter 2). This has been accom-
panied by measures to reduce the finan-
cial incentive for people to retire early, 
or more specifically, to withdraw fully 
from the workforce, since measures to 
encourage partial retirement (i.e. reduc-
ing the hours worked in return for a par-
tial pension) have been intensified. 
In a number of Member States, there-
fore, including Denmark and Finland, 
the rules on the possibility of older 
workers combining early retirement 
with continued part-time work have 
recently been relaxed, emulating the 
schemes introduced earlier in a number 
of countries, especially in France, 
where the possibility of partial retire-
ment was introduced in the 1980s and 
where significant numbers now take 
this option rather than withdrawing 
completely from the labour force. In 
Denmark, as well as scrapping the limit 
on the number of hours, it is possible to 
work while in receipt of a pension: 
those who continue working after the 
age of 60 can receive a special tax 
allowance for every three months of 
full-time work. In other countries, 
including Austria, Denmark, the 
Netherlands and Portugal, pension sys-
tems have been reformed to increase the 
financial attraction of taking up a pen-
sion at a later rather than an earlier age 
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(in Portugal, for example, this takes the 
form of a bonus payment for those 
deferring retirement until the statutory 
age). 
In some countries, financial penalties 
have been introduced to discourage 
companies from laying off older work-
ers. A prime example is the Delalande 
initiative in France, under which com-
panies have to pay a supplementary 
contribution when dismissing workers 
over 50. Recently, this penalty has been 
doubled to the equivalent of two 
months' wages for the individual con-
cerned in those companies employing 
over 50 people, rising with age so that 
dismissal of someone of 56 or over 
gives rise to a fine of 12 months' pay. In 
Austria, a similar bonus malus scheme 
is in operation, penalising firms laying 
off older workers and giving reductions 
in social contributions to those hiring 
older people who are unemployed. 
Employment measures for 
older unemployed people 
In around half of the Member States, 
active labour market measures have 
been implemented specifically to assist 
older people who are unemployed. 
These usually take the form of job sub-
sidies or reductions in employers' social 
contributions, which, of course, are 
equivalent in terms of their effect on 
labour costs. Eligibility for assistance, 
however, varies between Member 
States, from age 45 and over in Finland 
and Spain and 50 in Germany (where it 
has recently been reduced from 55) and 
the UK, to 55 and over in a number of 
countries. In Germany, the minimum 
period of unemployment giving access 
to integration subsidies for older 
employees has been reduced from 12 
months to 6 months. Similarly, in the 
UK, under the recently introduced 'New 
deal' for older people, those of 50 or 
over are eligible for active labour mar-
ket assistance after being unemployed 
for six months instead of the usual two 
years. This is in addition to the new 
'Employment credit', described above, 
which will guarantee them a minimum 
level of income if they take a job. 
There is also evidence that in some 
Member States, such as the 
Netherlands, greater pressure is being 
put on older unemployed people to find 
work, whereas in the past those 
approaching retirement age were 
expected not to be actively looking for 
a job (as is the case in most countries). 
Up to the age of 57 Vi, therefore, people 
in the Netherlands are liable to have 
their benefits withdrawn if they do not 
actively seek work and are obliged to 
accept a suitable job offer if they 
receive one. 
Maintaining the 
position of older 
people in the 
labour market 
I n order to try to overcome the threat of job loss among older workers, in 
many Member States, including 
Germany, Austria, the Netherlands and 
Finland, it has been recognised that 
there is a need to ensure that they have 
access to continuing training so that 
their skills are kept up to date. In these 
countries, fiscal incentives have been 
introduced to encourage firms to con-
tinue to provide training to employees 
over the age of 40, while, at the same 
time, the support of the social partners 
has also been enlisted, these being 
encouraged, for example, to include 
provision for such training in collective 
agreements. 
Measures to assist people 
with disabilities 
In many Member States, growing 
attempts have been made to give people 
with disabilities who are able to work 
the chance to do so, while at the same 
time restricting their ability to claim 
disability benefit by tightening the cri-
teria for assessing a person's inability to 
work, as noted above. In a number of 
cases, this has taken the form of oblig-
ing companies to employ a minimum 
number of such people. In France, for 
example, companies of over 20 employ-
ees have to ensure that 6 % of these are 
people with disabilities. 
In Ireland, a pilot programme was intro-
duced in 1998 for people with disabili-
ties, with a coordinator in each region to 
provide one-to-one support in order to 
integrate them into employment or 
training. This was accompanied by the 
auditing of all training centres to ensure 
their accessibility to those with disabil-
ities, while tax allowances have been 
introduced for companies employing 
people with disabilities who had been 
unemployed for 12 months or more. 
At the same time, there has been a shift 
in emphasis away from special pro-
grammes to make it possible for those 
with disabilities to participate on nor-
mal training courses along with other 
disadvantaged groups. In France, some 
60 000 places have been reserved for 
such people in 'fresh start' programmes 
and in Finland, 5 000 places are 
reserved on adult labour market training 
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courses. In Ireland, responsibility for 
training programmes has recently been 
switched from the Department of 
Health to the Department of Enterprise, 
Trade and Employment. 
In the UK, under the 'New deal', help is 
provided for those with disabilities who 
wish to work in the form of a personal 
adviser to help with job search, assess 
training needs and advise on in-work 
benefits and access to work placements, 
work trials and training. As elsewhere, 
there is no compulsion for those with 
disabilities to participate in labour mar-
ket programmes or accept job offers. At 
the same time, advice has also been 
made available to employers seeking to 
employ or retain people who are dis-
abled on the appropriate steps to take. 
Women 
The EU employment strategy recognis-
es explicitly that women still face spe-
cial difficulties in gaining access to the 
job market, in advancing their careers 
and in reconciling professional and fam-
ily life. The employment guidelines, 
therefore, specify a set of actions, relat-
ing to the operation of social protection 
systems and that of policy in other areas, 
which Member States need to follow to 
improve the position of women in the 
labour market, in particular: 
• to ensure that women have access to 
active labour market measures in 
proportion to their share of unem-
ployment; 
• to reduce tax-benefit disincentives 
which may deter women from work-
ing; 
• to reduce obstacles which might hin-
der women seeking to set up in busi-
ness for themselves; 
• to ensure that women are able to ben-
efit from flexible forms of work 
organisation. 
A major aspect of Member State policy 
in implementing the guidelines is the 
adoption of a 'gender mainstreaming' 
approach, which, in order to be effec-
tive, entails a need for the collection 
of relevant quantitative data both to 
identify the need for action and to 
monitor and evaluate progress. 
Efforts to ensure that women, especially 
those who are disadvantaged in the 
labour market or who are returning after 
a spell out of work because of caring 
responsibilities, have access to active 
labour market programmes take a num-
ber of different forms. In virtually all 
Member States, however, as part of a 
general move to collect more informa-
tion on the position of women in the 
labour market and the problems they 
face, their participation on courses 
arranged by the employment services 
and other public bodies has begun to be 
monitored systematically. Moreover, in 
many cases, concrete targets are being 
set, in line, for example, with their share 
in unemployment, which in most cases is 
significantly higher than their present 
participation. This policy is being wide-
ly supported by counselling and by 
increased child-care facilities. Indeed, 
even in countries where this has tradi-
tionally been left to the family, consider-
ation is beginning to be given to the need 
to improve the provision of facilities. 
In Germany, from 1999, all children 
aged three will be entitled to a nursery 
school place. In France, more financial 
aid is being given to women who have 
difficulty undertaking training courses 
to fund child care and provide home 
help for those with caring responsibili-
ties. In the Netherlands, child-care 
facilities for single parents receiving 
social assistance who embark on train-
ing courses have been introduced, addi-
tional to tax relief for child care intro-
duced in 1996. Twenty-six thousand 
extra places for after-school child care 
are planned to be created between 1997 
and 2000 as part of a scheme to help the 
long-term unemployed back to work. 
In Greece, a systematic analysis is 
planned of problems of women in the 
labour market, including an evaluation 
of present policies in cooperation with 
women's organisations and the social 
partners, as a necessary prelude to the 
design of effective policies. In the 
meantime, women are being given pri-
ority in training and other programmes 
with the aim of bringing their participa-
tion up to their share of the unemployed 
(around 60 %). In addition, nursery 
schools and 'creative play centres' for 
children are being established to pro-
vide child care in a country where tradi-
tionally the extended family has been 
the source of this. 
Changes in the 
means of financing 
social protection 
to promote 
employment 
I n addition to special reductions in social contributions aimed at helping 
young people, the long-term unem-
ployed, older workers and other disad-
vantaged groups to find jobs, there is a 
more general concern in a number of 
Member States to shift the burden of 
financing social expenditure from 
employers to other sources such as 
energy. (In the UK, for example, the 
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'New deal' programmes have been 
financed by a windfall tax on privatised 
utilities.) 
The emphasis, in particular, is on reduc-
ing social contributions at the bottom 
end of the scale on lower paid jobs, 
while at the same time imposing taxes on 
expenditure or the use of resources for 
which there are social and economic rea-
sons for discouraging. In addition, as 
noted above, there is increasing focus on 
the interaction between benefit payments 
and the tax and contribution system to 
try to ensure that the gap between the 
former and take-home pay is sufficient 
to give a financial incentive to work. In 
France, therefore, it is proposed to 
reduce the social contributions payable 
on employees earning up to 180 % of the 
minimum wage in 2000. This is in line 
with steps taken in the UK over a num-
ber of years to reduce or eliminate con-
tributions on low-paid workers. In addi-
tion, in Greece, legislative proposals are 
currently being discussed for reducing 
taxes on profits by an amount equal to 
50 % of employers' contributions when 
companies take on new recruits. 
Changes in public 
expenditure on 
labour market policy 
Expenditure on labour market policy, both on income support 
and active measures, has declined from 
a peak of 3.7 % of GDP in the Union in 
1993, at the bottom of the recession of 
the early 1990s, to 3 % in 1998 (Graph 
42). This has broadly followed the fall 
in unemployment, from just over 11 % 
in 1994 to under 10% in 1998 (note 
that Italy is excluded from the EU aver-
age because of the lack of comparable 
Social protection measures for job creation 
The employment guidelines commit Member States to re-evaluating the 
effect of tax and benefit systems from the perspective of both people who are 
out of work (to provide real incentives for unemployed or inactive people to 
seek and take up work or training opportunities) and prospective employers 
(to reduce the fiscal pressure on labour and non-wage labour costs, especial-
ly on unskilled and low-paid labour). 
In a recent study ('Activating social protection to be more employment-
friendly'), the Netherlands Economic Institute identified four main ways in 
which social protection measures are being used to encourage job creation 
across the Union. These are through job subsidies, reductions in tax and/or 
social contributions payable by employers, in-work benefits and measures to 
assist the unemployed to set up their own business. In practice, the last of 
these takes a number of other forms as well as reductions in social contribu-
tions, while the first, job subsidies, are not strictly a social protection mea-
sure. Their effect in reducing labour costs, however, is equivalent to a reduc-
tion in social contributions and, as such, ought to be considered in the same 
light. 
Indeed, the first three of the measures listed essentially perform the same 
function, so that the use of one rather than another is largely a matter of polit-
ical rather than economic choice. This should be clear in respect of job sub-
sidies and lowering social contributions, which have an equivalent effect on 
labour costs. It may be less clear in respect of in-work benefits, but these also 
serve to reduce the cost of labour to employers relative to the take-home pay 
of workers and, in the same way as the other two measures, therefore, make 
it possible for them to take on more people at any given level of the gross 
wage. 
In-work benefits 
In practice, in-work benefits are a significant part of the social protection system 
only in Ireland and the UK, as described in the text above. However, in the UK, 
while the system is soon to be replaced by the 'Working families' tax credit' and 
made more generous, its significance has been moderated in some degree by the 
introduction for the first time of a legally binding minimum wage. (This at the 
same time serves to limit any tendency for employers to set wages deliberately 
low because they know take-home pay will be raised by the tax credit.) 
In both countries, moreover, it is possible for people who were unemployed to 
continue to claim benefits, such as the 'Back to work allowance' and 'Child 
dependent allowance' in Ireland and 'Extended housing' and 'Council tax ben-
efit' in the UK, for several months after taking up work, in order to ensure that 
they are no worse off from taking a job. 
continued on p. /(W 
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Direct wage cost subsidies and reductions in social contributions 
In the majority of Member States, employers can receive a wage cost subsidy, 
either in a direct form or an indirect one through reductions in social contribu-
tions — or, more rarely, in taxes — if they hire someone who had previously 
been unemployed for some time. Most direct subsidies are paid for between 6 
and 12 months, though the duration tends to depend on the severity of the sit-
uation of the target group (in Sweden, for example, employers can receive a 
subsidy for up to 4H years for people with disabilities who were previously 
unemployed). The amount payable is typically related to the minimum wage 
rather than to the level of unemployment benefit. 
Reductions in social contributions as a means of reducing labour costs are par-
ticularly prevalent in countries where the rate levied on employers is relatively 
high, such as in Belgium, France, Germany, Austria and the southern Member 
States, excluding Greece, though they are also available in the UK, partly 
because of administrative convenience, partly because of political hostility to 
direct subsidies. They are typically payable for between one and three years. 
Overall evaluation of the effectiveness of subsidies is difficult, largely because 
of the problem of isolating them from other factors, changes in underlying 
employment conditions, in particular. Generally, however, studies suggest that 
more than half of the people assisted remain in work after the subsidy has 
elapsed, which at least might imply that they have some effect in redistributing 
available work more evenly between people even if they might not add very 
much to the overall level of employment. 
Promotion of self-employment 
In most Member States, unemployed people can obtain financial assistance if 
they become self-employed for periods ranging from a few months to a few 
years. In Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg and Spain, they continue to receive 
unemployment benefits. In the UK, the Netherlands, Sweden and Germany, 
they are entitled to a subsistence allowance instead, though the amount 
involved tends to be equivalent to, or close to, the level of unemployment ben-
efit. In France, Greece, Italy and Portugal, they are paid a lump-sum subsidy or 
grant. (In Portugal, for example, as from 1999, the unemployed wishing to set 
up in business for themselves can receive the unemployment benefit they are 
entitled to in a single lump sum if they are able to present a suitable business 
plan.) 
data). In terms of the two main compo-
nents, spending on active measures has 
fallen by less than spending on unem-
ployment compensation, its share of 
total expenditure rising from just under 
34 % in 1993 to just under 37 % in 
1998. Nevertheless, despite the empha-
sis in Member States on shifting the 
policy effort from passive to active 
measures, the shift which has occurred 
in practice since 1994 and the end of the 
period of economic recession in the 
Union has been relatively small and 
active measures accounted for the same 
share of total spending in 1998 as in 
1990. 
In relation to unemployment, expendi-
ture on both active and passive measures 
was slightly lower as a proportion of 
GDP in 1998 than in 1990, though on 
passive measures, significantly lower 
than in 1994, largely because of the 
reduction in spending on early retirement 
for labour market reasons, which 
increased markedly during the recession 
of the early 1990s (Graph 43, which 
shows expenditure on labour market pol-
icy at a constant 5 % rate of unemploy-
ment in each of the Member States to 
adjust explicitly for variations in the actu-
al rate). Expenditure on active measures 
at the Union level has remained 
unchanged in relation to GDP over the 
period of economic recovery if allowance 
is made for the fall in unemployment. 
In most Member States, however, 
spending on active measures was either 
lower in 1998 than eight years earlier or 
much the same, if explicit account is 
taken of the rise in unemployment over 
the period. This is particularly the case 
in Finland and Sweden, where the num-
ber of unemployed has increased sub-
stantially over the 1990s. It is also true, 
if to a smaller extent, in Germany, 
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where unemployment has risen as well. 
On the other hand, in Denmark and the 
Netherlands, where unemployment has 
fallen, expenditure on active measures 
adjusted for unemployment has risen 
significantly in relation to GDP, though 
these were the only countries in the 
Union, apart from France, where expen-
diture in these terms has increased by 
more than 0.1 % of GDP. There are also 
comparatively few countries apart from 
Denmark and the Netherlands — Spain, 
Ireland and Luxembourg being the only 
other three — where spending in these 
terms has risen by more than 0.1 % of 
GDP over the period of economic 
recovery since 1994. 
Expenditure on passive measures of 
income support in most countries (8 of 
the 14) was also lower relative to GDP 
in 1998 than in 1990 if allowance is 
made for the change in unemployment. 
Since 1994, however, expenditure on 
passive measures adjusted to a 5 % rate 
of unemployment has declined in all 
Member States in relation to GDP, 
except Greece (where it has remained 
broadly unchanged), Luxembourg and 
the Netherlands. Indeed, in the last of 
these, it has risen markedly over this 
period, as the slight fall in spending has 
not matched the significant reduction in 
unemployment which has occurred. 
The decline in passive expenditure has 
been particularly large in these terms in 
Germany and Austria. 
Although the evidence seems to suggest 
that passive measures tend to crowd out 
active ones when unemployment 
increases — reflecting the difficulty of 
reducing expenditure on income sup-
port at such times and the fact that 
active measures cannot in most cases 
simply be substituted for passive ones, 
at least in the short term — it also 
appears to indicate that Member States 
which have a relatively high expendi-
ture on one element also tend to have 
high expenditure on the other. The 
Netherlands and Denmark, therefore, 
have the highest spending relative to 
unemployment and GDP on both active 
and passive measures, while Spain and 
Greece have the lowest expenditure on 
both. (The relative level of expenditure 
in different countries on income sup-
port, it should be noted, is very much in 
line with the estimates of replacement 
rates presented above, in the sense that 
countries with high replacement rates 
also have high spending on passive 
measures per unemployed person.) 
The composition of 
active expenditure 
The division of expenditure between different types of active measure 
varies markedly across the Union and 
has, moreover, changed in different 
ways over the 1990s. There is, in other 
words, little sign of a common pattern 
of effort or common trends. 
Over the Union as a whole, around a 
third of spending on active measures in 
1998 went on providing training, espe-
cially to the unemployed (over 90 % of 
the total spent on this item). Another 
third went on employment subsidies of 
various kinds, mainly on direct job cre-
ation in the public sector and the sup-
port of jobs in the private sector, though 
also, to a very small extent, on assisting 
people to become self-employed (which 
accounted for only around WT % of 
total spending on active measures). The 
employment services accounted for just 
over half of the remainder (around 
17 % of total expenditure), while the 
rest (around 16 % of the total) went on 
special measures for people with dis-
abilities (Graph 44). 
This division, however, is not representa-
tive of the way expenditure is split in 
many Member States, though it should be 
emphasised that this may be due to differ-
ences in classification as much as actual 
differences in allocation. (There may be 
particular difficulties, for example, in dis-
tinguishing spending on people with dis-
abilities from spending on other groups or 
spending on the employment services 
from the administrative functions these 
are typically responsible for.) In three 
countries — Denmark, Portugal and the 
UK — more than half of spending on 
active measures went on training in 1998, 
while in four countries — Belgium, 
Ireland, the Netherlands and Sweden — 
under a quarter went on this item. In the 
first two of these countries, this reflects 
relatively high expenditure on employ-
ment subsidies; in the last two, high 
expenditure on measures to assist people 
with disabilities. The latter, however, may 
simply reflect the greater ability in these 
countries to distinguish measures for this 
group from those for other groups, though 
in both cases most of the expenditure in 
this category went on the provision of 
work for the people concerned. 
In addition to Belgium and Ireland, four 
other Member States — Spain, France, 
Luxembourg and Finland — also allo-
cated a relatively large proportion of 
expenditure to subsidies (over 40 %), 
while in Denmark, Portugal and the UK, 
these accounted for only a small propor-
tion of spending (20 % or less), reflect-
ing the concentration on training (in the 
UK, the figure was less than 1 %). 
The relative allocation of expenditure to 
the public employment services was 
highest in the UK (43 % of the total) 
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42. Public expenditure on active and passive labour market measures 
in the Union, 1990-98 
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and Greece (34 %), in both cases 
reflecting the relatively low level of 
spending on active measures overall as 
much as the priority attached to the 
employment services as such. Indeed, 
in both countries, such expenditure 
was lower in relation to GDP than the 
EU average (though in the UK, slight-
ly higher if allowance is made for the 
below average rate of unemployment). 
At the other extreme, spending on the 
employment services accounted for 
under 10 % of total expenditure in 
Denmark and Spain and only slightly 
over in Finland. 
Over the 1990s, the main feature of 
changes in the pattern of expenditure 
at the Union level was the growth of 
spending on employment subsidies 
and the decline in the resources devot-
ed to training. Between 1990 and 
1998, the share of subsidies in total 
spending increased by almost 12 per-
centage points, while that of training 
declined by 8 percentage points. This 
may reflect the increase in the relative 
importance of long-term unemploy-
ment as a problem as compared with 
youth unemployment, for which the 
provision of training is a more frequent-
ly used response, as noted above. 
Expenditure on both the employment 
services and measures for the disabled 
declined by around 1 VT S of the total 
over these eight years. Although the 
shift in expenditure towards subsidies 
was less pronounced in the second half 
of the period from 1994 on, it was still 
evident (the share of spending on this 
item increasing by some 4/4 percentage 
points), as was the shift away from 
training. Within subsidies, the main ele-
ment on which expenditure has risen 
over the 1990s has been direct job cre-
ation in the public or non-profit-making 
sector, though since 1994 there has 
been a shift back towards subsidising 
employment in private enterprises. 
This general pattern of change, how-
ever, was by no means common to all 
Member States. Indeed, the overall 
shift of expenditure towards subsidies 
at the EU level largely reflects the 
growth of spending on these in 
Germany (up by 16 % of the total) and 
France (up by 13 % of the total). 
Although there was also a significant 
shift in the same direction in Ireland, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria 
and Sweden, in the other seven 
Member States there was a shift of 
spending away from subsidies, partic-
ularly in Denmark and Portugal (the 
share declining by around 30 percent-
age points in both cases). 
The relative growth of spending on 
subsidies in the first group of Member 
States was accompanied by a relative 
decline in expenditure on training in 
all the countries except Luxembourg 
(where spending on measures for peo-
ple with disabilities fell markedly) and 
Austria (where spending on such mea-
sures also fell, as did that on the 
employment services). In all the coun-
tries in the second group, there was a 
relative increase in expenditure on 
training, with the exception of Greece 
and the UK, in both of which there was 
a larger decline in the share of spend-
ing on training than for subsidies, and 
the share of expenditure on the 
employment services rose signifi-
cantly. Nevertheless, in the UK, this 
increase in share was associated with a 
decline in expenditure on employment 
services relative to GDP, the only 
country in the Union where this was 
the case apart from Spain. 
In 11 of the 14 Member States for 
which data are available — the excep-
tions being Greece, Spain and the UK 
— spending on measures for people 
with disabilities declined as a share of 
total expenditure on active labour mar-
ket measures between 1990 and 1998. 
In seven of these, expenditure also fell 
in relation to GDP over the period. The 
relative decline in this item, however, 
may have more to do with 'mainstream-
ing' — i.e. assisting people with dis-
abilities through general labour market 
policies — rather than reflecting an 
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actual reduction in spending on mea­
sures to help such people. 
Concluding remarks 
While there is evidence of some shift of expenditure from passive 
to active labour market measures across 
the Union in recent years, it has not been 
large nor is it common to all Member 
States. Moreover, the emphasis on train­
ing which is evident in the employment 
guidelines and which is a special focus 
of attention in the NAPs is not reflected 
in the actual figures for expenditure on 
labour market policies. This may, how­
ever, be because the expenditure figures 
do not relate to a sufficiently recent 
period to pick up the shift in emphasis. 
Indeed for five Member States, inclu­
ding France, the latest data available are 
for 1997, before the current employment 
strategy in the Union took effect, while 
for Ireland, they relate to 1996. 
Nevertheless, in half the countries for 
which data are available, spending on 
training declined over the 1990s, not 
only as a share of total expenditure on 
active labour market measures but also 
in relation to GDP. 
There does seem, however, to have 
been a widespread reduction in rela­
tion to GDP in expenditure on passive 
measures of income support per 
unemployed person. This is in line 
with the common concern in Member 
43. Public expenditure on active and passive labour market policies in 
Member States, 1990,1994 and 1997/98 
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44. Active labour market measures by broad categories 
in Member States, 1990 and 1998 
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States to reduce the financial incentive of the first part of the chapter suggests 
to be out of work and to be dependent that in most countries, any such incen-
on State transfers, though the evidence tive was limited anyway. 
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Chapter 5: Social protection systems in 
candidate central and eastern European 
countries 
This chapter surveys key issues and developments in social protection 
in recent years in the 10 countries in 
central and eastern Europe that are can-
didates to join the European Union 
(CEECs hereafter). The chapter focuses 
on the situation and developments in the 
fields of pensions and health care and 
support for unemployed people and 
their families, and measures to help with 
reintegration into work — fields with an 
intimate bearing on the four objectives 
followed in the main report, although a 
somewhat broader and simpler approach 
has been taken. As the chapter concerns 
social protection policies and structures 
in the round, no attempt is made to offer 
an analysis of the implementation of the 
directives and regulations providing for 
equal treatment in social security and 
the coordination of schemes for migrant 
workers. The material in this chapter 
draws significantly on drafts of cross-
country surveys done in the course of 
projects under the Phare Consensus pro-
gramme ('). 
Support for the 
unemployed 
Unemployment 
The typical situation faced is one of slow, in some cases negative, 
employment growth coupled with per-
sistently high levels of unemployment, 
particularly for the young and 
unskilled. Informal and undeclared 
working is commonplace. 
Graph 45 gives trends on unemploy-
ment rates (2). These peaked in most 
CEECs around 1994; for the Czech 
Republic and Estonia the peak came in 
1996. They are now significantly lower, 
again excepting the Czech Republic and 
Estonia, with the greatest reductions in 
Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. 
Unemployment rates increased signifi-
cantly in 1998 in Bulgaria and the 
Czech Republic, moderately in 
Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, and 
fell slightly elsewhere. Bulgaria has the 
highest rate, 16 %. Latvia and Lithuania 
have rates in excess of 13 %, Poland 
and Slovakia more than 10 %. The low-
est rates are in Romania at 6.3 % and 
the Czech Republic, 6.5 %. The propor-
tion of unemployed people who are 
long-term unemployed has seen a slight 
reduction since 1994 everywhere except 
Bulgaria and Hungary, but remains at 
50 % or more of the total in Hungary, 
Slovakia and Slovenia. Regional varia-
tion in unemployment is strongest in 
Poland and Slovakia. 
As a consequence of reducing demand 
for unqualified and unskilled labour, 
those with incomplete or only basic 
school education are disproportionately 
affected by unemployment in most 
CEECs. Youth unemployment is signif-
icant and widespread. People aged less 
than 25 years account on average for 
around a third of people unemployed in 
1998, with the highest proportion in 
Romania at 43 %. This situation is fair-
ly static, with only small recent increas-
es in the proportion in the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Slovakia, and 
decreases in Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania and Poland. Graph 46 com-
pares unemployment rates for women 
and men. Rates are generally higher for 
women than for men, with the largest 
disparities in the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland. In Estonia the 
female rate is significantly lower than 
that for men. 
There are clear discrepancies between 
registered unemployment and labour 
force survey (LFS) results. In Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania registered unem-
ployment is below LFS levels but ris-
ing. This suggests that coverage of the 
unemployed is improving and that dis-
incentives to register presented by low 
benefit levels and scarcity of labour 
offices are being overcome. In Hungary, 
Slovakia and Slovenia registered unem-
ployment is well in excess of LFS lev-
els and has risen further, suggesting at 
least a difference between official defi-
(') 'Monitoring the development of social 
protection reform in the CEECs', Parts 1 
& 2. The cross-country reports under these 
projects were drawn up by Luis Capucha. 
Jochen Ciasen, Charles Normand, Joakim 
Palme, Wolfgang Ricke, Winifried 
Schmäht, Virginie Suzor and edited by 
Martin Evans and John Ditch. 
(2) Corresponding to ILO criteria. 
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nitions of unemployment and the ILO 
convention used in LFS, and probably 
an increase in working in the unofficial 
economy. In the Czech Republic and 
Poland the two levels are more or less 
congruent. 
Unemployment 
benefits 
Largely as a response to the onset of 
widespread structural unemployment 
around the beginning of the decade, all 
of the CEECs have focused on develop-
ing insurance-based systems of unem-
ployment benefits except Estonia which 
has a tax-funded unemployment assis-
tance system providing means-tested 
flat-rate benefits. Schemes are com-
monly part of a general social insurance 
fund. Unemployment insurance is gen-
erally compulsory for employees, and 
in the Czech Republic and Slovakia 
also compulsory for the self-employed. 
Contributions are levied on employers 
and employees, with the exception of 
Poland where the latter are not required 
to pay. Contribution rates range below 
5 % of earnings for employers, and 
close to or below 1 % for employees. 
Subsidy from taxes varies over time and 
between CEECs. In 1998 none was 
needed in Hungary and Slovakia and it 
was negligible in Latvia, whereas in 
Slovenia the contribution from general 
revenues had increased to stand at 90 % 
of scheme income. 
The minimum insurance record 
required to qualify for benefit ranges 
from six months in Estonia and 
Romania through nine months in Latvia 
to 12 for the rest except Lithuania 
where contributions must have been 
paid on two years' earnings. Taking 
account of maximum qualifying periods 
that can elapse between the insured 
period and a claim, entitlement condi-
tions are strictest in Bulgaria, Latvia 
and Slovenia, and least so in Hungary, 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia. 
Maximum duration of benefit is gener-
ally in the range of six to twelve 
months. Earnings-related benefit levels 
are prevalent, with the majority of 
CEECs granting benefit proportional to 
individual earnings subject to maxima. 
Such data as are available show average 
benefits at a low percentage of average 
wages, suggesting that a high propor-
tion of those in receipt of benefit had 
been among lower earners. 
45. Unemployment rates (percentages), 1994,1997 and 1998 
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The coverage of unemployment insur-
ance schemes has been in general 
decline during the 1990s. Graph 47 
gives the proportion of persons regis-
tered as unemployed who were in 
receipt of insurance benefit in 1998. In 
Bulgaria, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia 
and Slovenia beneficiary rates were 
30 %, and less than 40 % of the unem-
ployed are in receipt of insurance ben-
efits in all CEECs except the Czech 
Republic. Decline since 1995 has been 
greatest in Hungary, Lithuania and 
Poland. This falling coverage of insur-
ance reflects the preponderance among 
the unemployed of those whose benefit 
entitlement has been exhausted and 
younger people who have never had the 
opportunity to contribute. 
Undesirable consequences of this trend 
have been the loss of incentive for indi-
viduals to remain in contact with labour 
offices and employment services, or 
even to register in the first place, and an 
increasing reliance on forms of social 
assistance which may lack any strong 
labour market focus or on earnings 
from the informal economy. Another 
consequence of falling beneficiary rates 
has been lessened demand on the insur-
ance funds to the extent that the Czech 
Republic, Latvia, Romania and 
Slovakia have accumulated surpluses. 
Sources of potential negative pressure 
on scheme finances are further increas-
es in unemployment, contribution non-
compliance — a particular problem in 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia and Lithuania 
— and a general reduction of tax rev-
enues in the face of growth in the infor-
mal economy. 
Since the schemes were established the 
pattern of reform has been one of gradual 
but frequent change, adjusting, rationalis-
ing and strengthening schemes. Earlier 
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reforms tightening access to benefits and 
reducing levels in response to concerns 
about sustainability and the need to 
strengthen incentives to work have to an 
extent served to exacerbate the decline in 
coverage, and encourage informal work-
ing. More recent measures and proposals 
show evidence of some change in 
emphasis towards pursuit of active 
regimes to promote the reintegration of 
benefit recipients. These are considered 
below after the support that is available to 
unemployed people and their families 
from non-contributory social assi-
stance. 
Support from social 
assistance schemes 
Non-contributory support is of increas-
ing importance given the generally 
small and decreasing proportion of 
jobless people who are entitled to 
unemployment benefits. Despite the 
earlier decision of most CEECs to con-
centrate on insurance benefits, all now 
have some kind of means-tested forms 
of social assistance to supplement or 
replace these benefits, although in 
some cases this is rudimentary or still 
under development. In addition to 
Estonia, where all support for the 
unemployed is under the unified non-
contributory scheme, Bulgaria, 
Hungary, Romania and Slovenia have 
systems specifically for people whose 
unemployment benefits have been 
exhausted. 
Among the four special schemes, those 
of Bulgaria and Slovenia are apparently 
little used and in decline, whereas the 
Hungarian and Romanian schemes pro-
vide benefits to significant numbers of 
people (around a half and a quarter of 
registered unemployed respectively). In 
the other CEECs unemployed people 
rely on such general safety-net schemes 
as are available to other client groups. 
Unemployed people make up a sizeable 
proportion of all minimum benefit 
recipients, accounting for almost 50 % 
in Slovakia and more than 60 % in 
Bulgaria and Slovenia. 
The setting of minimum levels varies 
widely. For example, Slovenia has refer-
ence to a proportion of the minimum 
wage, Lithuania and Romania to a con-
structed poverty line. Rates have elements 
of discretion, and are generally less gen-
erous in real terms following retrench-
ment in the 1990s. The limited data avail-
able suggest cash values of minimum 
income benefits for a single able-bodied 
person of the order of 20 % of average 
gross wages. Information on the effective-
ness of schemes to alleviate poverty is 
similarly sketchy, not least because most 
CEECs have yet to perfect sufficiently 
developed measurement tools, for exam-
ple household budget surveys, but it is dif-
ficult to imagine that life could be easy on 
the kinds of benefit levels some CEECs 
are able to pay at present. 
Legislation establishing new assistance 
schemes has not always been matched 
by the required levels of funding from 
State or local budgets. Now that some 
CEECs are enjoying a degree of econ-
omic and increasing stability there may 
be scope for the enhancement of social 
assistance programmes, although this is 
likely to be tempered by continuing 
political resistance to increasing benefit 
levels. The potential effect of increasing 
benefit levels on work incentives has 
been a recurrent theme in discussions of 
46. Ratio of female unemployment rate to male rate, 1997 47. Unemployment insurance recipients as a percentage 
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reform. Nevertheless there are signs of 
positive improvements for those depen-
dent on minimum benefits. Slovenia 
proposes to introduce a unified system 
of cash social assistance providing high-
er levels of assistance with living costs 
to all who need it. The Bulgarian gov-
ernment intends to repeat a successful 
winter-heating benefit scheme to help 
some 600 000 of the poorest cope with 
the effects of fuel price liberalisation. 
Measures to support and 
encourage employment 
and reintegration 
An emphasis on trying to provide 
income replacement, with little appar-
ent attention to helping people back into 
work, has been an understandable ini-
tial response to the sharp and steep 
onset of structural unemployment earli-
er in the 1990s. Since that time a range 
of measures to improve individuals' 
employability and employers' ability to 
employ them has been tried and imple-
mented. The ratio of spending on active 
labour market programmes to cash 
transfers has increased in Bulgaria, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia and Slovenia, although total 
spending remains limited. 
At the most basic level, benefit entitle-
ments have been restricted or reduced 
to encourage job searching. Not surpris-
ingly, the small differentials between 
minimum benefits and minimum 
wages, or between minimum and maxi-
mum benefit levels, typical of the 
CEECs have been identified as a source 
of disincentive effects, e.g. in the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia. In an attempt to 
improve work incentives and contain 
expenditure, Latvia proposes to limit 
the level of unemployment benefit to 
75 % of the full rate after three months' 
unemployment, to 50 % after six 
months and to withdraw benefit at nine 
months. Slovakia has tightened the en-
titlement conditions and the maximum 
levels and duration for unemployment 
benefits and for assistance payments to 
the unemployed, which may be lower 
than for other groups. 
Benefit-related measures reinforcing the 
contingency of benefit receipt on indi-
viduals meeting labour market criteria 
have been introduced. All CEECs 
impose some kind of conditions of avail-
ability and active search for work, along 
with participation in training and active 
employment schemes. Requirements for 
registration and regular attendance at 
employment offices have been strength-
ened, for example in the Czech Republic 
and Latvia. Most have introduced the 
condition of accepting suitable work or 
training offers and tightened the defini-
tion of suitable work, most recently in 
Slovenia, where claimants must be sure 
they can be contacted for at least three 
hours per day. Lithuanian jobseekers 
must demonstrate they are physically 
capable of working. 
In Poland regional variations in ben-
efits are geared to the state of the local 
labour market, with shorter maximum 
duration of benefit in regions where 
unemployment is below the national 
average, longer duration where condi-
tions are worse. Slovenia has aligned 
the conditions for access to insurance 
and assistance benefits, at the same time 
as extending the maximum duration of 
unemployment benefits from 6 to 12 
months for low income groups at the 
expense of reducing longer-term receipt 
by other groups. Relatively lenient re-
qualification conditions in Slovenia 
allow jobseekers to take potentially 
unstable types of employment without 
necessarily risking loss of all of their 
entitlement record should the employ-
ment end quickly. 
Other major activities to help benefit 
recipients into work have included 
improvement of the links between ben-
efit agencies and labour offices, and 
some improvement of the operation of 
the offices themselves, subsidies to 
employers, and training and public 
work schemes. The hitherto poor opera-
tion of labour offices particularly 
affected those most affected by unem-
ployment, that is women, the young and 
the unskilled. These offices have begun 
to deploy new but simple methods of 
supporting the long-term and harder-to-
place unemployed, for example by pro-
viding information on local labour mar-
ket needs and opportunities to train to 
meet them. 
The reduction or waiving of social insur-
ance contributions for employers recruit-
ing from among the long-term unem-
ployed was significantly expanded in 
1997. In Hungary the level of subsidy 
varies according to the length of unem-
ployment or recruitment from target 
groups such as the young. Slovenian 
employers who recruit young people to 
their first job, and older people and those 
unemployed long term receive reim-
bursement of half of social security con-
tributions. Other subsidies and induce-
ments to employers include refunds for 
training costs, and direct wage subsidies 
such as those in place in Estonia, 
Romania and the Czech Republic where 
they are particularly focused on recruit-
ment and training of those leaving edu-
cation. Overall, spending on subsidised 
employment has increased from a third 
to more than half of total spending on 
active measures since 1997. 
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The value of training for younger and 
low-skilled unemployed people has 
gained wide recognition and can be sup-
ported by social protection policies. In 
Hungary entitlement to unemployment 
benefits for job-starters was withdrawn 
in 1996 and the resources saved redirect-
ed to training and work experience 
schemes for this group. Training 
allowances in the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania and Poland 
are set higher than benefit levels as an 
incentive to follow training programmes. 
Spending on, and in support of, training 
is generally eclipsed by other measures, 
particularly temporary public work pro-
grammes. These continue to be major 
but declining forms of labour market 
intervention, e.g. in Hungary and 
Poland. Financial supports for these pro-
grammes include exemption from social 
security contributions, and as the 
allowances paid under the schemes are 
often higher than benefit levels they can 
constitute an important source of income 
for those without entitlement to benefit. 
Little information is available yet on the 
effectiveness of the measures described. 
Training appears to have a positive 
impact on job prospects; wage subsidies 
and public works less so. Further devel-
opment is expected and the present 
financial surpluses in CEEC national 
labour market funds should, at least in 
principle, offer scope for further reduc-
tions in non-wage labour costs or 
increasing resources for active labour 
market programmes. 
Pensions 
The importance of reforming pen-sion systems to ensure safe and 
sustainable incomes for pensioners has 
long been recognised in the CEECs. 
Following a lengthy period of planning, 
against a background of political 
change and the urgent need to manage 
profound economic upheaval, a range 
of major reform projects is emerging. 
Most CEECs have recently legislated 
for, or implemented, major pension 
reforms, or soon will. There is a great 
diversity both in the precise nature of 
the arrangements adopted or planned, 
and in the state of development of dif-
ferent CEECs' reform processes. 
However, some common trends are evi-
dent in this diversity. The pay-as-you-
go (PAYG) principle is retained for 
financing basic compulsory pension 
provision in all of the CEECs, and 
changes to pension levels and retire-
ment age have been widely used to help 
contain growth in scheme expenditure. 
The reforms enacted thus far have typi-
cally involved broadening of the basis 
of provision with the introduction of an 
additional tier or tiers, and greater 
involvement of private sector providers. 
The background to reform 
These reforms have been driven in large 
part by the need for structural changes to 
accommodate the fundamental change 
in the organisation of economies, to 
meet changed individual expectations 
and political priorities, and in response 
to pressing fiscal imbalances. The need 
to ensure sound financing of pensions 
and avoid undue and unwanted burdens 
on public finances is familiar to all 
Table 6 — Estimated indicators for basic pension, 
Expenditure % 
of GDP (a) 
Bulgaria 
Czech Republic 
Estonia 
Hungary 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Poland 
Romania 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
7.5 
8.9 
7.3 
7.8 
10.7 
6.5 
14.3 
5.3 
8.2 
14.4 
1997 
Average gross pension % of 
average gross earnings (b) 
55.0 
45.3 
32.5 
27.4 
38.7 
31.3 
69.6 
30.2 
44.7 
42.7 
System dependency ratio 
(and inverse) (c) 
0.759 (1.32) 
0.503 (1.99) 
0.604 (1.66) 
0.593 (1.69) 
0.654 (1.53) 
0.708 (1.41) 
0.565 (1.77) 
0.689 (1.45) 
n.a. 
0.597 (1.68) 
Source: 'Monitoring the development of social protection reform in the CEECs 
Note: (a) Hungary 1994; (b) Hungary 1996; (c) Hungary 1996, Poland 1998. 
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Member States. However, the situation 
faced by CEECs has been more pressing 
by degrees for a number of reasons. 
An historical legacy of centralised 
pension schemes, which were typically 
funded chiefly by the employer or 
State agencies, left much of pension 
provision concentrated in the State 
sector with a strong and direct link to 
public finances. Estimates of the extent 
of pension spending as a percentage of 
GDP in 1997 are given in Table 6. 
There is a considerable spread, with 
the higher figures comparable to the 
higher figures for EU Member States, 
e.g. Poland and Slovenia show a total 
expenditure of more than 14 % of 
GDP, and the lower ones clearly below 
EU average. 
The average level of gross basic pen-
sions relative to average gross earnings 
is comparatively high with the majori-
ty of CEECs having figures close to or 
exceeding 40 %. System dependency 
ratios are also high. The estimates of 
system dependency ratio in Table 6 
show that only the Czech Republic has 
close to two contributors for each pen-
sioner, whereas the other CEECs have 
closer to one and a half, or worse. 
Ratios of this order can have a number 
of causes. Mass unemployment, con-
tribution avoidance, and strong growth 
in informal and undeclared working 
have all depressed contributor num-
bers. At the same time there are rela-
tively many pensioners. Historically 
high levels of employment for men and 
women have translated quite simply to 
high numbers qualifying for a pension, 
and retirement ages in the CEECs tend 
to be low compared with elsewhere. 
Added to this, demographic ageing is 
predicted for all of the CEECs, 
although at widely differing rates. 
Basic pensions 
The Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania and Poland have all 
already legislated for major reform of 
their basic pension schemes, and 
Slovenia is expected to do so before the 
end of 1999 as part of a comprehensive 
reform of pension provision there. 
Proposals for further reforms are under 
consideration in Bulgaria, Romania and 
Slovakia. 
Despite great variety in the detail of the 
provisions chosen, there are some clear 
similarities in the approach to basic 
pension provision in the CEECs. 
Without exception compulsory PAYG 
regimes have been retained for the 
financing of first tier pensions, and all 
the CEECs have either separated the 
pension fund from State budgets or 
established a discrete account within 
the State budget. These schemes are 
organised on a defined benefit basis 
with the exception of Latvia and 
Poland where reforms have seen the 
introduction of PAYG-financed defined 
contribution first tier pensions employ-
ing individual contributor accounts. All 
reforms have seen the introduction of 
price indexation, with the exception of 
Hungary which has chosen to index 
pensions with regard to prices and 
earnings. 
The interesting departure by Latvia and 
Poland in establishing defined contribu-
tion schemes serves to strengthen and 
make more explicit the link between 
contributions and benefits, a feature 
more typical of second and subsequent 
tier provision. Other CEECs are begin-
ning to explore ways of achieving such 
a stronger link, for example by extend-
ing the period over which qualifying 
contributions must be paid, or by iden-
tifying or introducing an earnings-
related component in defined ben-
efit schemes as will be introduced 
in Estonia in 2000. 
Increased transparency of this kind 
holds particular advantages in the 
attempt to secure the funding of first tier 
schemes. Making the level of benefit to 
be expected clearly contingent on con-
tributions is a strong aid to improving 
contribution compliance, and tackling 
contribution avoidance by the insured 
and employers is an important goal for 
all of the CEECs. It also helps to change 
contributors' attitudes towards an accep-
tance of the need to shift increasingly 
from an historic emphasis on employer 
contributions towards a greater one on 
employee contributions as the main 
source of scheme revenue. This change 
of emphasis is under way to some 
degree in most of the CEECs, notably in 
Latvia and Hungary. 
Another important trend driven by the 
need to ensure sustainable basic pen-
sion provision in the face of demo-
graphic ageing and generally low pen-
sion ages, but also with clear implica-
tions for supplementary provision, is 
the increasing of effective retirement 
ages across the CEECs. The simplest 
and most common approach here is a 
gradual increase in the minimum age 
at which basic pension can be paid. 
Some CEECs, for example Lithuania, 
have chosen to retain different pension 
ages for men and women, whereas 
others, e.g. Estonia, Hungary and 
Latvia, have taken the opportunity to 
equalise them. Reform proposals in 
Slovenia envisage partially closing the 
gap between male and female first tier 
pension ages at the same time as 
adjusting the pension calculation so 
that women are not disadvantaged by 
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virtue of their shorter maximum poss-
ible contribution history. The 
approach embraced by Latvia and 
Poland described above also holds the 
potential to increase effective retire-
ment age by influencing behaviour 
through an inverse link between the 
level of pension available at minimum 
pension age and life expectancy. 
Supplementary pensions 
The potential that supplementing the 
basic PAYG pensions with one or more 
tiers of additional provision can hold 
for helping to ensure sustainability of 
pensions has been universally recog-
nised. All of the CEECs have either 
implemented new schemes or are in the 
process of legislating or planning them. 
There is diversity between the CEECs 
in what has been done or is envisaged, 
covering both compulsory and volun-
tary 'second tier' supplementary pen-
sion schemes, and 'third tier' private 
pensions. However, the schemes that 
have been introduced all have in com-
mon fully-funded financing and indi-
vidual accounts for pension holders. 
Compulsory supplementary pension 
schemes have been established as an 
element of wider pension reforms in 
Hungary (1998) and in Poland (1999). 
The new scheme is compulsory for all 
new workers in both countries and for 
those aged less than 30 years in Poland. 
Joining the scheme is optional up to a 
maximum age limit which stands at 47 
in Hungary and 50 in Poland. Proposals 
for compulsory provision are in hand or 
under discussion in Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Latvia, Romania, Slovakia and 
Slovenia. Both the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia have voluntary supplementary 
schemes in place, the Czech scheme 
being funded by a mixture of contribu-
tions and State subsidy. A legislative 
framework governing the provision and 
regulation of 'third tier' private pen-
sions has already been put in place in 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and in 
Hungary as part of a three tier system 
which was introduced in 1998 and 
which is now the subject of early evalu-
ation. Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia and Slovenia all have plans or 
proposals to enable third tier provision. 
The scale and pace of transition to 
new forms of pension provision have 
accentuated certain impacts of change. 
Despite the introduction of new sup-
plementary schemes, compulsory or 
not, the well-being of the former 
PAYG schemes remains vital for the 
support of many pensioners and older 
pension holders who may not be able 
to benefit from the new arrangements. 
There is already a trend across CEECs 
to attempt to stabilise typically high 
contribution rates. Where, as in Hungary 
and Poland, an element of con-
tributions made is in effect diverted to 
the compulsory supplementary 
scheme the revenue base of the PAYG 
schemes shrinks. In Hungary the 
resulting deficit has so far been under-
written by government, and Poland is 
also considering supporting this cost 
of transition from State revenues. 
Among the factors influencing the 
eventual extent of potential PAYG 
deficits are the numbers and behaviour 
over time of those who can exercise a 
choice of scheme. Predicting this will 
be important for other CEECs who are 
presently considering an effective 
reduction of contributions to PAYG 
schemes in this way. 
The new schemes also place new 
demands on administrative and institu-
tional structures, which CEECs are 
striving to meet. The ability to operate 
individual pension holder accounts 
effectively, whether within basic PAYG 
or funded supplementary schemes, 
requires suitable management and infor-
mation systems. Developing these car-
ries costs, in terms of both initial invest-
ment in development and the impact on 
administrative running costs. The suc-
cess of the apparent trend towards 
including at least an element funded of 
provision clearly depends on access to 
sufficiently robust and well-regulated 
financial markets and services. These 
can in turn be enhanced by the arrival of 
pension funds as institutional investors, 
48. Demographic dependency ratios, 1998 and 2020 (+ 60/20-59) 
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Source: 'Monitoring the development of social protection reform in the CEECs'. 
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as appears to be the case from increasing 
demand for investment instruments in 
Poland's capital markets. 
Health care 
Over the past decade all of the CEECs have been engaged in 
reforms directed at securing sustainable 
financing of health care, more precise 
control of costs, and rationalisation of 
services and the organisation of their 
providers. The different countries are at 
different points in the reform process, 
for example, in the course of 1999 both 
Bulgaria and Romania introduced 
major reforms to the funding of health 
care, while the Czech Republic and 
Poland embarked on significant pro-
grammes consolidating and building on 
earlier reforms. Some issues of com-
mon interest and responses to them are 
outlined below. 
Before looking at specific areas of 
reform it is worth considering the cir-
cumstances under which these health-
care systems must operate and develop. 
Economic development has a clear bear-
ing on the levels of spending on health 
care that are possible, with countries 
with higher GDP per capita generally 
able to spend a proportionately greater 
share of that GDP on health care. 
Conversely, where the economic capaci-
ty is relatively lower, the availability of 
funding is likely to bear more critically 
upon the development of services. Table 
7 gives estimates comparing health-care 
spending with GDP in the CEECs for 
1997, alongside an index of per capita 
GDP. This shows a considerable spread 
both in GDP and the share apportioned 
to health care. The figures given should 
be treated with a degree of caution as 
they do not include unofficial or illegal 
contributions to the cost of health care, 
which can be substantial. 
The general health and longevity of 
individuals, and the potential impact on 
them of poor socioeconomic condi-
tions, are important factors in the evolu-
tion of health care in the developing 
economies of the CEECs. The interrela-
tion with social conditions is considered 
later. Estimates of life expectancy at 
birth are given in Table 7. 
Financing 
The insurance principle has been adopt-
ed in all of the CEECs, at least partially 
separating the financing of health care 
from its erstwhile reliance on direct State 
funding. The two most recently intro-
duced schemes are the Bulgarian 
National Health Insurance Fund and 
Romania's Social Health Insurance 
System, launched in March and April of 
1999 respectively. At the beginning of 
the same year Poland began implemen-
tation of reforms to strengthen the health 
insurance system, alongside a major 
overhaul of social insurance and public 
administration. In the Czech Republic a 
plan to consolidate the health-care sys-
tem has been adopted which includes 
proposals to underpin the operation of 
funding mechanisms. 
Health insurance contributions 
totalling some 13 % of earnings are 
shared by both worker and employer in 
Table 7 — Relative GDP per capita, health spending as a percentage of GDP and life expectancies at birth 
Bulgaria 
Czech Republic 
Estonia 
Hungary 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Poland 
Romania 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
GDP per capita 
where Latvia = 1 
1.4 
3.3 
1.2 
2.7 
1.0 
1.2 
2.3 
1.2 
2.2 
3.8 
Health spending % 
of GDP 
3.5 
7.2 
6.1 
6.7 
4.5 
4.7 
5.0 
2.8 
7.1 
7.8 
Life expectancy at birth 
M 
67.2 
70.5 
64.7 
66.1 
63.0 
65.1 
68.2 
65.0 
68.4 
71.2 
F 
74.4 
77.6 
75.9 
74.9 
74.5 
76.1 
76.6 
73.0 
76.5 
79.0 
Source: 'Monitoring the development of social protection reform in the CEECs.' 
Note: Data are for 1997 or for the most recent year for which reliable information is available. GDP and spending figures do not include illegal payments. 
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the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, 
Slovakia and Slovenia, with an empha-
sis on employer contributions except 
for Slovenia where they are equal. 
Latvia is moving towards similarly 
equalised contributions. In Estonia and 
Poland contributions are paid solely by 
the employer or employee respectively. 
Lithuania supports a low employer 
contribution of 3 % with an earmarked 
30 % of income tax receipts. 
Contribution rates are being finalised in 
Bulgaria and Romania. 
All of the CEECs have introduced 
charges on patients towards drug 
costs. In the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and 
Romania patients are also required to 
pay towards treatment costs, particu-
larly in primary care or for specified 
treatments. These charges are typ-
ically nominal, but in Latvia they can 
be 25 % of cost of basic care, and in 
Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia the 
whole cost of certain services is 
demanded. Charges are to an extent 
replacing unofficial payments to prac-
titioners, a hangover from the old sys-
tems, but they can also be an impor-
tant contribution to overall funding, 
e.g. in Latvia nearly a third of spend-
ing is from sources outside health 
insurance scheme. 
Membership of the insurance schemes 
is open to all in principle. Those who 
are not in a position to contribute, for 
example the unemployed and retired, 
are generally supported through contri-
butions underwritten by the State, 
although other arrangements have been 
introduced such as in Latvia where the 
uninsured are directly financed on a 
separate track. Other areas where State 
support or subsidy continues across the 
CEECs include meeting the costs of 
new or expensive treatments excluded 
from insurance and of health promo-
tion and public health activities, and 
contributing to the capital costs of 
estates and equipment. Regimes of 
resource-based budgeting for these 
capital costs are under development, 
e.g. in Poland, in an attempt to avoid 
distortions in the distribution of facili-
ties and the quality of service they are 
equipped to provide. 
Contributions are collected from pay-
roll with income taxes, or, more trans-
parently, alone or with other social con-
tributions. Whatever the method, diffi-
culties with contribution collection and 
compliance have contributed to some 
significant deficits in health insurance 
funds. Reasons for failed collection 
include simple employer debt and 
insolvency, an increase in the complex-
ity and cost of assessing and collecting 
contributions that has come with the 
relatively swift introduction of atypical 
working patterns on a large scale, and 
reported unscrupulous behaviour by 
employers exploiting the situation to 
lower the contributions paid. The 
approach taken in Poland has been to 
strengthen the incentive to pursue con-
tributions by withdrawing State under-
writing of fund equilibrium. 
It is widely recognised among the 
CEECs that effective control over the 
costs of health care is essential to the 
sustainability of schemes, particularly 
given the general scarcity of resources, 
widespread deficits and difficulty col-
lecting contributions. Meeting this 
imperative has seen a trend towards the 
narrowing of the route of payment 
between funds and service providers to 
enable greater financial control. Some, 
e.g. Latvia, have achieved this with a 
straightforward 'single payer' arrange-
ment. Elsewhere a similar effect has 
been achieved by linking funds to a 
central fund (e.g. Estonia) or by limit-
ing the number of funds (Slovakia). 
Potentially costly fee-for-service pay-
ments to health-care providers have 
widely been replaced with mechanisms 
that embody greater control. 
Capitation-based funding has been 
adopted by the majority of CEECs, 
often combined with fee-for-service 
payments for secondary care to enable 
better targeting of resources on specif-
ic services. Points based systems have 
also been introduced as the main mech-
anism (Latvia) or in conjunction with 
capitation and fees (Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic). Other measures used in the 
drive to improve the management of 
costs include controls on the range and 
prices of services offered, on access to 
secondary care, and over the prescrib-
ing and referring behaviour of primary 
care practitioners. 
Provision 
and organisation 
Reforms of financing of health care 
have been accompanied by substantial 
change in the extent and organisation 
of health-care services. Graph 49 
shows significant reductions all round 
in bed counts since 1990 which have 
brought many CEECs much closer to 
levels to be found in the EU. Graph 50 
shows a similar approximation in prac-
titioner numbers. 
These indicators of capacity are cer-
tainly suggestive of movement towards 
levels compatible with more efficient 
service delivery. However, behind them 
lie the need for continuing develop-
ment of the quality and use of existing 
capacity. In particular there is a widely 
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acknowledged need for investment in 
capital equipment, not least for phar­
maceutical manufacture, and for the 
development of appropriately skilled 
and organised primary health­care ser­
vices. 
As part of a general political trend of 
decentralisation, the role of central 
government as a direct manager of 
service providers has been reduced in 
all CEECs. This process has involved 
the establishment of quasi­govern­
mental institutions, a greater involve­
ment of local government in manag­
ing health care, e.g. in Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and 
Poland, and increasing engagement of 
the private sector. 
Privatisations have been rapid and 
extensive, and of greatest importance 
in primary care and pharmacy ser­
vices, with provision of secondary 
and tertiary level care more frequent­
ly left in the public sector. 
Privatisation of the scale and pace 
seen has not been without difficulties. 
Experiences have included some loss 
of strategic control by central policy 
makers, at least temporarily, the cre­
ation of perverse incentives to shift 
costs from privatised primary care to 
public secondary care services, and 
problems with the feasibility of pri­
vatising large specialist hospitals. As 
part of a review of provision the 
Czech Republic has decided to sus­
pend the privatisation of a number of 
facilities which had been agreed by a 
previous administration. 
Reforms of health service financing 
and organisation in the CEECs have 
served to highlight the need for 
administrative and institutional 
capacity equal to the task of imple­
menting new regimes and running 
them successfully. This requires suit­
able management structures and 
information systems and a workforce 
competent in the disciplines needed to 
administer effectively the new kinds 
of devolved institutions and associat­
ed financial and contracting processes 
that are emerging. Some CEECs, e.g. 
Romania, are focusing urgently on 
these human resources' issues, but in 
general there is much yet to be done, 
and done in the face of competition 
from other employment sectors for 
staff with the required skills. 
Effectiveness of 
health-care systems 
In addition to being financed sustain­
ably and organised efficiently, health­
care systems must of course offer effec­
tive services to individuals who need 
them. Access to quality heath care for all 
is one of the four broad objectives iden­
tified in the recent Commission commu­
nication. It is difficult to gain a clear pic­
ture of the quality of services offered 
under schemes in the CEECs as out­
come and quality indicators are among 
the management tools that are in need of 
development, and little reliable informa­
tion is available. Measures of relative 
spending on health care, such as the esti­
mated percentage of GDP in Table 2, 
hold circumstantial evidence about the 
likely ability of CEECs to provide high 
quality facilities and services. 
The principle of universal access is 
accepted by all of the CEECs with lim­
ited exceptions (for example some 
classes of self­employed people in the 
Czech Republic are not covered by the 
main insurance scheme). The risk that 
introducing health insurance would 
reduce access to care has been coun­
49. Hospital beds per 1 000 of population, 1990 
and 1997 
50. Doctors and nurses per 1 000 of population, 1997 
­
■ 1990 
1997 
BG CZ EE HU LV LT PL HO SK SI 
ΞΙΞΙΞΙΞ,ΞΙΞΙΞ,ΞΙΞ, 
BG CZ EE HU LV LT PL RO SK SI 
Source: 'Monitoring the development of social protection reform in the CEECs' 
Note: Data are for 1997 or the most recent year for which reliable information is 
available. Data for 1990 derived. 
Source: 'Monitoring the development of social protection reform in the CEECs'. 
Note: Data are for 1997 or for the most recent year for which reliable information 
is available. 
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tered by State guarantees of participa-
tion in insurance for those who are not 
in a position to contribute. The levels of 
resources available clearly have a bear-
ing on actual access to care. 
Maintaining universal access in the face 
of severe pressure on finances has led to 
some definition or restriction of the 
range of services that are available to all 
the insured. Latvia has chosen to 
finance basic care for the uninsured 
direct from State funds. However good 
the range of basic services that can be 
offered, these restrictions carry the risk 
of real or perceived inequality in access 
to health care. This is an important con-
cern in the continuing reforms, along-
side other factors with potential to 
increase inequity such as the prevalence 
and extent of fees and other payments 
for care by patients in CEECs, and 
asymmetries in the geographical distri-
bution of health-care facilities. 
Adverse economic and social conditions 
not only affect access to health care and 
its quality, they also have a significant 
influence on demand for services. 
Deprivation, social inequalities and 
unemployment affect people's health, 
with those in lower socioeconomic posi-
tions suffering higher rates of death and 
morbidity. In the CEECs many indica-
tors of health worsened with increasing 
unemployment and social dislocation 
through the 1990s. The death rate from 
diseases of the circulation system has 
risen in CEECs to stand almost twice 
that in western Europe, and the rate of 
deaths from cancer is also significantly 
higher. These trends are accompanied 
by evidence of lifestyles detrimental to 
health. For example, in all of the CEECs 
more than a third of men smoke, in 
Poland and Lithuania more than a half 
do. There are of course other factors. 
Lifestyle risks such as smoking and 
alcohol abuse are only part of the wider 
complex of risks and deprivations that 
typifies social exclusion. Poor housing, 
environment, and education figure 
alongside material poverty in affecting 
individual well-being and the likely 
need for health-care services. 
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The two main sources of data used are 
the European System of Integrated 
Social Protection Statistics (Esspros) 
and the first two waves of the European 
Community Household Panel (ECHP). 
Data from the Community Labour 
Force Survey (LFS) are also used to 
examine employment and labour mar-
ket developments as well as changes in 
the structure of households. These three 
sources are described in turn below. 
Esspros 
The analysis of trends in expendi-ture on social protection in 
Chapter 3 is based on the revised 
Esspros classification. Data on this 
classification exist for all Member 
States, though for Greece, at the time of 
writing, only provisional figures were 
available for all the years. Moreover, 
only 6 of the 15 countries (Denmark, 
France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Austria 
and Sweden) were able to provide final 
data for 1996. For the other countries, 
the figures involve some estimation 
and some problems of comparability, as 
noted below. They are, therefore, sub-
ject to revision as more information 
becomes available. 
The core system, which covers social 
protection as conventionally under-
stood, 'encompasses all interventions 
from public or private bodies intended 
to relieve households and individuals 
of a defined set of risks or needs, pro-
vided that there is neither a reciprocal 
simultaneous nor an individual 
arrangement involved'. As such, it 
includes both the financing and provi-
sion of benefits (benefits in kind — 
which include not only the direct provi-
sion of goods or services but also the 
reimbursement of personal expenditure 
on specified goods and services — as 
well as cash transfers) and the related 
administrative costs. It also includes, in 
principle at least, benefits provided by 
employers to their employees, so long 
as these cannot reasonably be regarded 
as payment for work, such as payment 
of wages and salaries during periods of 
sickness or maternity, as well as pen-
sion schemes, however funded and 
nominally designated, where the princi-
ple of social solidarity applies, such as 
occupational, company and certain per-
sonal schemes. 
In practice, the expenditure included in 
Esspros depends ultimately on the data 
which Member States are able to pro-
vide and on how they apply the formal 
definitions when compiling these. 
Since, as noted, national statistical 
offices have limited experience as yet 
in complying with the revised conven-
tions, it is inevitable that there are dif-
ferences in the way that definitions 
have been interpreted in the initial data 
provided. In certain cases, therefore, 
the comparisons presented here need to 
be interpreted with caution and with 
due regard to the notes set out below. 
Over time, such differences ought to 
diminish in importance as experience is 
gained and as national systems of data 
collection adapt to the new conven-
tions. 
Problems of comparability also extend 
to the functional classification of ben-
efits which is intended to divide spend-
ing between the different needs which 
social protection is aimed at meeting. 
The broad functions, or areas of need, 
distinguished in the system are as fol-
lows: 
• sickness/health care: income mainte-
nance and support in cash in connec-
tion with physical or mental illness, 
excluding disability. Health care 
intended to maintain, restore or 
improve health irrespective of the 
origin of the ailment; 
• disability: income maintenance and 
support in cash or kind (except 
health care) in connection with the 
inability of people with physical or 
mental disabilities to engage in econ-
omic and social activities; 
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• old age: income maintenance and 
support in cash or kind (except 
health care) in connection with 
old age; 
• survivors: income maintenance and 
support in cash or kind in connec-
tion with the death of a family 
member; 
• family/children: support in cash or 
kind (except health care) in connec-
tion with the costs of pregnancy, 
childbirth and adoption, bringing 
up children and caring for other 
family members; 
• unemployment: income mainte-
nance and support in cash or kind in 
connection with unemployment; 
• housing: help towards the cost of 
housing; 
• social exclusion not elsewhere clas-
sified: benefits in cash or kind 
(except health care) specifically 
intended to combat social exclusion 
where they are not covered by one 
of the other functions. 
Since institutional arrangements for 
delivering benefits in these areas differ 
markedly between countries and since 
a given type of benefit is often aimed 
at meeting more than one kind of need, 
it can be difficult for Member States to 
divide expenditure precisely between 
these different functions and they may, 
indeed, lack the detailed information 
to be able to do so. Early retirement 
pensions, for example, which may be 
given in part for labour market reasons 
and which to this extent ought to be 
partly classified to unemployment, are 
an important case in point. In practice, 
for some Member States, such expen-
diture is at least partly included under 
unemployment, in others, not at all, 
though it is hard to know whether this 
reflects genuine differences or merely 
statistical difficulties. 
The social exclusion category gives 
rise to a similar difficulty. In so far as 
this is intended to cover expenditure 
which is not primarily incurred under 
one of the other heads, the spending 
included in this function in any 
Member State might well be affected 
by practical problems of allocation, 
though again, it is hard to identify the 
extent to which this is the case. In addi-
tion, expenditure included in the unem-
ployment function should, in principle, 
encompass the provision of vocational 
training to those out of work, in so far 
as this is funded by public authorities. 
In practice, it is included in some coun-
tries but not in others. Similarly, it 
should exclude payments made to 
employers, in the form, for example, of 
job subsidies, but this is not always the 
case. These are further sources of diffi-
culty in comparing spending between 
Member States both under this head 
and in total. 
The analysis in Chapter 3, on the one 
hand, aggregates expenditure on old 
age and survivors, partly because of the 
potential difficulties of distinguishing 
consistently between the two, and, on 
the other hand, separates expenditure 
on health care (benefits in kind in the 
sickness/health-care function) from 
sickness benefits (cash transfers in the 
sickness/health-care function). Because 
of the comparability problems noted 
above, however, the analysis of the 
functional division — the pattern of 
social protection spending — should be 
interpreted as being indicative only. 
As emphasised in the text, the figures for 
expenditure are gross of any taxes or 
social charges levied on transfers, which 
are important in some countries and 
which reduce both the value of the ben-
efit to recipients and the effective cost to 
governments. They also exclude trans-
fers provided through tax concessions, 
rebates or allowances, which also vary 
in importance between countries, and to 
this extent understate the overall finan-
cing implications of social protection. 
For receipts, the data include contribu-
tions imputed to employers as well as 
actual social contributions. These are 
intended to reflect the costs to them of 
providing social benefits to their 
employees, other than through insurers 
or through a separate reserve. Since 
such benefits are included in expendi-
ture, the related need for financing has 
to be included in receipts. 
The main focus of the analysis in the 
text is on the period 1990 to 1996, for 
which reasonably consistent data are 
available for most Member States, 
though not all — data exist for Sweden 
only from 1993 and for Luxembourg 
only the aggregated figures by function 
are available. 
Germany 
Data in this report for Germany include 
the former East German Lander 
throughout. Since consolidated figures 
exist only from 1991, the figures for 
1990 have been estimated from the data 
for the former West Germany (specifi-
cally, the change for West Germany 
between 1990 and 1991 is applied to 
the 1991 figure for total Germany to 
derive an estimate for 1990 which is 
comparable to that for later years). This 
is also the case in respect of LFS data. 
United Kingdom 
Esspros data for the UK are on a finan-
cial year basis (i.e. April to March) 
rather than a calendar year one as for 
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other countries. Figures for GDP and 
for the relevant price indices have been 
adjusted approximately to the same 
basis when calculating expenditure rel-
ative to GDP and changes in real terms. 
European Union 
Figures for the European Union relate 
to total expenditure in the Member 
States indicated relative to total GDP 
in these countries or to population or 
are weighted averages of changes in 
Member States (where the weights are 
expenditure in the base year). 
GDP 
The GDP figures used in the report 
with which the expenditure data are 
compared are the latest available as of 
October 1999. 
PPS 
Expenditure is expressed in terms of 
the purchasing power standard (PPS), 
which takes account of differences in 
price levels between Member States 
(specifically of those of consumer 
goods and services), when making 
comparisons of the level of spending 
in different countries. For the Union 
as a whole, figures in terms of PPS 
are the same as Euro figures for 
households' final consumption 
expenditure. 
Country notes 
Denmark: Disability benefits include 
early retirement lump-sum benefits 
paid to those with a reduced capacity 
to work. Incomplete data exist to 
divide contributions of protected per-
sons between employees, the self-
employed and pensioners and other 
benefit recipients. They are allocated 
here wholly to employees, who are 
by far the largest contributors. 
Germany: Unemployment benefits 
exclude some wage subsidies paid to 
employers (which are included in 
Esspros) to encourage the employ-
ment of certain groups at risk on the 
labour market (amounting to around 
14 % of total spending on this item in 
1996). The new long-term care benefit 
introduced in 1995 is included partly 
in old age (accounting for around 2 % 
of spending on this item) and partly in 
disability (accounting for around 3 % 
of spending). 
France and Ireland: Old-age pensions 
exclude benefits to the disabled who 
have reached retirement age which are 
included in the disability function. 
Italy: Old-age pensions include early 
retirement benefits paid to those 
unable to find employment. 
Unemployment benefits include 
spending under the CIG (Cassa 
Integrazione Guadagni) paid to those 
on lay-off (amounting to some 21 % 
of expenditure on this item in 1996). 
Luxembourg: Data by function are 
available only for total expenditure 
on each — i.e. there is no breakdown 
between cash benefits and benefits in 
kind or between means-tested and 
non-means-tested benefits. The fig-
ures for health care, which are not 
separately distinguished from sick-
ness benefits in the Esspros data, are 
estimated on the basis of OECD data 
for public expenditure on health care 
(specifically, it is assumed that health 
care represents 85 % of total spend-
ing on the sickness function in each 
year) 
Austria: Unemployment benefits 
include some subsidies to employers 
(though these accounted for under 1 % 
of spending on this item). 
Portugal: 'Other expenditure', which is 
included in the total but not in the 
spending on benefits, includes transfers 
to institutions dealing with vocational 
training (IEFP and others) and for 
which the detailed information follow-
ing the Esspros classification is not 
available. Some or most of this would 
seem to belong to the unemployment 
function. 
Sweden: The unemployment function 
includes start-up benefits and place-
ment services and job-search assistance 
benefits. 
For more details on the Esspros data, 
see Esspros Manual 1996, Eurostat, 
1996 and Social protection expenditure 
and receipts, 1980-1996, Eurostat, 
1999. 
European Community 
Household Panel 
The ECHP is an annual survey of a 
representative panel of households and 
the individuals who live in them, cov-
ering a wide range of topics, including 
living conditions, employment status, 
health, education and, most import-
antly for the analysis in Chapter 4, 
income and the various sources from 
which it comes. The aim is to inter-
view the same households and individ-
uals over a number of consecutive 
years so that changes in their circum-
stances over time can be monitored. 
The survey is based on a harmonised 
questionnaire, drawn up by Eurostat, 
and subsequently adapted by the 
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national agencies responsible for col-
lecting data in each of the countries to 
take account of their own institutional 
features. 
The first two waves of the ECHP, 
which at the time of preparation of 
this report are the only two for which 
data are available, were conducted in 
1994 and 1995 in the 12 Member 
States which comprised the Union in 
the earlier year and covered some 
60 500 households in total (about 
170 000 individuals) and 5 000 or 
more in most Member States. (For a 
detailed description of the ECHP 
methodology, see The European 
Community Household Panel 
(ECHP): Volume 1 —Survey method-
ology and implementation, Eurostat, 
Luxembourg, 1996.) 
The ECHP was the source of the 
study carried out by the Centre for 
Social Policy of the University of 
Antwerp (UFSIA) on comparing 
social protection benefits and 
replacement rates for the 
Employment and Social Affairs DG, 
which is the basis of the analysis of 
unemployment replacements rates in 
Chapter 4. 
European Community 
Labour Force Survey 
The LFS, which is the basis for the 
analysis in Chapter 1, is also an annual 
survey of households, though the sam-
ple size is considerably larger than the 
ECHP. Conducted each year since 1983 
and covering all 15 Member States, it is 
focused more narrowly than the ECHP 
on employment issues and is similarly 
based on a common set of questions 
and definitions, so abstracting from 
national differences in methods of clas-
sification and institutional arrange-
ments. 
124 


European Commission 
Social protection in Europe 1999 
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities 
2000 — 124 pp. — 21 χ 29.7 cm 
ISBN 92-828-9346-4 
Price (excluding VAT) in Luxembourg: EUR 15 

Venta · Salg · Verkauf 
BELGIQUE/BELGIE 
Jean De Lannoy 
Avenue du Roi 202/Koningslaan 202 
B-1190 Bruxelles/Bruasel 
Tél. (32-2) 538 43 08 
Fax (32-2) 538 08 41 
E-mail: jean.de.lannoy@infoboard.be 
URL: http://www.jean-de-lannoy.be 
La librairie européenne/ 
De Europese Boekhandel 
Rue de la Loi 244/Wetstraat 244 
B-1040 Bruxelles/Brussel 
Tél. (32-2) 295 26 39 
Fax (32-2) 735 08 60 
E-mail: mall@libeurop.be 
URL: http://www.libeurop.be 
Moniteur beige/Belgisch Staatsblad 
Rue de Louvain 40-42/Leuvenseweg 40-42 
B-1000 Bruxelles/Brussel 
Tél. (32-2) 552 22 11 
Fax (32-2) 511 01 84 
E-mail: eusales@just.fgov.be 
DANMARK 
J. H. Schultz Information A/S 
Herstedvang 12 
DK-2620 Albertslund 
Tlf. (45) 43 63 23 00 
Fax (45) 43 63 19 69 
E-mail: schultz@schultz.dk 
URL: http://www.schultz.dk 
DEUTSCHLAND 
Bundesanzeiger Verlag GmbH 
Vertriebsabteilung 
Amsterdamer Straße 192 
D-50735 Köln 
Tel. (49-221)97 66 80 
Fax (49-221) 97 66 82 78 
E-Mail: vertrieb@bundesanzeiger.de 
URL: http://www.bundesanzeiger.de 
ΕΛΛΑΔΑ/GREECE 
G. C. Eleftheroudakls SA 
International Bookstore 
Panepistimlou 17 
GR-10564Athina 
Tel. (30-1) 331 41 80/1/2/3/4/5 
Fax (30-1) 323 98 21 
E-mail: elebooks@netor.gr 
ESPANA 
Boletín Oficiai del Estado 
Trafalgar, 27 
E-28071 Madrid 
Tel. (34)915 38 21 11 (libros), 
913 84 17 15 (suscripción) 
Fax (34) 915 38 21 21 (libros), 
913 84 17 14 (suscripción) 
E-mall: clientes@com.boe.es 
URL: http://www.boe.es 
Mundi Prensa Libros, SA 
Castellò, 37 
E-28001 Madrid 
Tel. (34) 914 36 37 00 
Fax (34) 915 75 39 98 
E-mail: llbrerla@mundiprensa.es 
URL: http://www.mundiprensa.com 
FRANCE 
Journal officiel 
Service des publications des CE 
26, rue Desaix 
F-75727 Paris Cedex 15 
Tél. (33)140 58 77 31 
Fax (33) 140 58 77 00 
E-mail: europublications@joumal-offlciel.gouv.fr 
URL: http://www.journal-officiel.gouv.fr 
IRELAND 
Alan Hanna's Bookshop 
270 LR Rathmines Road 
Dublin 6 
Tel. (353-1)496 73 98 
Fax ¡353-1) 496 02 28 
E-mail: hannas@iol.ie 
ITALIA 
Licosa SpA 
Via Duca di Calabria, 1/1 
Casella postale 552 
1-50125 Firenze 
Tel. (39) 055 64 83 1 
Fax (39) 055 64 12 57 
E-mail: licosa@licosa.com 
URL: http://www.licosa.com 
LUXEMBOURG 
Messageries du livre SARL 
5, rue Raiffeisen 
L-2411 Luxembourg 
Tél. (352)40 10 20 
Fax (352) 49 06 61 
E-mail: mail@mdl.lu 
URL: http://www.mdl.lu 
NEDERLAND 
SDU Servicecentrum Uitgevers 
Christoffel Plantijnstraat 2 
Postbus 20014 
2500 EA Den Haag 
Tel. (31-70)378 98 80 
Fax (31-70) 378 97 83 
E-mail: sdu@sdu.nl 
URL: http://www.sdu.nl 
Πωλήσεις · Sales · Vente · Vendita · Verkoop · Venda · Myynti · Försäljning 
http://eur-op.eu.int/general/en/s-ad.htm 
OSTERREICH 
PORTUGAL 
ISLAND 
Bokabud Larusar Blöndal 
Skolavördustig, 2 
IS-101 Reykjavik 
Tel. (354) 552 55 40 
Fax(354)552 55 60 
E-mail: bokabud@simnet.is 
NORGE 
Euro Info Center Schweiz 
c/o OSEC 
Stampfenbachstraße 85 
PF 492 
CH-8035 Zürich 
Tel. (41-1)365 53 15 
Fax (41-1) 365 54 11 
E-mail: eics@osec.ch 
URL: http://www.osec.ch/eics 
BALGARIJA 
Europress Euromedia Ltd 
59, blvd Vitosha 
BG-1000 Sofia 
Tel. (359-2) 980 37 66 
Fax (359-2) 980 42 30 
E-mail: Milena@mbox.clt.bg 
CESKÁ REPUBLIKA 
USIS 
odd. Publikaci 
Havelkova 22 
CZ-130 00Praha3 
Tel. (420-2)24 23 14 86 
Fax (420-2) 24 23 11 14 
E-mail: publikace@usiscr.cz 
URL: http://www.usiscr.cz 
CYPRUS 
EESTI 
Manz'sche Verlags- und 
Universitätsbuchhandlung GmbH 
Kohlmarkt 16 
A-1014Wien 
Tel. (43-1)53 16 11 00 
Fax (43-1) 53 16 11 67 
E-Mail: manz@schwinge.at 
URL: http://www.manz.at 
Eesti Kaubandus-Tööstuskoda 
(Estonian Chamber of Commerce and Industry) 
Toom-Kooll 17 
EE-0001 Tallinn 
Tel. (372) 646 02 44 
Fax(372)646 02 45 
E-mail: elnfo@koda.ee 
URL: http://www.koda.ee 
HRVATSKA 
Distribuidora de Livros Bertrand Ld.a 
Grupo Bertrand, SA 
Rua das Terras dos Vales, 4-A 
Apartado 60037 
P-2700 Amadora 
Tel.(351)214 95 87 87 
Fax (351) 214 96 02 55 
E-mail: dlb@ip.pt 
Imprensa Nacional-Casa da Moeda, SA 
Sector de Publicações Oficiais 
Rua da Escola Politécnica, 135 
P-1250-100 Lisboa Codex 
Tel.(351)213 94 57 00 
Fax (351) 213 94 57 50 
E-mail: spoce@incm.pt 
URL: http://www.incm.pt 
SUOMI/FINLAND 
Akateeminen Kirjakauppa/ 
Akademiska Bokhandeln 
Keskuskatu 1/Centralgalan 1 
PL/PB 128 
FIN-00101 Helsinki/Helsingfors 
P./tfn (358-9) 121 44 18 
F./fax (358-9) 121 44 35 
Sähköposti: sps@akateeminen.com 
URL: http://www.akateeminen.com 
SVERIGE 
BTJ AB 
Traktorvägen 11-13 
S-221 82 Lund 
Tlf. (46-46)18 00 00 
Fax (46-46) 30 79 47 
E-post: btjeu-pub@btj.se 
URL: http://www.btj.se 
UNITED KINGDOM 
The Stationery Office Ltd 
Customer Services 
PO Box 29 
Norwich NR3 1GN 
Tel. (44) 870 60 05-522 
Fax (44) 870 60 05-533 
E-mail: book.orders@theso.co.uk 
URL: http://www.itsofficial.net 
Mediatrade Ltd 
Pavia Hatza 1 
HR-10000 Zagreb 
Tel. (385-1)481 94 11 
Fax (385-1) 481 94 11 
MAGYARORSZAG 
Euro Info Service 
Expo tér 1 
Hungexpo Europa Központ 
PO Box 44 
H-1101 Budapest 
Tel. (36-1)264 82 70 
Fax (36-1) 264 82 75 
E-mail: euroinfo@euroinfo.hu 
URL: http://www.euroinfo.hu 
MALTA 
Miller Distributors Ltd 
Malta International Airport 
PO Box 25 
Luqa LQA 05 
Tel. (356) 66 44 88 
Fax (356) 67 67 99 
E-mail: gwirth@usa.net 
POLSKA 
Ars Polona 
Krakowskie Przedmiescie 7 
Skr. pocztowa 1001 
PL-00-950 Warszawa 
Tel. (48-22)82612 01 
Fax (48-22) 826 62 40 
E-mail: books119@arspolona.com.pl 
ROMANIA 
Euromedia 
Str.Dr. Marcovici, 9, sector 1 
RO-70749 Bucuresti 
Tel. (40-1)315 44 03 
Fax (40-1) 315 44 03 
E-mail: euromedia@mailcity.com 
ROSSIYA 
CCEC 
60-letiya Oktyabrya Av. 9 
117312 Moscow 
Tel. (7-095) 135 52 27 
Fax (7-095) 135 52 27 
SLOVAKIA 
Centrum VTI SR 
Nám. Slobody, 19 
SK-81223 Bratislava 
Tel. (421-7)54 41 83 64 
Fax (421-7) 54 41 83 64 
E-mail: europ@tbb1.sltk.stuba.sk 
URL: http://www.sltk.stuba.sk 
Swets Blackwell AS 
Østenjoveien 18 
Boks 6512 Etterstad 
N-0606 Oslo 
Tel. (47-22) 97 45 00 
Fax (47-22) 97 45 45 
E-mail: info @ no.swetsblackwell.com 
SCHWEIZ/SUISSE/SVIZZERA 
SLOVENIJA 
Gospodarski Vestnik 
Dunajska cesta 5 
SLO-1000 Ljubljana 
Tel.(386)613 09 16 40 
Fax (386) 613 09 16 45 
E-mail: europ@gvestnik.si 
URL: http://www.gvestnik.si 
TURKIYE 
Diinya Infotel AS 
100, Yil Mahallessi 34440 
TR-80050 Bagcilar-lstanbul 
Tel. (90­212)629 46 89 
Fax (90-212) 629 46 27 
E-mail: infotel@dunya-gazete.com.tr 
ARGENTINA 
World Publications SA 
Av. Cordoba 1877 
C1120 AAA Buenos Aires 
Tel. (54-11)481581 56 
Fax (54-11)48 15 81 56 
E-mail: wpbooks@infovia.com.ar 
URL: http://www.wpbooks.com.ar 
AUSTRALIA 
Hunter Publications 
PO Box 404 
3067 Abbotsford, Victoria 
Tel. (61-3)94 17 53 61 
Fax (61-3) 94 19 71 54 
E-mail: jpdavies@ozemail.com.au 
CANADA 
Cyprus Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry 
PO Box 21455 
CY-1509 Nicosia 
Tel. (357-2) 88 97 52 
Fax (357-2) 66 10 44 
E-mail: demetrap@ccci.org.cy 
Les éditions La Liberté Inc. 
3020, chemin Sainte-Foy 
G1X 3V6 Sainte-Foy, Québec 
Tel. (1-418)658 37 63 
Fax (1-800) 567 54 49 
E-mail: liberte ©mediom.qc.ca 
Runoili Publishing Co. Ltd 
5369 Chemin Canotek Road Unit 1 
KU 9J3 Ottawa, Ontario 
Tel. (1-613)745 26 65 
Fax (1-613) 745 76 60 
E-mail: order.dept@renoufbooks.com 
URL: http://www.renoufbooks.com 
EGYPT 
The Middle East Observer 
41 Sherif Street 
Cairo 
Tel. (20-2)392 69 19 
Fax (20-2) 393 97 32 
E-mail: inquiry@meobserver.com 
URL: http://www.meobserver.com.eg 
INDIA 
EBIC India 
3rd Floor, Y. B. Chavan Centre 
Gen. J. Bhosale Marg. 
400 021 Mumbai 
Tel. (91­22)282 60 64 
Fax (91-22) 285 45 64 
Ε-mall: ebic@glasbm01 .vsnl.net.in 
URL: http://www.ebicindia.com 
JAPAN 
PSI-Japan 
Asahi Sanbancho Plaza #206 
7-1 Sanbancho, Chiyoda-ku 
Tokyo 102 
Tel. (81-3)32 34 69 21 
Fax (81-3) 32 34 69 15 
E-mail: books@psi-japan.co.jp 
URL: http://www.psi-japan.co.jp 
MALAYSIA 
EBIC Malaysia 
Suite 45.02, Level 45 
Plaza MBf (Letter Box 45) 
8 Jalan Yap Kwan Seng 
50450 Kuala Lumpur 
Tel. (60-3) 21 62 62 98 
Fax (60-3) 21 62 61 98 
E-mail: ebic-kl@mol.net.my 
MEXICO 
Mundi Prensa México, SA de CV 
Río Panuco, 141 
Colonia Cuauhtemoc 
MX-06500 México, DF 
Tel. (52-5) 533 56 58 
Fax (52-5) 514 67 99 
E-mail: 101545.2361 ©compuserve.com 
PHILIPPINES 
EBIC Philippines 
19th Floor, PS Bank Tower 
Sen. Gil J. Puyat Ave. cor. Tindalo St. 
Makati City 
Metro Manilla 
Tel. (63-2) 759 66 80 
Fax (63-2) 759 66 90 
E-mall: eccpcom@globe.com.ph 
URL: http://www.eccp.com 
SOUTH AFRICA 
Eurochamber of Commerce in South Africa 
PO Box 781738 
2146 Sandten 
Tel. (27-11)884 39 52 
Fax (27-11)883 55 73 
E-mail: info@eurochamber.co.za 
SOUTH KOREA 
The European Union Chamber 
of Commerce in Korea 
5th Fl, The Shilla Hotel 
202, Jangchung-dong 2 Ga, Chung-ku 
100-392 Seoul 
Tel. (82-2) 22 53-5631/4 
Fax (82-2) 22 53-5635/6 
E-mail: eucck@eucck.org 
URL: http://www.eucck.org 
SRI LANKA 
EBIC Sri Lanka 
Trans Asia Hotel 
115 Sir chittampalam 
A. Gardiner Mawatha 
Colombo 2 
Tel. (94-1)074 71 50 78 
Fax (94-1) 44 87 79 
E-mail: ebicsl@itmin.com 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
Bernan Associates 
4611-F Assembly Drive 
Lanham MD20706 
Tel. (1-800) 274 44 47 (toll free telephone) 
Fax (1-800) 865 34 50 (toll free fax) 
E-mail: query@beman.com 
URL: http://www.bernan.com 
ANDERE LANDER/OTHER COUNTRIES/ 
AUTRES PAYS 
Bitte wenden Sie sich an ein Büro Ihrer 
Wahl/Please contact the sales office of 
your cholce/Veuillez vous adresser au 
bureau de vente de votre choix 
Office for Officiai Publications of the European 
Communities 
2, rue Mercier 
L-2985 Luxembourg 
Tel. (352) 29 29-42455 
Fax (352) 29 29-42758 
E-mail: info.lnfo@cec.eu.int 
URL: http://eur-op.eu.int 
9/2000 
n m 
ι 
M 
<_π 
I 
UD ι 
ΙΌ 
J> 
O 
-ζ. 
Subscribe to the 'Employment & social affairs' series! 
Price in Luxembourg (excluding VAT): 
Annual subscription (12 issues) 
Price per issue 
EUR 150 
EUR 15 
These publications include the annual reports produced by the Employment and Social Affairs DG, such as 
'Employment in Europe' and 'Equal opportunities for women and men in the European Union', and other key 
documents on the subjects of 'Employment and European Social Fund', 'Equality between women and men', 
'Health and safety at work', 'Social security and social integration', 'Industrial relations and industrial change ', 
and 'Fundamental rights and anti-discrimination'. 
Please send all orders to the sales office of your choice (see addresses overleaf or http.ileur-op.euJnt). 
This publication is not part of the above subscription. 
Price (excluding VAT) in Luxembourg: EUR 15 
OFFICE FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS 
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
L-2985 Luxembourg 
